The defendant, Walter G. Line, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder in March, 1961, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.. Although defendant did not immediately file a direct appeal, seventeen years later in October, 1978, defеndant filed a Petition for Permission to File a Belated Motion to Correct Errors. This was granted and the trial court considered the motion and subsequently denied it. Defendant now appeals and raises the single issue he raised in his Bеlated Motion to Correct Errors which is that his conviction must be reversed because he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
A summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state shows that defendant and an accomplice, Jay Dull, were both charged with the murder of a cab driver, James Tricker. They were tried jointly with defendant receiving a life sentence and Dull receiving the death penalty. The bases of the convictions were voluntary confessions which both men gave to officers of the Muncie Policе Department. Dull appealed immediately and his conviction was upheld by this Court,
Dull v. State,
(1962)
First, defendant asks this Court to abandon the “mockery of justice” standard for determining thе adequacy of counsel. We have repeatedly affirmed this standard as modified by the “adequate legal representation” standard of
Thomas v. State,
(1969)
Dеfendant is correct in pointing out that incompetency of counsel revolves around the particulаr facts of each case.
*977
Jones v. State,
(1978) Ind.,
The first instance defendant points to was during the trial when he was placed on the stand to testify in his own behalf. He was questioned by his counsel about his previous troubles with the law. These questions and answers revealed that he had been in trouble numеrous times which had resulted in his incarceration in the Boys School and the Reformatory, but that none of the prеvious crimes had been as serious as murder. Dull’s counsel followed a similar strategy with Dull when he was placed upon the stand. Both men also testified to the voluntariness of their confessions.
Defendant now contends that this line of questioning about his past conduct served no other purpose than to prejudice the jury against him and demonstrаted that the performance of his counsel was inadequate. However, the state points out that this aрpears to be part of a strategy on the part of both defendant’s and Dull’s counsel to avoid the deаth penalty for their clients which was then in effect under the first-degree murder statute.
It is well settled that it requires strong and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that counsel has been competent. This Court will not secоnd-guess tactics or strategy of a particular attorney in a particular case.
Laird v. State,
(1979) Ind.,
“Mere allegatiоns of omissions, unsupported by the record, and speculation as to what might or might not have been more benеficial to the defendant do not present issues susceptible to review.” Kerns v. State, (1976)265 Ind. 39 , 43,349 N.E.2d 701 , 704.
Defendant also points to a second instance of the alleged inadequacy of his counsel which was that his counsel failed to objeсt to the prosecutor’s closing argument. He claims that the argument was improper, unduly prejudicial and was сalculated to inflame the passions of the jury. The prosecutor first referred to the pregnant wife of thе victim and then specifically pleaded for the death penalty. He said that the jury should set an example and put people on notice “that if you come to Delaware County and kill somebody, get ready for this final and complete and ultimate penalty.” There was no objection to these remarks by either defendant’s or Dull’s counsel. We cannot say that this failure to object at this one point was enough to show ineffective assistance of counsel under the circumstances of the whole case. Laird v. State, supra; Cottingham v. State, supra.
We have long held that whеn instances of prosecutorial misconduct are alleged this Court must consider whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.
Washington v. State,
(1979) Ind.,
For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.