AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND DISMISSING APPEAL
Four years after her chapter 7 discharge in the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Illinois, appellant, Jeannie Lindskog, filed a Chapter 13 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Soon thereafter, Lindskog filed an adversary proceeding in which she sought to avoid a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien held by M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank.
On April 13, 2011, the bankruptcy court granted M & I’s motion to dismiss. Now, the case is before this court on Lindskog’s appeal of that decision.
When considering an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s judgment, a district court applies two standards of review: one for findings of fact and the other for conclusions of law. Grossman v. Sawdy,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Lindskog, a Wisconsin homeowner and resident, also maintains a domicile in Chi
On May 17, 2008, Lindskog filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 08-12661. (Doc. 1 at 24). She did not reaffirm her mortgage debt on the Powers Lake real estate, and was granted a bankruptcy discharge on August 19, 2008. (Doc. 1 at 24).
On April 29, 2010, Lindskog filed a Chapter 13 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Case No. 1-27037-jes. (Doc. 6 at 6). The proposed amended Chapter 13 plan called for the payment of almost $43,000 over a five-year period. (Doc. 5 at 6). The total unsecured claims anticipated were less than $20,000. (Doc. 5 at 6). However, the proposed plan would have avoided the second mortgage lien held by M & I. (Doc. 6 at 6). After M & I objected, Lindskog filed an adversary complaint seeking to have the lien declared void. (Doc. 6 at 6).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Whether a Chapter 13 debtor who is ineligible for a discharge may strip off wholly unsecured junior liens within four years of a Chapter 7 is an issue that has been the subject of numerous conflicting decisions across the country. Some courts hold that lien stripping is impermissible because it amounts to a de facto discharge. In re Jarvis,
Lindskog, whose home is worth less than the first mortgage lien, argues that the Bankruptcy Code mandates the elimination of a fully unsecured lien in Chapter 13 without regard to discharge. Indeed, in a Chapter 13, the debtor’s plan may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims_” § 1322(b)(2). Lindskog relies on Fair for its holding that “Congress did not intend to prevent lien stripping through § 1328(f)(1), and it is inaccurate to characterize lien stripping as a de facto discharge under the bankruptcy code.”
Having thoroughly reviewed the split of authorities and underlying Code provisions, the court adopts the reasoning of
Based on the plain language of § 1328(f), Lindskog did not qualify for a Chapter 13 discharge having received a Chapter 7 discharge within four years of filing. Stripping off the wholly unsecured lien on Lindskog’s Wisconsin residence amounts to a de facto discharge and undermines Congress’s desire to prevent debtors from exploiting loopholes in the bankruptcy system at the expense of other entities. H.R. Rep. 109-31(1) Pt. 1 at 5. Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal is dismissed.
Notes
. BMO Harris Bank N.A. is the successor to the second mortgage lien held by M & I.
