484 U.S. 934 | SCOTUS | 1987
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The issue here is whether a defendant’s rights under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses are violated when the Government forces a witness to take the stand solely to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury even though the Government already knew that the witness would refuse to testify. In this case, petitioner was convicted of mail fraud. At the trial, the Government called as a witness an unindicted co-conspirator who was alleged to have engaged in the same kind of conduct for which petitioner was indicted. The witness’ attorney informed the prosecutor and the court that his client would invoke the privilege if he were called to testify, and the witness did invoke the privilege when he was called outside the presence of the jury. When the jury returned, the prosecution called the witness and he was permitted to testify after the trial court overruled petitioner’s objection. Once again, after stating his name and place of residence, the witness invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify in response to five different questions. On appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit noted that this practice is “ ‘so imbued with the “potential for unfair prejudice” that a trial judge should closely scrutinize any such request.’” United States v. Lewis, Nos. 86-5377 and 86-5379 (Apr. 17, 1987), App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a (quoting United States v. Vandetti, 623 F. 2d 1144, 1147 (CA6 1980)). Nonetheless, it held that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it permitted the witness to testify and gave a cautionary instruction to the jury not to consider the witness’ actions as bearing on the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants. Ibid. The position of the Sixth Circuit, which is
Lead Opinion
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
