Lead Opinion
Our responses to the questions of the federal court are as follows: (1) Yes. An insured under an automobile liability policy may challenge the authority of a signatory to a UM/UIM coverage rejection form when such signatory’s authority is not disputed by the named insureds or insurer; (2) No. To satisfy the offer requirement of R.C. 3937.18, the insurer must inform the insured of the availability of UM/UIM coverage, set forth the premium for
The federal court’s questions and this court’s complete responses are set forth below.
Question 1
“Whether an insured under an automobile liability policy may challenge the authority of a signatory to an uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage rejection form when such signatory’s authority is not disputed by the named insureds or insurer.”
Our response is in the affirmative. As was the case with the plaintiff in Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc. (1996),
Question 2
“Whether the language of the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage rejection forms accompanying the subject automobile liability policy satisfies] the offer requirements of R.C. 3837.18 [sic, 3937.18].”
We find that the rejection form in this ease fails to satisfy the offеr requirements of former R.C. 3937.18(C) as it existed during the policy period. See 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 211. The pertinent portion of the Indemnity policy reads:
“Ohio Revised Code Section 3937.18 requires us to offer you Uninsured/Under-insured Motorists Insurancе coverage in an amount equal to the policy bodily injury liability limit(s) with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in the State of Ohio, unless you reject such coverage.
“Unless you have previously rejected this coverage, your policy has been issued to include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Insurance coverage at limit(s) equal to the policy bodily injury liability limit(s).”
In Gyori, this court held that “[t]here can be no rеjection pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(C) absent a written offer of uninsured motorist coverage from the
The above paragraph in the Indemnity cоntract that purports to be an offer states the law, but does not contain the information necessary to make it a meaningful offer. Since Gyori, Ohio’s appellate courts have developed a useful bоdy of law regarding what constitutes a valid offer of UM/UIM coverage. We agree with the following required elements for written offers imposed by Ohio appellate courts: a brief description of the coverage, the premium for that coverage, and an express statement of the UM/UIM coverage limits. See Murray v. Woodard (1997),
Indemnity’s alleged offer is complete only in its incompleteness. It does not describe the coverage, does not list the premium costs of UM/UIM coverage, and does not expressly state the coverage limits. We find that an offer must include those three elements. The Indemnity rejection form, lacking in that required informatiоn, thus could not be termed a written offer that would allow an insured to make an express, knowing rejection of the coverage.
Question 3(a)
‘With regard to the scope and validity of the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage rеjection forms:
“a. Whether each of several separately-incorporated named insureds must be expressly listed in the rejection form in order to satisfy the requirement that the waiver be made knowingly, exprеssly, and in writing by each named insured.”
According to long-established Ohio law, UM/UIM coverage can be removed from an insurance policy “only by the express rejection of that provision by the insured.” Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. (1970),
While a parent corporation may have a close relаtionship with its subsidiary, the two remain separate and distinct legal entities. North v. Higbee Co. (1936),
Question 3(b)
‘When, on its face, a rejection form was signed by the employee of only one of several separately-incorporated named insureds listed in the policy, whether the four corners of the insurance agreement control in determining whether the waiver was knowingly and expressly made by each of the named insureds, or does the parties’ intent, established by extrinsic evidence, control?”
We conclude that the fоur corners of the insurance agreement control in determining whether the waiver was knowingly and expressly made by each of the named insureds. Again, we cite Gyori, which requires a written offer and a written rejection of UM/UIM coverage. In Gyori this court made it clear that the issue of whether covеrage was offered and rejected should be apparent from the contract itself. This court stated that the requirement of written offers “will prevent needless litigation about whether the insurance company offered UM coverage.” Id.,
Question 3(c)
Our response tо Question 3(b) makes it unnecessary to answer Question 3(c).
Question 3(d)
“d. Whether a parent corporation has implied authority to waive coverage on behalf of its separately-incorporated subsidiary corporation when the subsidiary corporation did not provide written authorization to waive un/underinsured motor[ist] coverage benefits on its behalf prior to commencement of the policy?”
Gyori addresses how unwritten rеpresentations evade R.C. 3937.18’s mandate that rejections of UM/UIM coverage must be express and knowing. Thus, we required in Gyori that both offers and rejections of UM/UIM coverage be in writing. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. We would contradict Gyori were we to allow a corporate parent to claim a rejection of UM/UIM coverage by its subsidiary through the subsidiary’s implied, unwritten assent thereto. We thus require that a subsidiary’s authоrization to a parent corpora
Judgment accordingly.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s answer to the first certified question. The parties do not dispute that Linko was an insured under the Indemnity insurance policy. As an insured, Linko has standing to enforce any existing provisions concerning UM/UIM coverage. See Schumacher v. Kreiner (2000),
The second question asks whether the UM/UIM coverage rejection form that Hahn signed satisfies the written offer requirement crafted in Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc. (1996),
Under former R.C. 3937.18, UM/UIM coverage exists by operation of law unless the insured hаs rejected such coverage. We have required that the insured expressly reject UM/UIM coverage in order for the rejection to be effective. See Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. (1970),
Former R.C. 3937.18 does not require a written offer of UM/UIM covеrage and certainly does not require a written offer containing the specific terms insisted upon by the majority today. The focus of the trial court’s inquiry should be on whether UM/UIM coverage was properly rejected rather than whether Indemnity included specific details in a written offer of coverage. Cf. Hansberry v. Westfield Ins. Co. (June 27, 2000), Ross App. Nos. 99CA2504 and 99CA2505, unreported,
This court should also decline to answer all of the inquiries included in question three. Each relates to issues concerning “named insureds” on a pоlicy issued to a parent corporation. Though Linko and his employer were insureds under the Indemnity policy, neither is alleged to be a named insured. I therefore believe that answering these questions is inappropriate.