35 Me. 150 | Me. | 1852
—No principle is more fully settled by the uniform weight of authority, than that possession is prima facie evidence of title, and that upon proof of that fact, the party proving it is entitled to vindicate any violation of his rights thus established. Possession indeed may be considered the primitive proof of title and the natural foundation of
The plaintiff in this case was the widow of John Linscott, and shortly after his decease placed in the hands of the defendant, who was his executor, one hundred dollars. Whether the money was her own, or belonged to the estate of her late husband, and whether she' deposited the money in her own right and to be returned to her, and the defendant so received it, or whether the defendant received it as money of which the title was in doubt, to be returned to the plaintiff, if her claim should be made out, otherwise to be administered upon in the due course of law, were all matters in dispute.
That the plaintiff had been in possession of the money was not denied. The question was as to what was the nature and character of that possession. So it was conceded, that the defendant had received this sum from the plaintiff. The circumstances under and the purposes for which the money was given and received were in contestation. If there was nothing to qualify the fact of possession, the plaintiff’s right to recover could not be questioned. If the delivery of the money was merely a deposit, the plaintiff’s right of action would at once arise on demand. If on the other hand the widow held the money, wrongfully or improperly withdrawn from the assets of her deceased husband, she could not maintain her suit against the administrator rightfully administering upon it. Or if the money was left with the administrator to await the legal result of any tribunal having jurisdiction, or on any other special terms, the plaintiff must abide the conditions upon which the deposit was made.
Exceptions sustained and new trial granted.