*1 in- must be manifest and shown to have made provisions. fluenced its The further said: court “A grounded necessarily slight, belief on however evidence, perception involves faculties exercise mental reason; where is the matter how case, no imperfect may reasoning process be, or how erroneous conclusion it is reached, insane delusion.” not
Although appellant testified her and af- love disrupted, fection for her had father never been she estranged parents admitted that was she both period years. estrangement attributed She 3% message to a her sent her but the contents of father, message Appellant such estranged were revealed. was also during year
from her father the last of his Shortly life. July, after Mrs. Carruth suffered a stroke in appellant quarrel her father had physical ended encounter and she thereafter refused shortly to visit her until father before his death. There gift among her father those sent to his she household at Christmastime in 1948. Other incidents could be related which, those amount to named, some daughter’s evidence that testator’s statements as to his wholly imagi- affection toward him were not false and nary. The evidence as a does not whole warrant provisions prompted conclusion that the of the will were by an insane delusion. judgment is affirmed. Company
Lion Oil v. Marsh.
4-9887 249 W. 2d 569 S.
Opinion delivered June Rehearing denied 30, 1952. June *2 appellant. S for Allen, Davis
Lindsay Walden, P. and John William E. Rentfro appellee. Shachleford, M. dispute litigation This arises ont of labor J. Ward, appellant employees, and involves the
between and its picket said while employment liti- force effect. The was still full gation manner set out court in the arose and came below. organized corporation
Appellant, laws under the Arkansas, do and authorized to business of Delaware engaged, along with other business extensive activities, operating plant County, a chemical in Union Arkansas, sulphate prilled manufacture of am- ammonia, compounds. monium nitrate solutions and other chemical appears extensively used these substances are day opera- the manufacture of fertilizer. One of normal produce approximately sulphate tions will tons prilled ammonia, 400 tons ammonium tons nitrate, anhydrous of ammonium nitrate solutions and 120tons of ammonia. plant
There are about 600 at said and a large number of them are members Workers Oil International Union, C. I. referred to O., which hereafter be *3 Appellees
as Union. union- four member who were in made defendants suit this parties representing as class defendant union- all the employees. member On June 27th, 1947, the Union was by certified agent the National Labor Relations Board as the appellant employed by for all it from operation plant time to bargaining. time of its for collective April appellant On entered 29th, 1950, into a written agreement contract or writing, with. the Union. This pages transcript, which covers than more in the sets regulations regarding rights in detail out to arbitrate, changes, wages, classification work, hours of overtime, holiday pay, seniority, vacations, reduction of dis- forces, charges, physical safety union haz- examinations, dues, preamble ards, sickness, accidents other items. The “Agreement states that it is an between the Lion Oil Company . . . and Oil International Workers Union, ” provides: I.C. O. . . . Article I Agreement
“Term of agreement “This shall remain in full force and ef- period beginning fect 23, October and end- 1950, ing October 1951, thereafter 23, until canceled provided. manner hereinafter in Article agreement may “This canceled terminated subsequent Company the Union as of date following- by compliance to October with tbe procedure :
“(a) party agreement If either desires to to this notify agreement, amend the terms shall party writing other to that effect, its desire registered given prior mail. No notice shall such August days, period im- Within the mediately following receipt of said date notice -party Company to which notice is so delivered, attempt agree and the Union shall to the desired to this amendments
“(b) agreement respect If an with amendment agreement 60-day of this has not been reached within the period immediately pre- mentioned the sub-section ceding, party may agreement either terminate this there- ’ upon sixty days after than less written notice to the Any other. notice termination shall state the upon date which the termination of this shall be effective.” prior appellees,
Some time October 23rd, 1951, being wage dissatisfied de- effect, scale appellant hourly wage manded increase each employee equal plus to 25 cents differential of six cents *4 working evening for shift workers on the shift and 12 working midnight cents for a shift worker on shift, August pursuant provisions on and 24th, 1951, to the copied appellant [by writing Article I notified above, in registered mail] of its desire to amend the of terms agreement April No and was reached on employees began plant 30th, 1952, a strike at and picket established lines at all entrances. May appellant
On filed a 1st, suit in the Union Chancery against appellees, asking temporary Court a restraining enjoining appellees picketing. order from On following day appellant’s peti- the chancellor denied temporary restraining appellant for a tion order and appeal. prosecutes this appeal
In effect this case before ifas it were us sustaining an order of the lower court a demurrer only transcript complaint, contains because the to the agree- complaint to which is attached the verified chancellor. referred to above and the order of the ment complaint objection appellees that No is raised upon by properly presented to or acted not was properly appeal been that or this has chancellor, taken. complaint alleges heretofore set forth the facts calling alleges and estab- of the strike also that the
and lishing picket lines of said contract constitute breach approxi- agreement; picket that caused lines have mately employees it has work; to refuse' to already damaged dam- $50,000, in excess of been long as irreparable so age amount and increase will good it of its that will lose the continues; the strike states; and other located who are this customers allega- remedy adequate law. it has no All complaint, than and decla- other conclusions tions of the setting forth must be considered us law, rations complaint proven it into facts. The woven certain the allegations conspiracy part tending on the show many appellees representing other unions the Union representing large number similar throughout plants in violation of the United States phase monopoly state, of this statutes but this appeal since our de- considered on will not case unnecessary. makes cision agreement the written our conclusion by appellant legally binding into Union entered appellant upon far as it is en- and its so that the state, under the laws forceable appellees effect called a strike force and when full appellees have no above, mentioned on the date thereby prevent plant appellant’s picket its full *5 purpose imposing operations their for the demands wages, that the chancellor should have increased for restraining temporary order those issued point engaged picketing. out we We who were appellees, holding under the facts cir- not striking, could be restrained from this case, cumstances nothing distinguished picketing. in the There is as nothing agree- agreement, could in such an and there unless to work which could force the ment, they to do so. want been
The conclusions announced above have arrived thorough after after a con- much deliberation contrary arguments of the serious sideration which presented by appellees ably now have and which been we examine. Agreement hardly disputed in Force. It can agreement referred to in full above was force
when occurred, the strike as casual read- ing Appellees of Article set out I above show. could easily legal effected a cancellation by giving provided notice hut record therein, given. does this notice was terms show Since the provided agreement an automatic continuation appellees after on October burden 23rd, 1951, the was agreement by giving had terminated show required but this burden has notice, not been met. We it clear that if did make we not hold the picket time the force at the were established this lines entirely aspect. case would assume an different urged 2. Jurisdiction state courts. jurisdiction state courts have no the Federal in this matter because Labor-Management [commonly Act, 1947 Taft-Hartley placed juris- Act] called the exclusive diction in the federal and in courts the National Labor applies only Relations Board. This contention to cases involving Appellees, interstate commerce, this one does. quote excerpts from the last mentioned statute and from point, federal decisions to their sustain but we find nothing in the Act or the decisions that right jurisdiction denies here assume. we case Bethlehem Board, Steel v. New York Labor appears 330 U. S. S. Ct. 1026, L. Ed. 1234, hold that when the Federal has made com- administration prehensive regulations subject governing the matter of pass statutory the act then the states have no regulations subject regarding the same but this matter,
684 regula legislation or presents question state of
case tion. To holding of in the case is the effect the same 454, 70 S. 339 U. O’Brien, v. Workers Automobile United Amalgamated of the case 978, and 94 L. Ed. 781, S. Ct. S. Ct. 383, 71 Board, 340 U. S. v. Wisconsin Association find that the we other hand L. Ed. 364. 95 On 359, Federal courts expressly courts do that state held have jurisdiction of The ease situations. similar America Workers Electrical Radio & Machine United of Corporation, O.) Westinghouse (C. I. al. v. Electric et dispute Supp. arising under 65 F. involved 420, Norris-LaG-uardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act. These of have been amended acts, course, Taft-Hartley Act since this case but decided, language reasoning persuasive used are in this in question jurisdiction stance. The and, court of state was raised referring to the statutes first above mentioned, the
said:, nothing “However, there is in either statute that prohibits party either institution, involved in a controversy proceedings of this of character, in a state places jurisdiction or that court, exclusive in the federal ’’ courts. Amalga Bus Lines, the case of Southern Inc. v. Railway Ass’n Electric & Motor mated Street Coach Employees 2d al., et 38 America, 354, Miss. So. 765, Taft-Hartley years some after the Act decided two became approved finding reiterated and effective, court quoted Apparently Electrical case above. those United jurisdiction contesting did of state invoke Taft-Hartley good think for we Act, reason. understanding Taft-Hartley Act it From our does question jurisdiction, not deal with the but left that exactly question under former it was the two acts. as pointed might out that Moreover only and makes no mention with strikes Act deals picketing. jurisdic assumed
This heretofore court Dodge, Boyd in the cases Chan tion will seen Taylor, 2d cellor, 217 Ark. 234 S. W. Self recognize 2d 45. that these Ark. 235 S. W. We questions peace involve breaches cases of an Arkansas Amendment and violations Constitutional presented, cannot of the issue here be conclusive but persuasive *7 cited as of the fact that court has are [or not Act other fed- considered having act] eral clothed the federal courts with ex- jurisdiction. clusive purpose. 3. held in This court the case Unlawful Taylor, supra,
of did Self picket compel employer to in an effort to to agree shop. assigned to a closed The reason was that pressure employer so to exerted was coerce to contract in of Amendment violation 34 to No. the state commonly constitution called the Freedom to Work Appellees Amendment. here find no fault with that application insist but it has no decision, because picketing in the instant case is not done an unlawful appellees purpose. asking In other words are to make us picketing a distinction between to force a breach of a statutory law and force to a breach of a lawful hardly contract. We think it can be insisted, however, applying pur- that this court the rule of “unlawful pose” to phrase to in the the facts case meant to limit the Self facts set alone. agree appellees
We that the word “unlawful” ordinary applies in its connotation to the commission prohibited agree an act law, but we cannot that it. is say entirely proper to that it is to lawful this state pressure being Here breach contract. economic [resulting ap- exerted in substantial financial to losses pellant] acquire rights [higher wages] which under employment appellees the contract of were not entitled notwithstanding' receive; but this fact the method lawfully could which the demands have been asserted clearly agreement-for pro- set out in written parties. pointed tection all As courts out, heretofore enjoin in these circumstances, workers from not, striking, though may even such action the terms violate contract. But when a of a violation strike, fairly freely accompanied entered into,
by picketing deprives employer it substantial rights, although may not for be said action and, purpose forcing any statutory law, the violation of modify only purpose nullify its can be to that contract. relating to contracts business transactions are Lawful people all of all essential the welfare classes always always in- must hold them the courts have and relationships conception of contractual violate. This employer prosperity safety and the bulwark employee alike. express could not our
In this connection we better City expressed, in ideas of Greater than case al., Inc., et Y. S. Master Plumbers 6 N. Ass’n, Kahme very 2d similar were same issue and facts *8 arriving here. at the same involved there The as court following expressed part, used, conclusion we language: making agreement has
“The of a labor collective important goals of union labor been one of the most policy policy. as is a the court believes works that stabilizing advantage employers in much to the of the making employee in for a as to the labor conditions living, of and better standard is entitled to Murphy protection Ralph, of our courts. full parties N. Y. to a Misc. S. 270. collective 335, bargaining agreement protection entitled to such full equal elementary, ‘It is the court on an basis. come before yet requires emphasis, door of and sometimes employer open employee equity is alike. court of protect respecter persons keen to It is —it Schlesinger legal rights Quinto, of all.’ 117 Misc. page page 192 N. at 569. The com Y. S. bargain respective parties pliance to a collective agreement agreement entered ing with the terms approbation, their the court’s into them will receive will receive the con derelictions court’s violations and enforced, are made to be Contracts demnation. caprice party Mere thereto. whim broken at the be agreement willingly of an a term with dissatisfaction reason for the violation of insufficient into is entered of the that term the parties The fact one change does not to the a labor union legal principles. through has these trade Labor, unions, years fought recognition uphill for battle for an before equality dealing employers. Labor, courts rights jealous first of should it has achieved all, zealously guard them lest uncontrolled unbridled, part mem- unwise conduct on the of its some and/or may very thing it the which men even bers lose only have sacrificed their to achieve. Labor can lives progress being cognizant further achieve of the fact integral part orderly society that it is an governed of an processes of law and order. Labor must recognize processes. philosophy and should A right, these labor upon might theory disregard based philosophy of law and order, is unfortunate of re- gression consequences whose sole can be class disorder, hatred and intolerance*”
These considerations drive ns to the conclusion that purpose appellees, by establishing picket evidence great thereby causing appel- lines financial loss escape obligations legal was to lant, of a which were still in force. This mode of conduct never approbation chancery. received in a court of It cannot reasonably away urged holding taking so we are appellees any rights have under provisions of the federal *9 constitution because statutes, they they agreement under the terms of the could, are attempting given appellant days to have alter, 60 notice thereby placed position picket and themselves to with immunity. appears full Moreover it for unreasonable appellees right they to contend the here insist on is guaranteed pro- under the Act, because the just contrary. of that visions Act are to the Section (d) (4) provides that where there is a bar- collective gaining employer contract and readjustment bargaining for a shall not employer resort to expiration or the a strike to a lockout until the date the contract. Right speech. finally It is contended free enjoin appellees picketing
to from in this instance would by speech guaranteed' right deny them tbe of free be to 14th amendment to federal constitution. picketing is form a true that our courts held purview speech the constitu- within the comes deprived appellees them- but the answer tion, by days only] right period [for selves of entering a of 60 question of whether into the by deprive appellees definitely agreement in- themselves could right presented. see of this not here We deprive why they agreement logical could not reason right period, know themselves of this for a short we holding. it is understand of no decision In fact so we appellees had contained conceded that if the [dur- expressly binding appellees not to strike a clause binding. ing contract] have been the life of would right By conceding so must also concede time speech a limited or the free strike doing any bargained away to the can be violence without 14th amendment. given is reversed
For above the cause the reasons issue chancellor to remanded with directions to the complaint. temporary injunction prayed (dissenting). This Ed. F. MoFaddin, Justice “Lion”) (hereinafter appeal Company called Lion Oil temporary grant from the refusal of the Chancellor against injunction. May filed some Lion suit 1,1952, On enjoin employees, seeking of its them Only regular plant. served the Lion summons was days. notifying in 20 on each him to answer defendant, May day filing and without suit, On 2nd—one after applied application notice to of such defendants —Lion Chancery temporary restraining Judge order. for a temporary injunc- The Chancellor refused to issue appealed and Lion has from such refusal. tion, Riggs 2d 201 Ark. Hill, S. W. we quoted approval from 28 Am. the rule Jur. definitely recognized in this State:
“ refusing injunctive granting rests ‘The or relief judicial its trial and court, within the discretion the by sustained review the on an action matter will be power abused...” appellate has uot been the where court, it clear foregoing Applying bar, the rule to case the show that appeal, to is on Lion on the burden that, refusing grant to his discretion the Chancellor abused May most sin- temporary restraining I 2nd. on the order cerely sustained has not been that burden insist the tem- refused could have the Chancellor Lion, because any porary injunction each reasons,1 one of several range allowed of discretion within the of which was well good reason for such such case. One Chancellor in right injunction refusing temporary is the doubtful propose plaintiff prayed to show and I relief; of the grounds alleged right Lion on each of this doubtful for relief. Picketing Extremely that the Was I. Doubtful alleged Purpose”. complaint that “Unlawful purpose” it was strike “for an because unlawful the in was claiming that the strike was
breach of a contract. In injunc- purpose”, Lion that for an insists “unlawful against picketing under the been issued tion should have authority Taylor, Ark. W. 2d 45. 235 S. v. Self support. Taylor, affords Lion no But supra, case Self pointed picketing the workers out that were was shop, shop a closed made unlaw- for a closed Constitution, Amendment 34 to the Arkansas ful Legislature. Taylor, Act 101 the 1947Arkansas Self supra, relied cited and on Local v. 216 Ark. Asimos, and in Asimos 154; S. 2d the State and case, 227 W. catalogued holdings discussed detail, Federal were picketing- from them we deduced conclusion only (1) enjoined picketing when resulted can (2nd) when the is for an violence, unlawful purpose. There evidence of violence in the case at any forego discussion of of the Chancellor refuse temporary restraining defendants, lack order because of of notice (See seq. Stats.), et Ark. the decree in the case 32-201 since at bar § allegations complaint plaintiff recites “that of the and the application support affidavits fact stated in the porary for a tem restraining mentioned, order hereinbefore do not state facts plaintiff temporary restraining to a sufficient to entitle order as complaint”. decree, together prayed in This recital in the Court, arguments appellant’s counsel in oral in this statement of estab temporary did grant not base lish the Chancellor his refusal injunction lack of on notice. *11 690 phase passes of consideration. out law
bar, so that
of the
pur-
“unlawful
for an
Lion
the
claims that
strike was
pose”;
claiming,
mistakes
in
I
that Lion
but
so
insist
“wrong-
morally
maybe
“wrongful”.
“unlawful” for
during
contract,
of
ful”
life
its
for the union to strike
the
’’
of a contract.
but it
strike
violation
is not “unlawful
By
saying
the strike was
I am not
that
statement,
assuming
merely
such fact
the
I am
violation of
contract.
purpose
argument.
for the
of
“in
In
violation
law”.
State
“Unlawful”
of
means
Supreme
of
175 La.
Court
Bulot,
787,
142 So.
21,
Louisiana said that
term “unlawful” means “that
contrary
is not
to some
or that which is
lawful,
express provision
pur
law”,
“unlawful
pose”
purpose
doing something
for the
that is
means
prohibited by law.
I realize that
“unlawful”
the word
may
refer
sometimes
to mere civil
as distinct
violations,
general meaning
violations;2
criminal
but
Certainly
“unlawful”.is “violation
law”.3
meaning
purpose”
words “unlawful
in connection
with labor
State,
disturbances.
the case of
214
Cole v.
Ark.
216
387,
402,4
S. W. 2d
we discussed
words
“un
assemblage”
lawful
in connection with our Freedom to
Work
statute;
we there committed this Court to the
assemblage
view that
one
for the ac
unlawful
complishing
of an act
law. That
case
forbidden
reasoning
against
clearly
majority holding
its
adjudges
at bar.
the case
There
no law
a fine or
penalty against
person
other criminal
a
who
a
violates
contract. All that the defendants have
done
case
is to violate a
and such
contract,
is not
within
unlawful
purview
injunc
our labor laws. So I insist that an
against tion
should not
issue
this case, be
purpose
picketing5
wrongful
cause —while
—was
not unlawful.
2 See 66
J. 35.
C.
3
Kelly Worcester,
See
It is injunction temporary pro- sought most that a relief —at granted. we have a case Here visional writ —should extremely right relief to the doubtful. Lion’s where Certainly, did Chancellor his dis- therefore, abuse grant temporary injunction refusing in in cretion joining of issues. advance respectfully dissent I from the reasons, these
For opinion, majority Chancellor has holds refusing grant injunction. his discretion abused discuss the Law. Neither no need to There is '692
is right enter into there need for me to a discussion of peaceful picketing. stated in All of this is Local supra. majority, reversing Asimos, The the Chan- infringing peace- cellor on the case bar, picketing. respectfully ful For the reasons herein I stated, dissent. dissenting. George The fundamental J., Smith, Bose
question appellees striking case is whether the purpose, for an unlawful so that en can be joined Empire Storage Giboney under the doctrine Sup. Co., 336 U. 93 L. Ed. S. Ct. 684. majority hold that the strike is in breach of union’s purpose. contract and therefore for an unlawful While very seriously I doubt if a mere breach'of a civil contract, compensable damages, bring is so unlawful toas Giboney simpler ruling, conduct within the answer in this case there been no breach of contract. *13 majority say
By implication the that the collective company bargaining between the and the union employment; is a contract of but of course it not. Con employment individually, of arise tracts whenever the person company employs a to work for it. The collective agreement simply provides bargaining the various con prevail employees represented ditions while that will those by working company union are the the under their separate employment. of own contracts As the court B., said in Co. v. N. L. R. J. I. Case 321 U. Ed. S. 88 L. Sup. bargaining 576: 64 Ct. “Collective between employer representatives usually the of a unit, govern an accord as results in to terms which union, pay hiring and work that unit. The result is not, employment except of a contract however, cases; rare by job obligation reason of one has it and no to ’’ ordinarily individual comes into existence from it alone. Amalgamated To the same effect Division No. 1344 of Tampa (Fla.) Ass'n Elec. 2d Co., 47 S. 13. company By the contract us the before the union govern upon working agreed terms that were con- the They until October 23,1950, 23,1951. from October ditions agreed no modification these further would terms
693 60-day year, the sought during notice the as given before could desire to amend the contract exactly days of the August the end 60 before 24, 1951— employees year. employer alike and the first Thus uninterrupted gained by the contract the assurance year. parties Both work for one abided during primary its term. August either side was 24, 1951, after on and
But change days terms give desire to notice of its free During bargaining that 60 collective attempt days parties at a new con to arrive were provision negotiations. by peaceful This tract 60-day evidently supply the intended to contract was Taft-Hartley required period negotiations that is significant that § 158. But it is 29 U. S. C. A., Law. relinquish did not their contract the expiration negotia period after the strike Enameling, Etc., Co., tions. N. R. B. v. Columbian See L. Inc., 89 948; 7th 2d Wilson & N. L. R. B. Co., F. Cir., days negotiating After for 60 No. just go company is free to on strike as to close as plant. rely upon provision majority seem to
The 60-day requires condition to an additional notice altogether. certainly terminating There the contract during nothing forbids a strike clause that require days, nor does the Law second period. purpose cooling-off protracted of this such a parties to cancel the contract is to enable the its clause *14 long bargaining entirety. as the collective As wages company pay agreed bound to in force the employees, whether members or to its union all company wage should desire to its If the reduce not. negotiate to a contract to be unable that effect, scale and may days contract after 60 then it terminate the notice employ wages to other workmen at free whatever and be they accept. days willing nego- to since But, required Taft-Hartley Law must tiations this already place taken before the contract have notice of evidently given, it was can be termination the intention legally parties strike of the free to call a to leave the union way upon receipt of termination. of the notice upon pressure bring economic the union company able-to during employer days, cannot cheaper replace striking employees labor. ignored by majority, All these considerations are who content themselves with the blunt assertion that a during strike the existence the contract is unlawful. There it least breach if would, true, of contract employment were a if contract it contained a up giving during to clause strike the existence majority point any of the But the do language contract either indicate that of these present. certainly conditions is We that strikes know during bargaining the continued existence aof collective agreement are no means uncommon; would im- possible negotiate duration unless provisions negotiations during were there further its a.syllable term. I do not find in this contract that tends agree- that this show is even in strike breach of the purpose. much less for an ment, unlawful joins J., this dissent. Millwee, Terry v. Esso Standard Company. Oil 4-9799 249 S. W. 2d 577
Opinion delivered June 2, 1952. Rehearing denied June