*1 hоlding under section Such 24-10-108 view, contrary, my
would be both the
plain language of that section and our sover- immunity
eign jurisprudence, including our
unique common law and the GIA. Because necessarily
the “bar to suit” our GIA
requires immunity a determination of that is case,
intertwined with the merits I plaintiff
believe a is entitled to a full fair claim,
hearing hearing on the merits of his always guaranteed
that is not under C.R.C.P.
12(b)(1). agree prior dismissal, I
plaintiffs provided should be with a full and however, hearing, contrary majori-
fair
ty, I type pretrial would leave the motion parties
utilized to the and the discretion of
the trial court.9
IV
Because the determination as to whether a Fogg’s may
bar to claim exist under the GIA
is so “intertwined with the merits” of his
claim, agree I that the trial court’s reliance 12(b)(1)
upon C.R.C.P. dismiss was Accordingly,
error. because I too would re- remand, only
verse and I concur in the re-
sult.
Gregory LINDSEY, Petitioner,
The PEOPLE of the State of
Colorado, Respondent.
No. 93SC167. Colorado,
Supreme Court of
En Banc.
March 1995.
Rehearing April Denied 1995. Moore, ally procedure contemplate 2A James W. Moore's Federal Prac- our rules of also other ¶ (2d 1992). motions, tice ed. 12(b)(5) 12.07[2.-2] 12-60 pretrial including for failure to summary judgment state a claim motion My reading §§ of pretrial 24-10-108 24-10-109 dismissal under C.R.C.P. 56. 12(b)(1); does not limit motions to Rule *2 following
examination of victim the as- expert sault. The court also allowed testimo- ny probability that the regarding the defen- profile pro- DNA match a dant’s would DNA randomly Afri- file obtained from a selected Lindsey argues can American individual. improperly that the trial court admitted the procedure DNA evidence because the used to compute probability of the statistical a ran- Vela, F. Colorado State Public De- David profile dom DNA match was not Gerra, fender, Deputy Pub- and Martin State accepted by when Denver, Defender, petitioner. lic the trial ruled that the was court evidence admissible. Norton, Gen., Atty. Stephen A. K. Gale ErkenBrack, Gen., Atty. Deputy Timo- Chief Gen.,
thy
Tymkovich,
M.
Sol.
and Deborah
A. Facts
Pratt,
Atty. Gen.,
En-
Isenberg
Asst.
Crim.
16, 1988,
February
wearing
man
Section, Denver,
On
for respondent.
forcement
Springs
mask broke into a woman’s Colorado
sexually
home and
her.
assaulted
She did
ROVIRA delivered the
Chief Justice
at
Opinion
not look
her attacker who
him-
of the Court.
identified
police
self as a
man”.
told
“black
She
she
granted
People
We
certiorari
v. Lind
believed
man
attacked her
next
who
lived
sey,
(Colo.App.1993),
gether with at both evidence obtained crime Diagnostic Corporation scenes Cellmark I. AND FACTUAL PROCEDURAL (Cellmark) analysis. for DNA Cellmark’s re- BACKGROUND port declared a match between the DNA (Lind- defendant, Gregory Lindsey Lindsey’s sample extracted from blood sey), degree convicted of first sexual was the DNA from both crime scenes. recovered assault, degree burglary, second and four originally charged single was trial, counts. At habitual criminal the court information assault on vic- with sexual both to introduce evidence that allowed granted Lindsey’s tims. After court mo- samples matched defendant’s DNA charges, January taken fluid medical tion to from seminal obtained sever the assault case was tried first.1 At the trial of jury of the DNA evidence while February People’s 1988 assault case the January selection in the 1988 assault case experts regarding testified undеrway (January hearing). At Lindsey’s profile would match the hearing this recalled Drs. Hous- profile randomly of a selected African Ameri- man presented testimony Garner and *3 ranged can individual. The estimates from from expert an additional who testified re- one 340 billion down to in 21 one million garding general acceptance the of the meth- using more conservative calcula- ods used to calculate random probabil- match tions. Again, Lindsey ities.3 presented contrary no Following
evidence.
hearing
the
the trial
proceedings
B. Pretrial
court ruled that
DNA
completed by Cellmark was admissible under
evidence,
admitting
Prior to
the DNA
Frye
test.4
trial court
proceedings
conducted
to deter-
admissibility
mine its
v. United
Upon
January
conclusion of the
1988 as-
States,
(D.C.Cir.1923).
evidence.6
was in
claimed Cellmark’s database
Frye hearing
ruled that
for a
tion
new
disequilibrium causing
cal-
the random match
respect
had been met with
test
to be
the court
culations
unreliable. Because
analysis and
both
already
had
ruled that
the DNA evidence
calculating
random
the statistical methods
Frye test,
the court
was admissible under
objected, ar-
probabilities.7 Lindsey
Lindsey’s
ana-
ruled on
motion
limine
typing procedures,
guing Cellmark’s DNA
Lindsey’s
lyzing
objections
under CRE
upon
genetic probes relied
particularly the
and 403. The court summarized the testimo-
segments, had not
polymorphic DNA
isolate
ny:
community.
accepted by the scientific
been
unanimously
The Defendant’s witnesses
granted Lindsey per-
response,
the court
agreed
predic-
that no reliable statistical
*4
to
in limine to address
mission
file a motion
probability
tion of
of a match
two
between
regarding
his
Cellmark’s DNA test-
concerns
unrelated individuals could be established
ing protocols.
upon
system
the evidence or the
utilized
motion,
requested
filed such a
and
by
prosecu-
Cellmark. Witnesses
the
suppress
that
the
the DNA evidence.
court
study
recognized
tion have
that
further
requested
At
he
reconsidera-
the same time
refining
and
con-
should
Frye hearing.
a
The
tion of the denial of
tinue,
testify
technique
but
that
the
was
argument on
in li-
court heard
the motion
point
at
reliable
this
to establish the identi-
February
Although Lindsey
in
mine
ty
persons
degree
to a reasonable
of
originally objected
genetic
to Cellmark’s
probability by
scientific
in com-
utilization
hearing
probes,
argument
at
his
focused
paring
Applying
the
DNA
patterns.
Rule
Evidence,
procedures
used
on the statistical
Cellmark
of the Colorado Rules
the
State,
(Fla.Dist.Ct.
analyzing
6. Andrews v.
We
propriate.
explained
In Fishback we
in Fishback the United
since our decision
typ-
rejected Frye
for DNA
Supreme Court has
as
relevant
States
ing
disciplines.
of scientific
included several
the standard
Here,
289
See,
Devlin,
genetics
demographics.
erally.”
e.g.,
genetics, human
Commonwealth v.
149,
353,
365 Mass.
Id.
310 N.E.2d
356 n. 3
(1974) (requiring
authority
“substantial
for”
inquiry
de
The more difficult
involves the
acceptance
community).
within the scientific
theory
termination of when a novel scientific
general
Nor are
accep-
we of the view that
“generally accepted”
is
within the relevant
requires
tance
the trial court to “count scien-
community. Frye
clarify
does not
noses,”
Frye.
tific
an often voiced criticism of
general acceptance.
In Fishback we ex
Downing,
See United States v.
753 F.2d
plained
“party
prove
a
need not
the absolute
(3d
1224,
Cir.1985);
1238
but see
v.
validity
producing
of the
used
263,
Perryman,
(Colo.App.1993)
859 P.2d
268
novel scientific evidence before it can be ad
(explaining
testimony
reliance on the
of a
unanimity
mitted.” Id. at 884. Scientific
single
appropriate
witness is
when “the wit-
nor,
instances,
required
neither
some
de
qualified
skill,
through knowledge,
ness is
Recently,
ap
a
court
sirable.
California
training,
experience
education or
to render
rejected
peal
argument
that the existence
opinion
general
an
acceptance
as to the
of the
in a
of “two sides”
scientific discussion re
techniques....”)
evidence,
quires
exclusion
total
ex
plaining
admissibility required
“Generally” accepted
if
accepted
absence
means
“in a
Copernicus’s theory
reasonably
of debate “even
of a sun-
inclusive manner.” Webster’s 3d
(1986).
system
Dictionary
centered solar
could not be men New International
954
Frye,
requires
in a court of
tioned
law....
The flat earth Under
this
the trial court to
Soto,
society
carry
day.” People
give qualitative
would
v.
consideration to the evidence
340,
846,
court,
Cal.App.4th
Cal.Rptr.2d
presented
30
35
the state
science ascer-
(1994).
Leahy,
commentary
also
v.
tainable from scientific
See
Cal.
(Cal.1994)
655,
Rptr.2d
journals,
rulings
jurisdictions
at
ed that the need not be IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ‘unanimously endorsed’ the scientific com appellate “[I]t is the task of an court munity ‘generally acceptable must but be as reviewing determination to assess ”). reliable.’ gener whether novel scientific evidence was “generally ally accepted
This court has adhered to the
in the relevant scientific com
accepted”
implicitly
standard.
have not
it
We
munities
the time was offered into evi
demanding
created a more
standard
dence at trial.”
290
Frye.
requires
evaluation under
See
general
ations,
of whether
the determination
(Colo.1991).
1,
Campbell People,
814 P.2d
8
admit the evidence is
acceptance existed to
Accordingly,
review the
made clear
Fishback where
we
This view was
question of law.
test de
“to the trial courts the initial determi-
application of
we left
trial court’s
Giannelli,
Admissibility
whether,
of
light
The
of events which
nation of
novo. See
Evidence, supra at 1222-23
subsequently to the trial
have occurred
Novel Scientific
case,
an
qualification
calculating
of
(explaining that while the
the method for
the sta-
this
discretion of the
expert
frequency
within the sound
match re-
is
tistical
of a declared
“process”
Fishback,
judge,
qualification
generally accepted.”
trial
851
mains
law);
of
see also
as a matter
is better viewed
P.2d at 895.
Watson,
915,
Ill.App.3d
196
People v.
257
Here,
underlying theory
question
634,
89, 95,
(finding
629 N.E.2d
Ill.Dec.
quantify
probabili-
whether scientists can
matter of law for
acceptance a
of scientific
pro-
ty
will have DNA
that two individuals
denied,
court),
Ill.2d
appeal
appellate
highly
characteristics at
files with the same
(1994).
182,
519,
642 N.E.2d
205 Ill.Dec.
using
calculations
polymorphic loci
statistical
genetic principles.24
on known
We
based
theory and
A. Scientific
misconception that the
take care to avoid the
under consideration
theory
probability
somehow relates to
of
test
Central
the crime. See
that a defendant committed
theory
is the identification
Keohler,
Exaggera-
Error and
Jonathon J.
scrutiny.
to
techniques under
Were we
of
Evidence at
tion in the Presentation DNA
theory to relate
broadly
define
(1993).
21,
Trial, 34
J.
31-32
Jurimetrics
analysis
inquiry would end.
to RFLP
our
underlying technique
The
used to test the
narrowly
Similarly, if
too
and con-
we focus
theory requires creation of a database ade-
only the mathematical bases for
sider
statistically
quate
yield
significant allele
to
calculations, further examination is
statistical
frequencies
probability
for use in
calcula-
Indeed,
unnecessary.
raise the
theory
tions.
If the trial court concludes
question
whether the
calculations
any
generally accepted,
are
theories rise
undisputed
based
questions regarding
implementation
technique
to the level of novel
specific techniques go to the
require analysis under the
test. While
the evidence.
recognize that
the statistical formulae
we
frequencies are
applied to calculate allele
at trial
B. State of scientific evidence
type
physical
nor the
science
neither novel
Fishback,
Frye analysis,
Like
this case raises the
typically
such
associated
during
proceedings the
question
calculations
of when
a narrow view of the
applied.
intertwining
Frye analysis must be
In Fishback
ignores
inescapable
of statis-
acceptance
analysis.
assessed the
of the evidence
RFLP
In our view the we
tics with
trial court
with- with reference to the time the
formulae are subsumed
basic statistical
admission.
851 P.2d
novelty
typing, and involve the
considered its
in the
of DNA
trial court’s
physical
at 891 & n. 17.25 Because the
type
manipulation
apprоach
analogous theory
the Arizona court's
is no less time
in RFLP
is that
ours,
specific
be
based on their
individuals can
unique
identified
the court elects to take
than
rather
profiles.
snapshot
point
its
at a later
in time. In Fishback
explained Frye requires nothing more than
we
recognize
25. We
that our view of the relevant
general acceptance at the time the evidence is
Frye analysis
subject
for a
has been
timeframe
Fishback,
We now turn to the trial court’s evidentia- The of DNA in Forensic (Dee. 1991). ry Work, findings made at the motion in limine 254 Science 1735 Fishback, hearing. Contrary Questions regarding subgrouping again evi- where were acceptability dence of the of statistical fre- addressed in National Research Council uncontradicted, quency Technology calculations went see Publication DNA in Forensic Sci- (NRC 893-94, Lindsey’s Report) pre- 851 P.2d at at- ence first circulated substantial, publication copies early tack on DNA made available in Thus, years despite followed two basic themes. The first related two trial.26 after proceedings Report tíme of the in this case in 1988 and 26. The NRC also detailed an alternate 1989.”). calculating probabili- method of random match using "ceiling frequencies.” ties Under the NRC approach product applied by using rule is *11 292 probability evidence under product rule criticisms leveled
the later
“more relaxed” standard
CRE 702.
ruled on the admis-
analysis, when the court
at the motion
sibility of the DNA evidence
Lindsey’s allegations,
Contrary to
controversy had not at-
hearing the
limine
recognized that
appeals
court of
“forensic
recently
within the
dimension
seen
tained the
portion
application of the statistical
community.
analysis
Frye.
required
evidence”
Lindsey,
P.2d at 1089. The
People v.
868
supports
also
Review of the record
concluded, however,
that
ac-
court
ruling
the evidence.
trial court’s
to admit
cepted techniques for the calculation of ran-
questions
sub-
Lindsey’s experts raised
about
probabilities
existed at the time
dom
any empirical
present
grouping, but failed to
at trial.
Id. at
the evidence was introduced
the inde-
subgrouping
that
affected
evidence
agree
appeals
1089-90.
with the court of
We
Support
loci.
pendence of Cellmark’s VNTR
proceedings
that the district court
conclusion
Lindsey’s proposition that individ-
for
existed
Frye and
satisfied the standard under both
ra-
marry others
similar ethnic or
uals
CRE
however, Lindsey
backgrounds,
cial
offered
Assuming arguendo that
the trial
endogamous marriage
only speculation that
analysis
appeals’
court and court of
differed
linkage disequili-
Hardy-Weinberg or
caused
parameters
set
from the
People
in Cellmark’s database. The
brium
Fishback,
forth in
reversal of the conviction
effectively
mating
dеcisions
countered
Quintana,
required.
People
not
See
comparable
be
based on these loci would
(Colo.1994).
Quintana,
we ex
P.2d 1366
bloodtype.
mating
based on
Lind-
decisions
correctly
plained when a trial court
admits
large
sey’s experts
hypothesized
also
albeit under an incorrect rationale
homozygous
appearing in
frequency of
alleles
required
a conviction.
we are not
to reverse
evidence of sub-
Cellmark’s database was
Mathes,
See also
703 P.2d
equally
grouping. The
answered with
(admissible
(Colo.App.)
evidence does not be
experts who testified that this occur-
reliable
a trial court relied
come inadmissible because
frequency
shorter
alleles
rence resulted from
evidence),
inappropriate
on an
rule of
cert.
gel during electropho-
running
agarose
(Colo.1985);
Jenkins,
People v.
denied
resis.
(A
(Colo.App.1988)
P.2d
defendant’s
misconception
Lindsey
under the
labors
not
if a trial court
conviction will
be reversed
of a scientific debate trans-
that the existence
although by an
reaches the correct result
general acceptance.
into a lack of
As
lated
cert,
(Colo.1989).
analysis),
incorrect
denied
previously explained debate alone is insuffi- Hеre,
analysis
complex
court’s
previously
the trial court had
cient. Because
subject
not far
from the
matter was
removed
met,
that the
standard was
ruled
nearly
years
approach
provided
we
two
later.
in the views of
did not show shift
Fish-
Because we conclude that
community we hold that
result,
contrary
would not warrant a
we
back
and statistical evidence was
reject Lindsey’s argument.
the trial level under the
properly admitted at
evidence is
admitted dis-
Once
Frye test.
putes
reliability go
weight.
its
to its
over
Fishback,
at 892. In
See
851 P.2d
Allegations
C.
of trial court
explained challenges
implementa-
to the
we
error
accepted techniques go
tion and execution of
Id. at 893.
Lindsey argues that errors in the tri
of the evidence.
Here,
analy-
Lindsey’s
much of
attack
appeals’ legal
court of
focused
al court and the
procedures, including the size of
requires exclusion of the DNA evidence Cellmark’s
ses
specifical
database and whether the sam-
of his conviction. He
Cellmark’s
and reversal
truly ran-
ruling
pling of a Detroit blood bank was
ly questions the court’s
to admit the
alleles,
any
all
maximum
theoretically
for individual
maximum occurrence of
allele within
corresponding
considering
origins.
populations
increase in
without
ethnic
gеnotype.
duplication
Application
ceiling principles
of the entire
results in the
*12
anticipated.” Barney,
Cal.Rptr.2d
10
Lindsey
challenged Cellmark’s have
dom.
also
criteria,
problems existed with
alleged
Barney
744. The
court
on the Le-
focused
questioned
electrophoresis processes and
its
wontin-Hartle, Chakroborty-Kidd
debate
quality of
database autorads.
Cellmark’s
magazine
in
in
featured
Science
late 1991.
go
questions
In
these
to Cellmark’s
our view
Cal.Rptr.2d at 740. As a
Id. 10
result the
frequency analysis,
implementation of DNA
probability
statistical
evidence was excluded.
by
jury.
properly considered
Soto,
recently,
People
Id. Most
v.
30
340,
(1994),
Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.App.4th
35
846
typing
of DNA
evidence
D. Current status
changed
the court
direction and concluded
Finally, Lindsey argues that
er
testimony regarding
probabil
random match
might
admitting
ror in
the DNA evidence
Soto,
Kelly requirements.
In
ities met the
intervening
if “in
have been harmless
rejected
Barney analysis
the court
ex
gener
period,
those
have become
plaining,
showing that
“[w]e now have data
ally accepted.” Lindsey relies on the articles
population substructuring
‘forensically
is not
in which courts have
listed above and cases
significant’
estimating
the random likeli
See, e.g.,
rejected probability evidence.
рarticular
profile.” (citing
hood
aof
Bible,
549,
Ariz.
P.2d 1152
State v.
175
858
2).
IA,
report,
p.
by
FBI
Vol.
As evidenced
—
(1993) (en
U.S. -,
banc), cert. denied
these cases the debate seems to have turned
1578,
(1994);
221
114
128 L.Ed.2d
Peo
S.Ct.
questions
full circle as
are resolved
scientific
798,
Barney,
Cal.App.4th
10
ple v.
8
Cal.
People
are refined. See also
Porter,
(1992);
Rptr.2d
v.
731
United States
Wilds,
636, Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.App.4th
v.
31
37
(D.C.App.1992).
data available to determine whether
involved DNA
does not
us
forensically significant
prior
analyses
not
differences
to rule that
are inval-
might
using
popu-
place
occur when
different
id. To do
would
so
courts at
bases;
caprice
progression
preclude
lation data
of scientific
ceiling
principal
principle
28. Lander and Budowle focused on six
4. The
is so conservative
hampers
that it
the courtroom
objections
ceiling princi-
raised to the use of the
fingerprinting.
ple:
ceiling principle
actually guar-
5. The
is not
ceiling principle
premised on the
1. The
is
anteed to be conservative.
analysis
flawed
of Lewontin and Hartl that
report
causing
finger-
6. The NRC
is
significant population
is a
substructure.
there
printing cases to be thrown out of court.
ceiling principle
scientifically
is
2. The
objections
The article
answers each
these
populations
concluding
ceiling
flawed because it is not used in
that debate over use of the
Moreover,
genetics.
plan
sample
principle
purely
academic.
"The most ex-
10-15
positions range
treme
magnitude:
over mere two orders of
representations is unsound.
population frequency
whether the
ceiling principle
3. The
makes ludicrous as-
stated,
typical
genotype
four-locus
should be
sumptions
possible
about the
substructure of a
example
as 10 -5 or 10 -7. The distinction is
population.
irrelevant for courtroom use.” Id.
trial, gen-
was admitted at
based
date this evidence
admissibility of valuable evidence
erally accepted
the relevant scientific com-
on those theories
But,
majority
munities.” Id. at 893.
as the
time of trial.
accepted at the
recognizes,
[regarding
“the debate
analysis]
crystallize until late
did not
V.
rulings
year
evidentiary
after the
over one
summary,
the trial court
we find that
Maj.
[Lindsey]_”
op.
legiti-
at 291. We
analyzed
evidence
used in
mized the statistical
methods
applica-
and that
under
v. United States
Lindsey by
in Fishback. The
our decision
People,
P.2d 884
tion of Fishback v.
unchanged
of scientific evidence be-
state
(Colo.1993),
produce
not
a different
would
Lindsey’s
hearing
motion in limine
tween
Further, we find that the existence
result.
evidentiary hearing causes most
Fishback’s
not,
itself,
require
of scientific debate does
majority
beyond
opinion
to extend
or Fish-
exclusion
scope of the issues in this case.
*14
frequen-
hold that DNA statistical
back. We
Fishback,
In
“to
trial courts the
we left
the
analysis
generally accepted by
cy
was
the
of whether
...
the
initial determination
all
to
times relevant
calculating
frequen-
the statistical
method for
trial court’s decision to admit the DNA
the
cy of a declared match remains
judgment
typing evidence. The
of the court
Fishback,
accepted.”
P.2d at 895. How-
appeals
is affirmed.
ever,
limited to a
this determination was
which have occurred
consideration
“events
J.,
ERICKSON,
only,
concurs in the result
subsequent
trial [in
]....”
to the
Fishback
LOHR, J., joins in the concurrence.
added).
(emphasis
time lines of
Id.
The
MULLARKEY, J.,
in
concurs
the result
evidentiary findings
establish that
both cases
only.
simultaneously,
almost
so no sub-
were made
developed in
sequent scientific debate
time to
concurring in
Justice ERICKSON
the
our
in Fishback or
cast a shadow on
decision
only:
result
change
analysis.
our
Because
a reason to
view,
my
In
facts in
case do not
this
presents no
the context of this case
subse-
establishing
support
new standards or rules
consider,
quent
information to
the result
relating
of DNA evidence.
to the admission
determined, purely
simply, on
should be
by
in
is
Fish
The result
this case
controlled
to the facts of
of Fishback
(Colo.1993).
People,
back v.
tistical
concurring in the
MULLARKEY
Justice
typing
DNA
case related
only:
result
admissibility.
not its
As the
evidence and
notes,
majority
evidentiary time frame of
case,
majority
judg
In
affirms the
this
present
Fishback and the
case is almost iden-
admitting
appeals
DNA
ment of the court of
Fishback,
maj. op. at 291. In
tical. See
majority applies
The
typing evidence.
evidentiary hearing
conducted in Octo-
was
set
of scientific evidence
test for
Fishback,
at 891.
ber 1989. See
851 P.2d
States,
F. 1013
Frye
in
v.
out
United
evidentiary hearing in Lind-
The most recent
(D.C.Cir.1923).
adopted
test with
We
this
sey
February
In Fish-
occurred
typing
in Fishback
respect to DNA
back,
general acceptance we assessed the
(Colo.1993). Because
People,
the evidence. Petitioner, YARD,
DELTA SALES PATTEN, Respondent.
Pepper
No. 93SC699. Colorado,
Supreme Court of
En Banc.
March
Woodrow, Carey, Frank J. & Roushar Montrose, Woodrow, petitioner. Gen., K. Norton, Atty. Stephen A. Gale Gen., Timo- ErkenBrack, Deputy Atty. Chief Gen., Lip- P. Simon thy Tymkovich, Sol. M.
