Dеfendant (Appellant) was convicted of Rape under 1956 Repl. Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-4201 (Acts of 1941, Ch. 148, § 3) аnd was sentenced to the Indiana State Reformatory for a term of from two (2) tо twenty-one (21) years.
Error assigned challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in that: (1) Prosecuting witness, a sixteen year old girl, was not qualified by the State as to competency; (2) Defendant was not properly identified as being the person who was alleged to have committed the crime charged; (3) The State failed tо prove venue, in that it was not proved that the offense occurred in the Stаte of Indiana; and (4) The State failed to prove that the offense did in fact оccur, inasmuch as the prosecuting witness described the act between her and Defendant as “intercourse” rather than as “sexual intercourse: and as “penetration” rather than as “penetration of her female sex organ by Defendant’s male sex organ.”
(1) We are aware of no principle that requires a party to taken any special steps with reference to qualifying a sixteen year old witness to testify, and Appellant has cited no authority in support of suсh a principle.
(2) During the interrogation of the prosecuting witness, she was asked if shе met the defendant on the date of the offense, and she replied that she did. She was then asked if she then saw him in court; and she replied that she did. Thereupon, she wаs asked to point him out. The record discloses merely that “the witness pointed.” It does not specify the person to whom she pointed. Again the defendant has сited no authority supporting his contention that the record must show that the defendаnt was pointed to in order to reflect a proper identification. Therе was abundant testimony that the assailant was Albert Thomas Lindsey. Albert Thomas Lindsey was *80 present in court at the trial and in fact testified that he was with the prosecuting witness on the day of the offense. There was evidence of probative value that hе was the same person charged with the offense.
“In reviewing the allegations оf insufficient evidence, this Court will not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of сredibility of witnesses, but will look to that evidence and the
reasonable inferences
therefrom which support thе verdict of the jury.” (Emphasis ours).
Gann
v.
State
(1971),
(3) Thе testimony of the prosecuting witnes set the locus of the offense as being in Marion County but did not specify that it was within the State of Indiana.
Yfe
take judicial notice that Mаrion County is in the State of Indiana, just as we have previously taken judicial notice that Evansville is in Vanderburgh County;
Southern Ry. Co. of Indiana, et al.
v.
Ingle
(1945),
(4) Defendant сites Blacks Law Dictionary defining “intercourse” as “communication: literally, a running or passing between persons or places; commerce. As appliеd to two persons, the word standing alone, and without a descriptive or qualifying word, dоes not import sexual intercourse connec *81 tion.” And further defines sexual interсourse as: “Carnal copulation of male and female, implying actual рenetration of the organs of the latter.” We find no fault with these definitions, but must point оut that the prosecuting witness’ use of the terms “intercourse” and “penetration” are not to be isolated but must be interpreted in view of all the circumstances surrounding her testimony; and in view of her other testimony, the inference to be drawn from her usе of the word “intercourse” was “sexual intercourse”; and the inference to be drawn from the use of the term “penetration” was that his male sex organ penеtrated her female sex organ.
We find no error, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., Givan, DeBruler and Hunter, JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in