213 Ga. 756 | Ga. | 1958
We find no necessity to deal here with the matter of trying tO' distinguish between governmental functions and proprietary functions of a municipal government. Hence we pass by as utterly immaterial here any references to such a distinction that might have been made in Aven v. Steiner
Counsel for the city cite Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267 (241 S. W. 2d 291), where a similar provision for cutting off water for nonpayment of sewer charges was upheld against an attack that the contract was a denial of due process. But counsel for the intervenor cite Dodd v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 39 (113 S. E. 166, 28 A. L. R. 465), where this court said: “But there is one exception to this general rule which authorizes the city to shut off the water supply for failure of the consumer to pay such charges; and that exception is, that the water supply should not be shut off in case the consumer disputes, in good faith, either the amount due or his liability therefor.” But it was further said, at page 36, that, “even in the absence of legislative authority, the general rule is that those furnishing the public with its water supply, either in a private or municipal capacity, may adopt, as a reasonable regulation for conducting said business, a rule providing that the water so furnished may be cut off for nonpayment therefor; and in pursuance of such regulation the water supply may be discontinued on the failure of the consumer to pay the water rates.” And
So we must take a look at the contract provisions here involved. It provides that “The company agrees to discontinue water service to those sewer users whose service accounts remain unpaid1 sixty (60) days after the due date, and the company further agrees not to re-establish water service through the turning on of such water until such time as all sewer service charges have been paid.” This excerpt from the contract shows that the cut-off complained about will not be abrupt; will not surprise the consumer, endanger his property, or inconvenience him for a period of sixty days after his failure to perform his duty by paying his debts. If during the sixty-day period he is unable to reach an amicable adjustment of any complaint, and his position is correct, he can resort to the courts to protect himself.
The foregoing rulings control our judgment, and we need not deal with other matters discussed by counsel, such as rulings by the courts of other States and whether or not the charter of Rossville, without the amendment, is sufficient to authorize what is being done.
Judgment affirmed.