— This is an action to contest the will of 'William Stephens of Platte county, Missouri. The plaintiffs, Mrs. Lindsey and Daniel P. Stephens, are two of the children of William L. Stephens. The defendants are his widow, Mrs. Mary Virginia Stephens, and her four children by Mr. Stephens, and a son, Louis N. Stephens, his child by his first marriage.
On the 21st of January, 1906, William L. Stephens executed the will which forms the basis of this suit. By this will he gave to his three oldest children, Louis N. Stephens, Sarah J. Lindsey, the wife of Walter T. Lindsey, and Daniel P. Stephens, twenty dollars each, and all the residue of his estate, both personal and real, he gave to his widow, Mary Virginia, for and during her natural life, and at her death to be equally divided between his four youngest children, of whom she was the mother, and he appointed Louis N. Stephens and his widow his executors without bond. The will was contested on two grounds: first, that William L. Stephens was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and by reason of old age and sickness he was
The facts developed on the trial were substantially as follows:
At the time of the testator’s death on the 21st of January, 1906, he was eighty-two years old. He had been twice married. By his first wife he had four children, three of whom survived him. He married a second time in 1880, and there were five children of this second marriage, one of whom had died before her father. At the time of his death he was the owner of eighty acres of land in Platte county and a small amount of personalty. Three of the children of the last marriage were minors when their father died. He had been sick about two weeks with pneumonia. Plis physician testified that he had pneumonia in both lungs, the lower lobe of his right lung and the whole left lung was solidified. He was partially paralyzed, his left arm was paralyzed. This paralysis the doctor attributed to old age. Pie saw him on the day before he died and he said his vitality was failing rapidly. From the other testimony in the case, it appears that the testator’s wife, from the information she received from the doctor as to her husband’s condition, sent for two friends of her husband, at his request, Judge Thorp and Mr. Vermillion. Judge Thorp testified he was acquainted with William L. Stephens in his lifetime. On the 21st of January, 1906, he was at the home of Mr. Stephens. Mrs. Lind'sey, his daughter, told him that her father wanted him to
Mr. Vermillion, one of the subscribing witnesses, testified that he knew Mr. Stephens in his lifetime, and signed the document drawn up as his will on January 21, 1906. He did not remember what Mr. Stephens said about the instrument, but he understood that it was his desire that he should witness it.' He testified that was his signature to the will and the other was that of Mr. Robbins. They signed it in the presence of each other. Mr. Stephens was asked to sign the paper and they held the paper up for him, but he could not sign it. He had great trouble in breathing when this will was written. He seemed to know what he wanted when he spoke to the person waiting on him. Mr. Thorp had just finished reading the will to Mr. Stephens. When he went into the room Mr. Stephens seemed to acknowledge the will. “I thought he was dying, he never asked me directly to sign the instrument.” He did not think Mr. Stephens understood the nature of the transaction he was engaged in or the extent of his bounty or the object of his bounty. When the question would be asked him if that was satisfactory, or shall I do this, he would nod his head. Mr. Thorp asked him to sign the will in the presence of Squire Stephens. He asked Mr. Stephens if that was satisfactory and he nodded his head.
Mrs. Pharis, a daughter of the testator, corroborated the testimony of Judge Thorp in all respects as to what occurred as to the request of her father to Mr. Thorp to write the will and of her procuring the
Dr. Schultz testified that he called on Mr. Stephens on Sunday, January 21, 1906, the day of the execution of the will, between nine and ten o ’clock in the forenoon and his mental condition was good at that time. He did not see him after that time before his death. Other witnesses testified that while the testator was very weak at the time he signed the will his mind was clear and he was conscious of what he was doing.
The old will was admitted in evidence by the court as going to the question of the testator’s mental condition and for no other purpose, - fox the reason that the other witnesses had testified that this old will was read to the testator at the time of the execution of the last will. To the admission of this old will the plaintiffs at the time objected and excepted. The inventory and appraisement of Mr. Stephens’s estate was offered and admitted in evidence over the objection of the plaintiffs but neither party has incorporated these documents in their abstract of the record.
On the part of the plaintiffs, Mrs. Lindsey, one of the plaintiffs, testified -that she went to see her father at eleven o’clock on Sunday before he died on the next Monday. He was in great pain, very nervous and restless. He did not have mind enough to hold any conversation with any one. The will was written about two o’clock Sunday afternoon. Mr. Thorp took Ms hand and made the mark to the will, then they laid Mm down and he said nothing, only, “Lay me down.” He said, “Take the tobacco off of the bed,” and he thought he was talking to the hired man, named Cox. Just once in a while he knew us.
Louis N. Stephens, one of the executors named in the will, testified that his father got worse about noon on Friday. He did not see his father sign the will. Pie saw Mr. Thorp writing on a stand close by the bed. He did not hear any one ask the witnesses to sign the will. He was excited. I think he knew what he was doing. He testified that his father and mother gave him eighty acres of Kansas land, worth $350', a horse and a cow. His father had eighty acres of land when he died. It was worth sixty dollars per acre.
Daniel Stephens, another son, testified that he was there on Friday a few hours only. In the evening liis father got out of his head and talked about tobacco. He was a little weaker on Saturday. He asked him to have a chair. “I do not know whether he was talking about tobacco that day or not.” He was out of his head when he talked about tobacco. Witness was not there on Sunday. All that his father ever
Mrs. M. Ei. Stephens testified to the extreme debility of the testator at the time the will was made and of his inability to sign the will. • She said that Mr. Thorp did the writing and Mrs. Pharis did the reading to. him.
In rebuttal O. O. Graves testified on behalf of the defendant that Mr. Stephens always recognized him even np to ten minutes before he died. He was too sick to talk much, but he always recognized him. He was a strong man intellectually.
Mrs. Louis Simmons testified that she was the stepdaughter of William L. Stephens, and she was at the home of Mr. Stephens from the time he was taken sick until he died. She was there when his last will was written by Mr. Thorp; she was in and out of the room during all the time; that Mr. Stephens knew what he was doing and knew the time he was to take his medicine and everything. His mind was sound and he knew every thing that was said.
Mrs. Mary Virginia Stephens, the widow, testified and fully corroborated the statements of Judge Thorp and Mrs. Pharis as to what occurred in the sick room at the time the will was drawn and witnessed. Her testimony, denies the exercise of any influence whatever over her husband as to the disposition of his property and the execution of his will. This is sufficient statement of the facts.
I. It is insisted by the plaintiffs that the burden was upon the proponents to establish the due execution of the will and that they have utterly failed to do so, and there was no will. They insist that the testator had not mental capacity to make a will and was not capable of comprehending and did not comprehend at the time the will was written the nature and kind of his property and the persons who reasonably would
The law presumes that a testator is of a sound and disposing mind until there is evidence tending to overcome this presumption. [Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 175.] "While, of course, the jury were necessarily required to take into consideration the age of the testator, who was then a man eighty-two years old, and the extreme illness with which he was then suffering, these facts of themselves did not constitute him incapable of making a will. The law looks to the capacity of the mind, and if a testator had sufficient understanding and intelligence to know or understand the extent of his property and the persons who were the natural objects of his bounty, and to know the business that he was about and the manner in which he wished to dispose of his property, it was sufficient, and so the circuit court correctly instructed the jury. The jury had before them all the witnesses, and the testimony of the attending physician that the testator was perfectly rational up to nine or ten o’clock of the day on which he executed the will at two o’clock that afternoon, and the testimony of Judge Thorp' and other members of the family, and it was their province to believe their testimony, and if they did, unquestionably the testator knew not only what he was about, but had in mind all of his children, not only those living, but those who had died, and knew that he was making a disposition of his property.
"When it is considered that he had only eighty acres of land on which he was residing and a small amount of personal property, it certainly was not a difficult matter "for him to have his property in mind. The contest of a will is a civil case, and where, as in this case, the capacity of a testator to make the will in question was submitted to the jury under correct
We might add that the very changes which the testator desired to make in his former will themselves demonstrate the clearness of his conception of thé change in the conditions from the time he made his first will some ten years before that time. During that time two of his children had died and he remembered that he had given only five dollars to his first children in the first will and he desired to increase that in this will.
II. Counsel for the plaintiffs also assail the execution of the will on the ground that he himself did not request the witnesses to sign and attest the same, hut here again they are confronted with the testimony that he had sent for Mr. Robbins and Mr. Vermillion for this very purpose and when Mr. Robbins came into the room and shook hands with him, he remarked to him. that he had witnessed his first will, and he
III. It is insisted that the circuit court erred in' admitting the former will in evidence. It will be remembered that the learned circuit court admitted this former will solely for the purpose of showing the mental condition of the testator and the state of his affection. But not as evidence of the fact stated in that will. It is significant that the testator himself' called for this old will without any suggestion from any member of his family or from the scrivener who was to write the will. The changes in that were few and simple. Two of the children had died and their names were omitted in the last will, a change was made simply in the amount of the bequests to the older children, and at the suggestion of Judge Thorp he omitted the useless grant of power to his executors to sell his real estate for the purpose of paying his debts. With these small changes the last will was a practical copy of the first and tended to show that his affection remained at the last just as it was ten years before when he exe
IV. On the issue of undue influence, the court instructed the jury that it devolved upon the plaintiff to prove the undue influence alleged in the petition, but that it was not necessary that it should be proven by direct evidence but might be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the case if they were of sufficient
These instructions were in harmony with instructions on the same subject requested by the plaintiffs and given by the court and properly declare the law of the case. While the court submitted this question to the jury and the jury found there was no undue influence, it is extremely doubtful whether there was sufficient evidence upon which to submit such an issue to the jury. But of course, the plaintiffs are in no position whatever to complain on this ground. We have been unable to find any error in the admission of the testimony or the instructions of the court. The cause was well tried and submitted to a jury of the county in which all the parties reside and as already said there was ample evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury if they believed it, and such being the case their verdict should not and will not be disturbed. The judgment is affirmed.