Village of Linndale et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of Ohio et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14AP-21 (C.P.C. No. 13CV-2640)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on September 16, 2014
[Cite as Linndale v. State, 2014-Ohio-4024.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., Charles A. Nemer, Leslie E. Wargo and David A. Schafer; Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Mark A. Vander Laan and Bryan E. Pacheco; George Simon, Law Director of Linndale, for appellants.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Richard N. Coglianese and Holly W. Wallinger, for appellees State of Ohio, Secretary of State Jon Husted, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine, and Governor John R. Kasich.
Frost Brown Todd LLC, Philip K. Hartmann, Stephen J. Smith and Yazan S. Ashrawi, for amicus curiae The Ohio Municipal League.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, the villages of Linndale, Brice, West Mifflin, Belmore, Amesville, West Millgrove, and Nashville (“appellants“), appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees, State of Ohio, Attorney General Michael DeWine, and Governor John R. Kasich (collectively “the state“). Because we conclude that the legislation challenged by appellants violated the one-subject rule
{¶ 2} This appeal involves legislation, House Bill No. 606 (“H.B. 606“), that was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives and read for the first time on November 21, 2012. As introduced, H.B. 606 made a single change to
{¶ 3} The final version of H.B. 606, as amended by the Senate Committee on Judiciary, made changes to four statutes. It amended
{¶ 4} Appellants filed a complaint asserting that H.B. 606 was unconstitutional because it violated the one-subject rule under the
{¶ 5} The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The common pleas court issued a judgment denying appellant‘s motion for summary judgment and granting the state‘s motion to dismiss, concluding that H.B. 606 was not unconstitutional.
{¶ 6} Appellants appeal from the trial court‘s judgment, assigning one error for this court‘s review:
The trial court erred in denying the Villages’ motion for summary judgment, and granting the State‘s motion to dismiss, because H.B. 606 is unconstitutional.
{¶ 7} We review de novo a trial court‘s dismissal of a complaint, pursuant to
{¶ 8} Additionally, because appellants’ complaint involves challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, we note that there is a presumption of constitutionality for
{¶ 9} Within appellants’ sole assignment of error, they assert four arguments. First, they argue that H.B. 606 violates the one-subject rule set forth in
I. One-Subject Rule
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} The one-subject rule is mandatory and may result in the invalidation of legislation. In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, ¶ 54. However, there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Dix at 142.
{¶ 12} Determining a statute‘s constitutionality depends primarily on a “case-by-case, semantic and contextual analysis.” Dix at 145. The fact that legislation contains multiple topics is not necessarily fatal, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has declared that “disunity of subject matter, not aggregation, is the polestar in assessing a violation of the one-subject rule.” In re Nowak at ¶ 59. Where legislation contains multiple topics, “[t]he pivotal question is whether [the] topics share a common purpose or relationship so that they unite to form a single subject for purposes of [the one-subject rule].” Akron Metro. Housing Auth. Bd. of Trustees v. State, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-738, 2008-Ohio-2836, ¶ 20.
{¶ 13} In Akron Metro. Housing, this court concluded that the challenged legislation violated the one-subject rule by combining multiple provisions related to different topics. The legislation at issue began in the Senate as a measure to amend
{¶ 14} The state argued on appeal that the three topics shared the common purpose of “the authority to regulate local housing.” Id. at ¶ 22. This court concluded, however, that the state‘s argument “stretche[d] the one-subject concept too far, in effect
{¶ 15} Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a bill that combined provisions modifying the state‘s judiciary and local option liquor laws violated the one-subject rule. Hinkle at 149. The legislation at issue in Hinkle contained several provisions modifying the judicial system—it created an environmental division in the Franklin County Municipal Court and a judge for that division, created the Clermont County Municipal Court, added a common pleas judge in Lucas County, made revisions to municipal and county court law, and changed the disposition of certain fines paid into municipal and county courts. Id. at 148. The bill also changed the definition of the term “residence district” for purposes of a local option ballot question related to the sale of alcohol. Id. at 145-46. The party defending the statute argued that the topics in the legislation all related to “election matters” because it provided for elective judicial offices and related to local option elections. Id. at 148. The court rejected this reasoning, analogizing that “[t]o say that laws relating to the state judiciary and local option have elections in common is akin to saying that securities laws and drug trafficking penalties have sales in common—the connection is merely coincidental.” Id. The court held that the section of the legislation changing the definition of a residence district for purposes of the local option privilege violated the one-subject rule, and it severed that portion of the bill in order to preserve the remainder. Id. at 149.
{¶ 17} We conclude that the current case is more analogous to Akron Metro. Housing and Hinkle than it is to Bloomer. H.B. 606 contains three distinct topics: (1) elimination of one judgeship on the Youngstown Municipal Court; (2) an increase in the population threshold for municipal corporations to hold mayor‘s courts from 100 to 200, with certain exceptions, thereby eliminating certain mayor‘s courts; and (3) clarification that an individual may be prosecuted under the state law banning texting while driving by any driver or operating any handheld device while driving for certain classes of permit holders and a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance but that, if convicted under both, the two offenses are allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 18} The state argues that these three provisions share the common purpose of modifying the “authority, scope, and jurisdiction” of statutory courts. We agree that the Youngstown-judgeship provision and the mayor‘s-court provision share a common relationship of regulating the organization and structure of Ohio‘s statutory courts. Both of these provisions modify statutes within Title 19 of the Revised Code, which governs municipal, mayor‘s, and county courts. The state argues that the texting-while-driving provision relates to the jurisdiction of statutory courts by preserving municipal ordinances so that mayor‘s courts can maintain jurisdiction to hear violations of such ordinances. However, this argument stretches the one-subject concept too far. Hinkle at 148; Akron Metro. Housing at ¶ 23. There is a blatant disunity between the texting-while-driving
{¶ 19} Our analysis of H.B. 606 does not end with the conclusion that it violates the one-subject rule. We also must consider whether it is possible to determine the primary subject matter of the bill and thereby preserve that subject matter by severing the unrelated portions. H.B. 606 was introduced as a measure that would eliminate one judgeship on the Youngstown Municipal Court. This portion of the bill remained unchanged despite subsequent amendments. Based on our analysis, we conclude that the primary subject matter of H.B. 606 was the organization and structure of Ohio‘s statutory courts. With respect to the amendments added during the legislative process, as explained above, we conclude that the mayor‘s-court provision is consistent with the original primary purpose of the legislation. This purpose may be preserved by severing the texting-while-driving provision. Accordingly, we hold that the portions of H.B. 606 amending
II. Three-Reading Rule
{¶ 20} Appellants also argue that the General Assembly violated the three-reading rule under the
{¶ 22} Having concluded that that the texting-while-driving provision must be severed from H.B. 606 as a violation of the one-subject rule, we are left with the question of whether the amendment of H.B. 606 by the Senate Committee on Judiciary “vitally altered” the bill by adding the mayor‘s-court provision, such that it was necessary for each chamber to have three readings of the amended bill. We conclude that the amendment did not vitally alter the bill. H.B. 606 initially addressed the sole topic of eliminating one judgeship on the Youngstown Municipal Court. The General Assembly‘s journals indicate that this version was read three times in the House of Representatives and twice in the Senate. The amendment to H.B. 606 made by the Senate committee added an additional
{¶ 23} Finally, we note as well that the third version of the bill considered by the full Senate contained the mayor‘s-court amendment. At this time, members of the Senate could have moved that the amendment be stripped or otherwise altered. They did not. The Senate passed the version of the bill with the amendment. Because this version was different from the version passed by the House, it was returned to the House for further consideration. At this time, members of the House could have moved that the amendment be stripped or otherwise altered. They did not. The House concurred with the version containing the amendment, thereby foregoing the opportunity to further consider and debate the bill in a conference committee. Both the Senate and the House had opportunities to consider the version of the bill with the mayor‘s-court amendment consistent with the purpose of the three-reading requirement.
III. Classification of Municipalities By Population
{¶ 24} Appellants also argue that H.B. 606 violates
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} The constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may from time to time be established by law.”
{¶ 28} Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[n]one of the various provisions of [A]rticle XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio are effective to abridge the sovereignty of the state over municipalities in respect to its courts.” Ramey at syllabus. See also Geisinger v. Cook, 52 Ohio St.2d 51 (1977), syllabus (holding that Article IV, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution, pertaining to changing the number of judges on courts created by the constitution, did not limit the General Assembly‘s power to abolish municipal courts). Therefore, we reject appellants’ argument that H.B. 606 violates
IV. Uniformity Clause
{¶ 29} Finally, appellants argue that H.B. 606 violates the uniformity clause of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”
{¶ 31} As explained above, the General Assembly has exclusive power under
{¶ 32} We conclude that H.B. 606 was a valid exercise of the General Assembly‘s authority under
{¶ 33} In summary, we conclude that H.B. 606 violated the one-subject rule by combining the texting-while-driving provision in the same measure as the Youngstown-judgeship provision and the mayor‘s-court provision. We hold that the texting-while-driving provision must be severed in order to preserve the primary subject matter of the legislation. We reject appellants’ claims that the General Assembly violated the three-reading rule in adopting H.B. 606. We further reject appellants’ arguments that H.B. 606 violated the constitution by treating municipalities differently based on population and that H.B. 606 violated the uniformity clause.
{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellants’ sole assignment of error. We reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded.
KLATT, J., concurs.
SADLER, P.J., concurs in part; dissents in part.
Village of Linndale et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of Ohio et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14AP-21
{¶1} Because I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that H.B. No. 606 violates the one-subject rule but disagree with the conclusion that the process under which H.B. No. 606‘s amendments were adopted did not violate the three-reading rule, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
{¶2} As the majority recognizes, after severing the texting-while-driving provision from H.B. No. 606, we are left to consider whether the addition of the mayor‘s-court provision vitally altered the bill such that it was necessary for each chamber to have three readings of the amended bill. The majority finds that the mayor‘s-court provision and the Youngstown-judgeship provision share a common relationship of “regulating the organization and structure of Ohio‘s statutory courts,” and, thus, three readings were not required. (Majority, ¶ 22.)
{¶3} To reach said conclusion, it appears the majority employs the same test as that used to determine whether H.B. No. 606 violated the single-subject rule. I am cognizant that, when considering a challenge to legislation on the basis of a single-subject violation, case law directs “[t]he pivotal question is whether [the] topics share a common purpose or relationship so that they unite to form a single subject for purposes of [the one-subject rule].” Akron Metro. Housing Auth. Bd. of Trustees v. State, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-738, 2008-Ohio-2836, ¶ 20. Likewise, when considering a challenge to legislation on the basis of the three-reading rule, State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225 (1994), held that “a legislative Act is valid if the requisite entries are made in the legislative journals and there is no indication that the subject matter of the original bill was ‘vitally’ altered such that there is no longer a common purpose or relationship between the original bill and the bill as amended.” Id. at 233. While I note the similarity in language, when read as a whole, I interpret Voinovich as instructing that in addition to commonality, process is an important consideration as well.
{¶4} The relators in Voinovich proposed that, to determine whether a bill has been “vitally altered,” one must consider the degree of amendment. The court rejected such an interpretation and cautioned that the court “would be setting dangerous and impracticable precedent if it undertook a duty to police any such difference of degree.”
{¶5} In Voinovich, after many amendments, the final version of the bill was reread only once in each chamber. Nonetheless, the Voinovich court found the process met the purpose of the three-reading rule because (1) through its amendments, the bill retained its common purpose of modifying workers’ compensation laws, (2) both houses deliberated upon the bill and its amendments for several months, (3) hearings were held and the issues were openly debated, and (4) the Governor stimulated the debate by announcing in the press that he would veto any appropriations bill that did not also substantially reform the underlying workers’ compensation system. Therefore, the court concluded “[i]t would be difficult to characterize this activity as ‘hasty action’ that precipitated ‘ill-advised amendment at the last moment.’ ” Id. at 234.
{¶6} Thus, the Voinovich court considered not only commonality but also process. In my view, the process here differs starkly from that in Voinovich. In Voinovich, the final version of the bill was reread once in each chamber, while here the final version of the bill was reread once in only one chamber, the Senate. Additionally, in the case before us, the three readings in the House occurred within a few weeks, specifically, November 12, November 27, and December 5, 2012, and the three readings in the Senate occurred over eight days. As set forth in the majority‘s decision, H.B. No. 606 was first read in the Senate on December 6. On December 11, the bill was read for the second time and referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Two days later, December 13, the bill with amendments was read in the Senate, and the Senate passed it
{¶7} As stated in Voinovich, the purpose of the three-reading rule is to provide time for publicity, discussion, and an opportunity for legislators to study the legislation and confer on the issues. Instead, it appears from this record that the process undertaken to enact the mayors-court provision, one that affects every Ohio municipal corporation with populations of 200 persons or less thereby eliminating some mayor‘s courts in their entirety, was not only swift but also unanticipated. Thus, even if I were to agree that the two provisions share a common purpose or relationship, I cannot conclude that the purpose of the three-reading rule was met in this case such that there has been no violation of the same.
{¶8} Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the process under which H.B. No. 606 was adopted violated the three-reading rule, and I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion otherwise. Having determined that H.B. No. 606 violates the three-reading rule, I need not consider appellant‘s remaining two arguments and find them moot.
{¶9} For all of the above-stated reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.