127 Mo. 271 | Mo. | 1895
Of course this cause is, to a large extent, a fact case, but still there are certain principles of law that are interwoven with the facts elicited in evidence. It is claimed that the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the decree entered. When an equity cause 'comes up to this court, it is for hearing de novo, and it will be considered, for the most part, as if it had originated here and was to be heard for the first time. This, however, would not authorize this
Notwithstanding this, we still adhere to the rulings in the cases cited, as well as in numerous others, that we will, to a considerable extent, where the testimony is delivered orally, and does not appear in the form of depositions (Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591) defer to the result on the facts reached by the lower court.
The evidence in the record is very voluminous, and having read it, it will not be necessary to set it out in detail; it will be sufficient in the main to quote occasional portions of it, state the general tendency and effect of the material- residue, and then give our conclusion on the whole case.
In the first .place, it is shown by several witnesses, Pollard, C. Q. Lewis, and Stuppy, that John Lenhardt always spoke kindly of Katy, and earnestly desired and designed to give her her proper and equal share in his property, but his wife exhibited a decided repugnance to Katy being recognized in the distribution of his property. This is testified to by Katy and J. H. Lewis. That Katy was to have her share of the property, is admitted, even by defendant in her testimony. But it is shown that defendant would intercept letters written by Katy to her father, so that Katy had to write in care of Stuppy, so that her letters could reach their destination.
The result shows that John did not convey a share in his property to Katy. What, prevented his wish from being consummated? The ties of natural affection are not easily sundered, and, therefore, when undue influence is charged such questions assume a peculiar
It is established by Dr. Long, who had been in attendance on John Lenhardt as late as the latter part of September next preceding his death, and during that month eight or ten times, and for some five years prior to that period, that Lenhardt was afflicted with general breaking down of the nervous system, in a word paresis, i. «., a wasting away of the brain tissue, without softening; that this had been his condition for some five years before the doctor’s last visit; that Lenhardt gradually got feebler in body and feebler in mind; that his digestive system was disarranged, that those symptoms usually end in paralysis; that those symptoms increased in Lenhardt, he was usually lying down, less inclined to talk, his bowels would not move, urine had to be drawn off by artificial means; that these mental signs of weakness increased very much toward the last, he lost his energy and will power, was disabled from doing anything, disinclined to talk and did not do so to amount to anything, was feeble minded; that such persons frequently suffer from illusions; that when he last
The doctor also says: “The last week I treated him, my opinion was very unfavorable. I told her how this thing would progress, and how it would end; then she told me: ‘I have things just my own way; I have all the money deposited in my name; I collect the rents and go to his bed and ask him for the key which he has under his pillow, and I unlock his trunk and get the bank book, and have the money deposited in my name, and lock the trunk again, and as long as he has the key he is satisfied; he has not mind enough to know or look that I don’t deposit the money in his name.’ ”
J. H. Lewis supports by his testimony that of Dr. Long, for he says that he did not regard Lenhardt, whom he had known and done business for for years, as of sound mind; that “he would tell me often that he would put so much money in an old bureau drawer that belonged in the house and when he would go back the amounts were not there, and he was disposed to think that his wife had a key to his drawer. His wife told me he was insane, and his wife told me if he had a proper mind about him he could have seen that she simply opened the drawer above and took it out, and she could get into the drawer below.”
This witness also states that the relations between Lenhardt and his wife were exceedingly unpleasant; they never spoke pleasantly of each other, either she of him or he of her; that about six months before certain
This transaction occurred after the sale of John’s property to the railroad, out of which he had realized some $18,200, and resulted in that deed in the name of his wife being put to record; this occurred as to two deeds of lots from different grantors.
W. H. Lewis, son of the former witness, who drew the four deeds, and whose memory seemed to be better on the point than his father’s, says he drew four deeds, and after two of the deeds had been drawn- in favor of John, Theresa came by herself and countermanded the order, and had the two deeds made to herself, and in a
Pollard also testifies that at the time he acted with C. Q. Lewis in the purchase of John’s property for the said road, and when John came to see about the checks arranged “he was very wild;” that at other times he seemed to be “at himself.” At other times “he seemed not to be competent to transact business;” that is, he was not “a rational man.”
The evidence also discloses that there were mutual disagreements, quarrels and fights between John and Theresa, John accusing her of collecting the rents and not making returns. At one time, it seems in 1877, a little over ten years before his death, she separated from him, on account of his mistreatment, and brought suit for a divorce, which John compromised with her by paying her $500.
"When John came to Stuppy’s office to make the deed to the half lot 11 to his daughter Maggie, property worth some $1,500, “he was,” as Stuppy says, “in trouble; he was afraid he would be attached in some way or other, for debt, or for some mischief, and he thought he could turn that property over to his daughter, in order to hold it.” It also appears in evidence that as to small sums, John’s mind could grasp them, but not so as to large ones; with those he seemed to feel embarrassed — this is shown by Pollard’s testimony that when he received the large check of $18,200 arising from the sale of the property to the railroad “he said he did not know hardly what to do with his money; he wanted to give Katie a part of that money; he did not know what to do with it.”
There is evidence to the contrary of the foregoing' as to the mental condition of John, but it is not of such a preponderating character as to warrant our substituting our views for those of the circuit court. We are satisfied from the evidence, which well warranted the belief of that court, that John Lenhardt’s mind was affected; that he was laboring under the illusion, consequent on a diseased condition of the brain and of his wife’s cunning machinations, that his money and other property would be swept away from him by litigation coming from some quarter, he knew not where, and based on a cause, he knew not what, and that in order to save what he had he had to make it over to his wife or daughter, principally the former.
The fact that he was able to draw the undated contract for the building of a frame house for his wife, which was to be completed by October 1,1887, he being
Complaint is made that plaintiffs were permitted to show what was a reasonable allowance per annum for the support of one of Theresa’s condition in life. There was no error in such evidence being admitted.
If the transactions between a husband and wife amount to a mere gift to the wife, a court of equity will require that clear and incontrovertible evidence be brought forward to establish such gift as a matter of intention and fact, and will also require that such gift or allowance or settlement be no more than a reasonable provision for the wife. 2 Story’s Equity Jurisprudence [13 Ed.], sec. 1375; 1 Bishop on Law of Married Women, sec. 754; Paschall v. Hall, 5 Jones’ Eq. 108. Frequently such gifts, etc., fail by reason of the mere 11 extravagance of the gift.” Elliott v. Elliott, 1 Dev. and Bat. Eq., loc. cit., 62.
In Beard v. Beard, 3 Atkyns, 72, a court of chancery refused to sanction a conveyance where the husband conveyed the idhole of his estate to his wife, because it was not in the nature of a provision, “which is all the wife is entitled to.”
In order to determine whether such gift or provision is reasonable, it is proper to consider the condition of the parties as to its reasonableness, and more especially as to whether, if the gift or settlement is to stand, there will be sufficient left for the heirs of the donor; for the heir at law is a favorite in all courts; the chancellor will never disinherit him in order to bestow an unreasonable allowance on the wife. Wells v. Wells, 35 Miss. 638, and cases cited.
But, aside from any question of undue influence, if it be true, as found in the decree, and there is much evidence to support the finding, that John intended to have the deeds of the property made to himself, but his intention was frustrated by the contrivances and covin of Theresa, and the deeds made to her, then a court of equity will set aside these conveyances at the instance and in favor of the heirs. Smith v. Smith, 50 Mo. 262; 2 Bishop on Law of Mar. Wom., sec. 120.
Strenuous effort has been made to show that the property sold to the railroad was the property of Theresa, but the evidence, even her own, does not sustain this assertion. At first she repeatedly said that she kept the property, which was bought of Whitehead, in her own name, but, on being closely pressed with questions whether the property was not conveyed by Whitehead to John, she finally said, ilI don’t know exactly.”
This property, she says, was bought in 1864, when they moved to St. Joseph. The couple were married in 1851, as she states, and that they only had $200 when they reached St. Joseph, having lost everything in the war. Then she says that, at the time of this purchase from Whitehead, she had $2,000, derived from the estate of her -father; that she had had that
In the absence of any satisfactory showing that the wife purchased property with her own separate funds, the presumption is a violent one that the husband furnished the means of payment. Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580. Now, in this case, if Theresa invested the $2,000 in property in 1864, she certainly did not have it in bank June 25, 1887, as she says she did, and it is not pretended that she had any separate estate, from whence that sum could be derived. If, in 1877, as she says, she “signed over” the property to. her husband upon making up with him after a separation, then this may be regarded as a recognition of his original right to it. But it is unnecessary to pursue her testimony further. Filled as it is with numerous contradictions, the lower court doubtless disregarded it.
There is another view, however, to be taken of her testimony; it is this: The transactions between her
Finding no error in the record, we affirm the decree.