245 P. 212 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1926
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *421 This is an application for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Superior Court of Humboldt County adjudging the defendant guilty of four separate and distinct contempts of court and imposing sentence therefor. The petitioner was adjudged guilty of four distinct contempts of court and sentenced to pay a fine for each separate contempt, or, in default thereof, to be imprisoned *422 in the county jail. The petitioner is charged in the affidavit with having on four different occasions committed contempt of court by reason of printing, publishing, and circulating certain articles in a newspaper known as the "Humboldt News," in the county of Humboldt, violative of subdivision 9 of section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The charge is in four separate and distinct counts and judgment was pronounced upon each count. The petitioner alleges that the affidavit upon which the proceeding is based is insufficient and that no proof of the facts stated in the affidavit was produced at the hearing; that no hearing, in fact, was had. It appears from the affidavit that an action against the petitioner for criminal libel was pending in the Superior Court of Humboldt County; that the cause had been set for trial on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1925; that the names of sixty persons had been drawn from the trial jury box from which to impanel the jury; that the petitioner is editor of the newspaper above mentioned, printed, published, and circulated in the city of Eureka and county of Humboldt; that said newspaper has a large number of subscribers in said county; that after the drawing of said names from the said jury-box, in four separate issues of said newspaper the petitioner published therein certain statements, which are set forth at length in this proceeding, attacking the district attorney of the county, impugning his motives in respect to the prosecution of said criminal action, and reflecting upon the character and veracity of the prosecuting witnesses therein; that said articles were respectively published and circulated for the purpose and with the intent of creating public sympathy for the defendant, the petitioner herein, and for the purpose and with the intent of influencing the judgment and opinion of witnesses who may have been or might be summoned to act as jurors in the trial of said action, and also to intimidate witnesses against testifying for the prosecution therein and to embarrass the judge of said court in the trial thereof, and to interfere with the administration of justice. The statements so published referred to the prosecuting witness as a former admitted stool-pigeon, a man who had presented a perjured expense bill against the county and later stolen the same from the supervisors' files. As shown by the return herein the articles published are too numerous and *423 lengthy to be set out in this opinion, but were all calculated to hold up to ridicule and opprobrium the proceedings then pending against petitioner in the Superior Court of Humboldt County, to cast reflection upon and question the honesty of purpose of the prosecuting officers and of the witnesses that would appear at the trial of said action. These matters are all specifically set forth in the affidavit which was filed in the contempt proceedings, and the affidavit further set forth that the petitioner knew of the pendency of said action, of the prosecuting witness therein, whom the petitioner had named in the articles referred to, and that the articles so printed and published and circulated in the county of Humboldt were for the purpose of embarrassing the court and unduly influencing jurors and witnesses. [1] Without further review of the evidence we may conclude our review to this part of the cause by stating that the facts set forth in the affidavit are sufficient to show the contemptuous acts charged against the petitioner in each count therein and contains all of the necessary allegations and recital of the things constituting the alleged contempt necessary to give the court jurisdiction to proceed.
After the making and filing of the affidavit just herein referred to and the presentation of the same to the court, the court made and entered its order reciting that upon reading and filing of the affidavit, and good cause appearing therefor, it was ordered that the said Alfred Lindsley be and appear before said court at 10 o'clock on the thirtieth day of October, 1925, then and there to show cause, if any he had, why an order and judgment of the court should not be made adjudging him guilty of contempt. This order and affidavit were served upon the petitioner. At the time set in the order to show cause the petitioner appeared with his counsel, and, upon the calling of the case, first filed a motion to quash each of the four counts set forth in the affidavit, specifying a number of grounds therefor: (1) That the court had no jurisdiction to issue the order to show cause, etc.; (2) that the acts, facts, and things specified did not constitute a contempt of court. Upon the denial of this motion the defendant and petitioner herein then filed a demurrer raising the question of jurisdiction and setting forth in the demurrer specifically the same grounds as contained in the motion to quash; that none of the counts *424 set forth facts sufficient to constitute a contempt; want of facts and lack of jurisdiction being urged in the demurrer against each one of the several counts. The record further shows that after argument the motion to quash was denied and the demurrer overruled; whereupon, according to the reporter's notes, set forth in the transcript, the petitioner's counsel then said: "We rest without putting anything before the court." The recital in the judgment as to this particular is as follows: "After argument said motion to quash was denied and said demurrer was overruled; thereupon said Metzler Mitchell, as counsel for said Lindsley, announced in open court that they had nothing further to offer." Following this statement the court pronounced its judgment finding that the acts and matter set forth in each of the four counts contained in the affidavit constituted separate and distinct contempts and adjudging the petitioner herein guilty on each of said four counts, imposing separate and distinct fines for each count, with imprisonment in jail in lieu of payment at the rate of two dollars per day.
[2] It is now contended that the judgment of the court is void, by reason of the fact that no further evidence was offered in the case, that there was nothing before the court except the affidavit and the order to show cause, to which we have herein referred, that testimony should have been taken, and, in substance, that the court was without jurisdiction to pronounce judgment without first proceeding to take testimony.
This proceeding was instituted under the second paragraph of section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies that "when the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court, or judge, of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators, or other judicial officer." Section
[3] It must be borne in mind, also, that the affidavit upon which such an order to show cause is based must set forth the facts constituting the contempt in order to give the court jurisdiction to proceed; not merely the ultimate facts, but the facts themselves, showing acts specifically constituting the contempt. In this particular the affidavit differs from the formal language ordinarily found in an information or indictment. The affidavit, in itself, in a contempt proceeding must be evidentiary in character in order to show the contempt alleged and lay a basis for the proceeding. As stated in Frowley v.Superior Court,
"A party charged with contempt has the same inalienable right to be heard in his defense, especially in instances of mere constructive contempt, as he would have against the charge of any other crime. And in the proceeding for such a contempt, an issue is made up by the affidavit and answer, witnesses are called and examined and a trial is had as in other cases. While affirmative allegations contained in an affidavit of the defendant in contempt proceedings for the disobedience of an injunction cannot be deemed established without a trial to determine the issues so joined, yet the production of witnesses may be waived in such proceedings and the party may consent to try the case on the evidence" (5 Cal. Jur. 943, sec. 40). As to what the record should show, we find the following in 13 C.J., page 82: "The *427
judgment should show on its face that the court had jurisdiction to inflict the penalty, and that the judgment was warranted by the pleadings. In cases of constructive contempt it should show that the accused had been given an opportunity to be heard in his defense. The punishment inflicted should be clearly and specifically stated." [5] Outside of providing that the court may examine witnesses for or against the person alleged to be in contempt, section
"The petitioners allege, and the allegations are not denied, but are supported by the record, that the court adjudged the accused guilty upon the affidavits and answers `without proof or evidence,' without an investigation of the charge, and without a trial or a hearing. Though sufficient facts are alleged to constitute a constructive and criminal contempt and though the person charged therewith stands mute, still the court under the statute may not treat such allegations as confessed, and upon them pronounce a judgment of conviction. The court nevertheless is required `to investigate the charge.' It no doubt may, without proof or evidence, pronounce such a judgment if a plea of guilt or an answer equivalent thereto is entered." While citing from this case, in considering the point relied upon by the petitioner, we may also quote therefrom the following statement, sustained by a long list of authorities there set forth, to wit: "The authorities are almost, if not quite, unanimous that, if any act or conduct of any publication is `calculated to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the courts in the due administration of justice in matters pending before them,' it constitutes a contempt of court. Moreover, it is also frequently stated in the cases that if any wilful act or conduct, or any publication, has a tendency to prevent a fair trial, or tends to prejudice the public or jurors against an accused person on trial for an offense, or *429 the tendency of which publication is to prejudice the rights of either party to a civil action, such act, conduct, or publication may be punished as for a contempt of court." As stated, the citation of authority supporting this rule is legion.
It will be observed that the opinion of the court in the Herald-Republican case was based upon the predicate that an answer had been filed to the affidavits presented to the court charging contempt; that every allegation contained in the affidavits was denied save and except the mere fact of publication. The trial court held that the fact of publication being admitted, carried with it all the other acts, including the intent necessary to constitute contempt and admitted of no other proof in the case. It is also stated, after quoting the language that the court is required to investigate the charge: "and nothing short of a plea of guilty, or its equivalent, will justify a judgment of conviction without evidence, and without an investigation of the charge."
In Zobel v. People,
[6] This court has already held that the facts alleged in the affidavits upon which the proceeding for contempt was based are clearly sufficient to show wilful contempt within the foregoing rule (discussing the rule relating to publications tending to embarrass the proceedings pending in court, etc.). It is also there held by this court that it is not necessary to show that the jurors, or prospective jurors, actually read the article so published. In the Matter of Application of Lindsley for a Writof Habeas Corpus,
As analogous to the proceedings had in this case, we may refer to the provisions of the Penal Code and also to the common law applying to ordinary criminal cases where a like situation is presented. Section 1011 of the Penal Code reads: "If the demurrer is disallowed, the court must permit *431
the defendant, at his election, to plead, which he must do forthwith, or at such time as the court may direct. If he does not plead judgment may be pronounced against him." This section of the Penal Code has been held constitutional by the supreme court in the case of People v. King,
In 7 Cal. Jur., page 993, section 130, the procedure followed in this case is set forth as proper. In the case of Mitchell v.Superior Court, supra, the supreme court, in considering whether further proof was necessary to support a certain allegation in the affidavit setting forth contempt, in the absence of a denial of the allegation, ruled as follows: "It is not necessary, however, to determine these matters, because the undenied allegation of defendant's presence at the time of the making of the order rendered the showing of service of notice upon him entirely unnecessary." As said in the case ofHerald-Republican Co. v. Lewis, supra, if what was done by the defendant amounted to a plea of guilty or admission of everything charged in the affidavit, then, and in that case, the trial court was authorized to proceed and render judgment. If the procedure provided by the Penal Code that may be followed in cases which are criminal cases in every sense of the term and where the punishment may be more severe than that allowed in the present case is applicable, then the procedure of the trial court in the case at bar must be approved.
[7] We are of the opinion that when the defendant came into court in response to an order to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt for having done and performed the acts charged in the affidavit, filed his motion to quash and then his demurrer thereto, and, after an adverse ruling on both his motion and his demurrer, announced that "he rested his case without putting anything before the court," he did those acts which amounted to an admission of guilt, or plea of guilty of whatever was charged against him in the affidavit, and if the affidavit set forth facts showing contempt, then, and in that case, upon an investigation of the affidavit and consideration of the facts therein alleged, which were alleged under oath, the court, if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was *433 guilty of each of the several contempts charged, it had jurisdiction to pronounce judgment. The petitioner had his day in court; he had his opportunity to make answer and present any defense, excuse, or explanation that he saw fit. Thus, every constitutional right guaranteed to him was preserved, and if he chose to submit his case upon the testimony, to wit, the affidavit already presented to the court, we do not readily see how, in the face of his own expressed willingness to so submit the case, that he can now be heard to complain.
[8] It has been argued that only one contempt was committed; that the several acts committed upon different days in the different articles published upon different days do not constitute different contempts, but if contempt at all, only one contempt was committed. This, however, is not the law. In Oates
v. United States, 223 Fed. 1013 [139 C.C.A. 389], it is said: "Where it consists of separate acts of disobedience to an injunction, the sentence should not be imposed generally for all offenses; but the punishment for each offense should be specified so that it can be reviewed on appeal." In Gompers v. BuckStove Range Co.,
It follows from what has been said that the petition for a writ of review herein must be and the same is hereby denied.
Hart, J., and Finch, P.J., concurred.