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Linell v. State
671 S.W.2d 741
Ark.
1984
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*1 tо drive intoxicating liquor the influence of who is under within this State.” control of vehicle be actual we hold this case the circumstances Under of his within in actual control vehicle not He not been the may person of the statute. have meaning If he drove it it was parked. who drove vehicle where in have become where it was found place be construed strictly later. laws are to toxicated Criminal 259, 247 favor of the accused. Lewis v. act to authority without to declare an We are of this state by implication. come within the criminal laws Lewis v. supra. dismissed.

Reversed and J.,

Adkisson, Hickman, C.J., concur. J.,

Dudley, participating. Lee LINELL v.

Carl Arkansas STATE of CR 84-9 of Arkansas Court

Supreme 9, 1984 delivered July Opinion

16B *2 McKissic, for E. McKissic, Gene Cross, & by: Kearney appellant. Wheeler, E. Gen., Clark, Michael Asst. Att’y by:

Steve Gen., for appellee. Att’y Carl Hays, brought This is an appeal Steele Justice. of Charles murder for the capital from a conviction

Linell murder capital Misho attempted Louise wound Patterson, survived a bullet who Austin All stomach. three were shot with a small caliber weapon around p.m. January 7:00 during commis- sion of an aggrevated outside the robbery Bar and Grill in Pine Bluff. Linell,

Five later days Carl Carvin Thompson and Mamie Guy were Curry charged with the crimes. Thompson entered into a plea agreement for a sentence of life without parole and agreed to for the testify state. Linell was tried on 11,1983, July convicted and sentenced to life without parole for two counts of capital murder and twenty years for murder, attempted capital the sentences to run consecu- tively. Charges Mamie against Guy Curry dismissed for lack of evidence. The raises seven points *3 reversal, none of which are persuasive.

Carl Linell argues the triаl court abused its discretion by not one of excusing the jurors cause. The juror had indicated on a questionnaire that his business had been robbed and there had been acts of violence his against family. When if asked these events would make him predisposed another, about crime one way the juror “No, this, responded, is, in a case like as serious as it certainly wouldn’t be predisposed.” He said that he was not biased and would be fair and impartial. Appellant contends there is a clear assumption that the juror was biased and as he had used all his peremptory challenges, it was reversible error tо hold a biased juror The competent. cases appellant cites to support his contention involved rather implied, than actual, bias. Implied bias arises by implication law and its liberally construed in criminal cases. See Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-1920; Beed v. 898 (1980); § Henslee An (1971). 471 S.W.2d 352 entirely bias, different standard to applies аctual which is the issue here. When actual bias is in question, quali fication of a juror is within the sound ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‍discretion of the trial judge because he is in a better to position weigh demeanor of the prospective juror’s response ques tions on voir dire. Allen v. 660 S.W.2d 922 (1983). are assumed to be unbiased and the burden of Jurors demonstrating actual bias is on the appellant. Jeffers In we Jeffers had on jurors appellant’s panel of bias where found no proof for the murder of in a trial served as jurors also in Allen we found sister, no abuse prosecutrix’s who refusal to excuse veniremen discretion in the court’s but who could testify, officers to expected knew two police as that testimony aside their lay friendship weigh stranger. a bias and Linell has not demonstrated actual

Appellant was asks that we assume such bias was present. juror on the issue and his questioned responses satisfactory to to the trial On review we are not judge. рosition bias, or assume actual that the trial court’s discretion say was abused in otherwise. holding

The second and third are one. arguments essentially Linell contends his cross examination Carvin accomplice on Thompson inconsistent statements about prior him shooting restricted and this denied unduly to be сonfronted with the him under the witnesses against Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The appellant that he complains should have been to cross permitted examine the statements out for point the incorrect details in each how Thomp- statement and son’s story as he changed was fed information the pоlice. Evidence, He cites Arkansas Uniform Rules of Rule 613 (b) *4 previous and cases1 to his Rule 613 support position. (b) provides pertinent part:

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an to or opportunity explain deny the same and the opposite is afforded an party oppor- thereon, to him tunity interrogate or the interests of justice otherwise require.

Neither the rule nor the cases the Rule support arguments. 613 (b) provides the introduction of inconsistent prior State, 929, (1956); v. 1Eddington Comer v. Ark. 225 286 S.W.2d 473 Statе, State, 156, Ark. (1953); Humpolack Ark. v. 175 564 222 786, 303, ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‍12 State, (1927); Billings Ark. S.W. 300 S.W. 574 426 52 166 gives

statements and the witness the opportunity deny to statements, the which was done this explain case. cases cited of support theory application the Rule only (b) 613 and neither the nor those statute cases give for the of cross support type appellant argues examination is appropriate.

All prior statements read to which he Thompson, acknowledged and admitted were not true. He cross examined on the circumstances the statements surrounding and the court allowed considerable latitude before limiting the the questioning, including repeated suggestion Thompson’s statements were In by influenced the police. State, Beed v. 609 898 a similar (1980), 271 S.W.2d was made argument by the as to undue restriction witness, of cross examination the while state’s impeaching the victim. The trial the court sustained to a objection question it found repetitious and we argumentative and upheld the ruling. We noted Unif. R. Evid. gives 611 (a) trial court reasonable control over the mode of interro- gating so witnesses as to avoid needless of time consumption and protect the witness from harassment. The appellant provided has no nor supporting does he show authority, how his defensе would been have fostered line by this The issue questioning. he wanted was brought before the most that can be said of the he is that was point permitted not question as as he have extensively might liked. But that not unlimited where discretion abused.

Appellant suggests that was entitled to introduce evidence of other robberies committed Carvin for which the state had elected not to file But neither charges. nor proffer ruling we will appear abstract and not consider the argument. Rule (d) Supreme 9 Rules Court Court A Appeals. dams v. 276 1097, 594 (1982); S.W.2d 828 Byers App. (1980); Vail v. Ark.App. (1980); Ellis v. Ark.App. *5 309 (1979). Two other closely related treated as one: points are been motion for directed verdict should have Appellant’s a of Carvin granted testimony accomplice, because the the was not corroborated and because Thompson, sufficiently did not the are arguments the evidence verdict. support however, to as there was substantiаl evidence lacking, verdict with the appellant’s the and connection support the crime established beyond supplied by was that by proof accomplice.

Carvin testified that and the appellant he had been drinking beer and dominos with Mamie playing at Eva Cato’s house on Sometime Guy Curry January 12. dark, Mamie, said, around to he left to a go and store He and Linell liquor shotgun had a Highway 79. had a while was the pistol Guy Curry liquor Mamie store decided to rob someone. After Mamie they walking to Guy Eva house back Curry Cato’s went and waited they near the Bar and When a truck pickup pulled Grill. Linell both shot of the (the Mishos) truck occupants third individual who came out of the bar to (Patterson) investigate noise. ran house They back to Eva Cato’s victims, with the and billfold of the where purse they removed their which clothing, Guy Curry Mamie concealed in a bathroom purse cabinet. The behind a placed couch was аnd later retrieved by Linell. statute, relies on our

Appellant Ark. Stat. Ann. 43- § 2116 (Repl. 1977):

A conviction be cannot had in upon case felony of an testimony accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending with connect defendant offense; of the and the commission corroboration is not sufficient if merely it shows offense committed, Provided, and the circumstances thereof. That misdemeanor cases a conviction be had upon an testimony accomplice.

The test for determining sufficiency corrobora- whether, ting evidence if the testimony the accomplice ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‍other, is disregarded, therе evidence independent establish the crime its and connect the defendant with

168 435, State, 16 S.W.2d

commission. Henderson v. 652 279 697, State, (1960). 339 S.W.2d 601 (1983);Froman v. 232 Ark. circumstantial, so long be may The evidence corroborating tends to connect is of a material nature and as it Pollard v. defendant with the crime. 264 574 v. 185Ark. 505 Roath S.W.2d (1978); the defendant False statements to (1932). police evidence. v.Bly constitute corroborating 450 (1980). in Linell’s involvement evidence of independent were shot with the crime is sufficient. The victims entirely to Eva according which was in his pistol possession, after Linell and testimony, immediately Cato’s to be a thought returned to her house from what had been both removed their stоre. She said trip liquor they hidden, Guy Curry which was and Mamie clothing, outer in Linell put concealed Linell’s her bra. She said pistol him when woman’s behind her couch and took it with purse of his he left. Linell versions to gave conflicting police other evidence whereabouts on the of the crimes and evening him in the of the crimes at the time vicinity they placed in that inde- occurred. We have no difficulty determining material evidence was offered which connected pendent, to the crimes for he was convicted. which in seating insists the trial court erred Finally, appellant F. a death qualified jury, citing Grigsby Mabry, Supp. Howevеr, we have of death rejected premise cases, in juries several Rector qualified notably 168 (1983). find no We error other matters prejudicial to our attention under Rule 11 brought (f).

Affirmed.

Purtle Hollingsworth, dissent. JJ., Purtle, I. I believe the trial Justice, dissenting. John court limited unduly Thomp- cross-examination witness son. In order to out the issue I set place proper perspective what I to be the perceive error. The witness and co-defendant had made several statements about the crime. The prior witness admitted that the statements were untrue and the then following took place: I would like to *7 the statement go through Defense:

and we give various versions he because know gave that he was told it and he happen way couldn’t his in with brought conformity testimony prosecu- tion theory.

State: Mr. Mr. if he McKissic ask made each and every statement and once he he says it made to the next one. But go he is not entitled to cross-examine him on these statements.

Court: Your Mr. objection is well taken. McKissic him if you may ask he state- made prior inconsistent ments. He can either admit or them but deny you may not cross-examine If on statements he knows to be false. says statement is true cross-examine you may him on it.

I do not to be in understand the of the trial court ruling with the law and our We stated keeping prior opinions. ‘‘ State, 409, Miller v. Ark. (1980): 601 845 269 S.W.2d of free and unfettered of the accuser right cross-examination the accused is basic to our In Miller we by system justice.” State, 1152, from Smith v. Ark. 143 190 200 quoted (1940) as follows: ‘‘The of cross-examination part a substantive and right, important and a most valuable one.” Both Miller and Smith wеre reversed because restrictions on should cross-examination. The appellant have full trust opportunity credibility test the and worthiness of a witness. Rhodes v. 634 276 (1982); v. 590 S.W.2d 107 267 Gustafson Both Rhodes and were re (1979). 853 Gustafson it and we should do have reversed before always versed. We again. dissenting. Appellant P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice v. us to oveturn our Rector

urges ruling 280 individuals with con- 168 because (1983) 659 S.W.2d were excluded scientious ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‍to the death objections penalty 170 that he was asserts in his trial. Appellant participating

from Amendments Fourteen under the Sixth and denied his rights a determined his guilt to have to the federal constitution dissent from agree of the community. cross-section fair for this reason. the majority opinion drawn from a fair that a be The mandate not unique community cross-section of the representative 155 Hall v. to Arkansas law. 259 Ark., Hutto, 1975), (E.D. v. Supp. 394 F. 1278 (1976); Sanford Stebbins, Cir., v. (8th 1975); affirmed 523 F.2d Jewell Ark., States The United 1969). F. Supp. (E.D. Smith concept. this has affirmed frequently Court Supreme Texas, Pac. Co. Thiel v. Southern 311 U.S. (1940); In Taylor Peters v. U.S. 493 U.S. (1946); Kiff, 407 Louisiana, that “the the Court held U.S. (1975), cross-section a representative selection of a from petit jury of the Sixth component is an essential community *8 trial.” Amendment to a right jury from a fairly drawn to be tried a by jury for a is critical community cross-section of the reрresentative of variety reasons: exercise of of a is to j ury guard against

The purpose available the commonsense make arbitrary power —to against a community hedge of the as judgment and in preference overzealous or mistaken prosecutor or or overconditiоned perhaps professional biased response. Louisiana,

Duncan v. 391 U.S. 145 at 155-156 “ stated, A commentator on this issue has the absence in where the group a from communities group petit juries lead a substantial of the portion population represents than rather prejudice based jury decisionmaking Note, Challenge: reason.” See Limiting Peremptory L.J, 1715, Representation Groups Juries, on Petit 86 Yale & N. 69. 1730-1731 of the the administration

Community participation over, law, with our is criminal more consistent only to public but is heritage democratic also critical criminal justice confidence fairness of the system. Restricting only speсial groups service to jury roles segments major identifiable excluding playing in the cannot be the constitu- with community squared tional trial. concept

Taylor, supra. 419 U.S. at 530-531. in Rector disagree by majority with the statement

that: that has served its jury system ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‍purpose admirably not to be

throughout the nation’s twisted history ought out of for the benefit of least persons those shape entitled to been favors. It has the law special always Arkansas, when the punishment mandatory, except the same who have the jurors responsibility or innocence must also shoulder determining guilt burden of punishment. That as it should fixing be, for the two necessаrily are interwoven. questions isIt conceivable that the law has in this area to the developed that it is point for the permissible jurors State to bar with conscientious to the death from objections penalty serving Illinois, on sentencing juries. Witherspoon 391 U.S. 510 reading Witherspoon leads me to the conclu- (1968). My sion that if further study prove that juries death-qualified Witherspoon standards less with than neutral respect *9 — guilt it a two mandated trial one phase phase to establish guilt phase one for sentencing. Grigsby Mabry, 569 F. to devise the Supp. (1983) requires us two Grigsby phase remedy. empirical evidence in jurors favor who the death are more to vote to penalty convict likely defendants than who jurors oppose capital punishment us to requires a modification adopt of our criminal trial in Death this area. See Qualification and “Fireside Berry, Induction” 5 UALR I (1982). would allow L.J. individuals with conscientious to the death objections to be from penalty excluded participating liability phase appellant’s trial. would reverse that reason.

Case Details

Case Name: Linell v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Jul 9, 1984
Citation: 671 S.W.2d 741
Docket Number: CR 84-9
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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