201 S.W.2d 745 | Ark. | 1947
Appellee brought unlawful detainer proceedings in the circuit court to recover possession of certain real estate, with a dwelling house thereon, which appellee had rented by the month to appellant, and to recover the sum of $30 rent thereon. Default in payment of rent and service of notice to quit was alleged in appellee's complaint. Possession was delivered to appellee under writ issued by the clerk. *640
Appellant filed demurrer to the complaint, and on overruling thereof answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint, and in cross complaint asked damages for improper ouster.
A trial jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee for possession of the property and for $30 rent. From judgment on the verdict this appeal is prosecuted.
The Constitution of Arkansas (40 of Art. VII) thus prescribes the jurisdiction of justices of the peace: "They shall have original jurisdiction in the following matters: First, exclusive of the circuit court, in all matters of contract where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars, excluding interest, and concurrent jurisdiction in matters of contract where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of three hundred dollars, exclusive of interest; second, concurrent jurisdiction in suits for the recovery of personal property where the value of the property does not exceed the sum of three hundred dollars, and in all matters of damage to personal property where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars; third, such jurisdiction of misdemeanors as is now, or may be, prescribed by law; fourth, to sit as examining courts and commit, discharge or recognize offenders to the court having jurisdiction, for further trial, and to bind persons to keep the peace or for good behavior; fifth, for the foregoing purposes they shall have power to issue all necessary process; sixth, they shall be conservators of the peace within their respective counties, provided a justice of the Peace shall not have jurisdiction where a lien on land or title or possession thereto is involved." (Italics supplied.)
Authority for creation of municipal courts is found in 43 of Art. VII of the Constitution as follows: "Corporation courts for towns and cities may be invested with jurisdiction concurrent with justices of the peace in civil and criminal matters, and the General Assembly may invest such of them as it may deem expedient with jurisdiction of any criminal offenses not punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, with or without indictment, as may be provided by law, and, until the General *642 Assembly shall otherwise provide, they shall have the jurisdiction now provided by law."
Under the plain language of the Constitution a justice of the peace "shall not have jurisdiction where a lien on land or title or possession thereto is involved"; and the Constitution authorized the creation of municipal courts with only "jurisdiction concurrent with justices of the peace in civil . . . matters . . ."
Now the right of the respective parties to possession of the rented premises is the very essence of an action for unlawful detainer.
It follows that, insofar as it purports to vest jurisdiction in justices of the peace and municipal courts to hear and determine actions for unlawful detainer, Act No. 28 of the General Assembly of 1941 is contrary to the Constitution and void. The circuit court did not err in retaining jurisdiction.
Nor is the contention of appellant as to the insufficiency of the description in the notice well founded. The property was described in the notice as "the premises owned by me but now occupied by you situated on the `Logtown Hill' road just outside of Van Buren, Arkansas." It is not disputed that appellant was in possession of a small dwelling house owned by appellee in the named locality. The notice could not have referred to any other property and therefore was not misleading. "Generally speaking a description of the premises in a complaint for forcible entry and detainer is sufficient if it enables identification of the property." 36 C.J.S. 1178. "Great strictness and accuracy of description is not required in complaints in forcible entry and detainer." Fink v. Schmidt (Mo.App.),
Furthermore, appellant did not in any pleading raise this question until after the trial, when he incorporated *644 his contention relative thereto in the motion for new trial. It was too late then to make such an objection, even if it would have been available in any event.
It will be noted that no objection was made to the question as to payment of fine for drunkenness; and appellant did not answer the question as to his being in jail. Under the circumstances no prejudice could have resulted from the first question; and no objection was made to the last one.
No error appearing the judgment is affirmed. *645