Lindsay v. YatesLindsay v. Yates
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cole
OPINION
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge.Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas and Tina Lindsay brought suit against Defendants-Appellees JoAnn Yates, the Estate of Gene Yates, and Brent Yates (collectively, the “Yateses”), as well as Sluss Realty Company and realtor Carol Eicher, on the grounds that Defendants terminated a real-estate sales contract with the Lind-says one day after learning that the Lind-says are black. The district court dismissed the Lindsays’ complaint, concluding that they failed to plead facts establishing each element of a prima facie case as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Although the district court did not address it, the Yateses argued below, and now argue before this Court, that the Lindsays’ complaint must be dismissed for the further reason that they failed to plead facts showing that the purchase agreement executed by the parties was valid and enforceable.
For the reasons described below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The Lindsays are an African-American couple who reside in Richland County, Ohio. They allege that on or about August 8, 2004, Gene and JoAnn Yates contracted with Sluss Realty and Sluss realtor, Carol Eicher, to advertise the Yateses’ home in Lexington, Ohio, for sale. The Yateses’ home is located at 2268 Eckert Road, and the Yateses own several adjacent parcels of property, which were not for sale. In addition, the Yateses’ son, Brent, operates a business on one of these adjacent parcels.
Gene Yates died in January 2005, but the Yateses’ Eckert Road property re
On May 23, 2005, the Lindsays visited their soon-to-be new home to identify the property lines. At that time, they introduced themselves to Brent Yates. The next day, Sluss and Eicher informed the Lindsays that the Yateses intended to terminate the sales contract because JoAnn Yates wished to keep the house “for sentimental reasons.” The Lindsays appeared for the June 10, 2005 scheduled closing, but the Yateses did not.
B. Procedural History
The Lindsays filed suit on June 16, 2005, asserting that Defendants unlawfully refused to sell them the Yateses’ property on account of their race. The Lindsays brought claims for violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws, including (1) the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),
Rather than move to dismiss the Lind-says’ complaint under
The district court granted the Yateses’ motion on October 17, 2005, but not on the grounds urged by the Yateses or otherwise briefed by the parties. 5
Second, the district court
sua sponte
concluded that the Lindsays failed to plead a prima facie case of racial discrimination because they did not allege facts establishing that the Eckert Road property remained on the market after the Yateses rejected them.
Id.
at 4-6. The district court therefore dismissed all the Lindsays’ federal claims, dismissed the Lindsays’ state-law claims without prejudice, and stated that its order was final and appeal-able.
Id.
at 6. The district court never ruled on whether the Lindsays adequately pleaded facts regarding the existence of a valid contract, which was the entire premise of the Yateses’
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs complaint de novo.
EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co.,
246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir.2001). The same standards apply irrespective of whether the complaint has been dismissed under
B. Merits
On appeal, the Lindsays do not challenge the district court’s dismissal of their claim under
1. The District Court Erred by Requiring the Lindsays to Plead Facts Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Framework
The familiar
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
analysis applies to federal housing-discrimination claims, whether they are brought under the FHA or
If the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirements, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff. Mencer, 228 F.3d at 634. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason is a pretext. Id. “Although the burden of production shifts between the parties, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the process.” Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir.2007).
The question on appeal is whether, at the pleading stage, a housing-discrimination plaintiff must establish each of the elements of the prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint. As described above, the district court held that the Lindsays’ complaint failed to state a claim because they did not plead facts showing that the Eckert Road property remained available to other potential buyers, and that therefore the Lindsays did not satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case. Both the district court and the parties faded to consider controlling Supreme Court authority that contravenes the district court’s judgment.
In
Swierkiewicz,
the Supreme Court unanimously held that a plaintiff who asserted federal employment-discrimination claims was not required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case to state a claim for relief. The Court stated that “[t]he prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas
... is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”
Id.
at 510, 122 S.Ct. 992. Thus, the Court held that an employment-discrimination plaintiff satisfies her pleading burden by drafting “a short and plain statement of the claim” consistent with
Although Swierkiewicz was an employment-discrimination case, our sister Circuits have expressly extended its holding to housing-discrimination claims. Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs., 124 Fed.Appx. 686, 688 (2d Cir.2005); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061-63 (9th Cir.2004). Indeed, both the Second and Ninth Circuits have stated that Swierkiew-icz applies to any claim covered by the McDonnell Douglas framework. Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2006) (“The Swierkiew-icz holding applies with equal force to any claim ... that the McDonnell Douglas framework covers.”); Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1062 (stating that the reasoning of Swierkiewicz “applies to any claim to which the McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable ... ”). We agree.
Swierkiewicz
was not directed at explaining what an employment-discrimination plaintiff, in particular, does or does not need to plead to survive a motion to dismiss, so much as it was directed to
A fair reading of the Lindsays’ complaint shows that they have pleaded claims for which relief may be granted. The Lindsays have alleged the statutory bases for their claims (
2. The Lindsays Are Not Required to Plead Facts Showing That the Purchase Agreement Was Valid and Enforceable to State a Claim for Relief
The district court did not rule on whether the Lindsays were required to
In their complaint, the Lindsays pleaded that
Sluss Realty Company and Carol Eicher represented to the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ real estate agent, that co-defendant, Brent Yates, had authority to negotiate the sale of the real property and sign the purchase agreement on behalf of his mother, Jo[A]nn Yates, who was at that time out of town.
(Joint Appendix (“JA”) 21 (Comply 15).)
The Yateses argue that the Lindsays are required to allege that the purchase agreement is valid and enforceable in order to state a claim under federal and state law for housing discrimination. To do so, the Yateses insist that the Lindsays had to plead facts showing that JoAnn Yates authorized Brent to act on her behalf in negotiating and completing the sale. Paragraph 15 of the Lindsays’ complaint, set forth above, does just that. But, the Yateses disagree, arguing that it was not enough for the Lindsays to plead that Sluss and Eicher told them that Brent was acting on his mother’s behalf in arranging the sale, nor was it enough to attach to the complaint the purchase agreement, showing that Brent held himself out as his mother’s agent by negotiating the sale terms and signing the purchase agreement. Instead, the Yateses contend that the Lindsays were required to plead facts showing that JoAnn Yates represented to them that Brent was her authorized agent in the transaction. Absent such an allegation, argue the Yateses, the Lindsays’ claims are doomed.
In support of their position, the Yateses cite the recent Supreme Court decision in
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald,
546 U.S. 470, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006). The Yateses read
Domino’s Pizza
to stand for the expansive proposition that any time plaintiffs bring claims under
Domino’s Pizza
dealt exclusively with
Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.
Id.
at 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246. Applying this rule, the Court held that the plaintiff in
Thus, in holding that a
Here, there can be no doubt that the Lindsays are seeking vindication of their own contractual rights. Domino’s Pizza therefore has no bearing on their claims.
The Yateses also argue that the purchase agreement was not valid and enforceable under Ohio law. Just as Domino’s Pizza does not stand for the proposition that a housing-discrimination plaintiff must plead the existence of a valid sales contract to state a claim, neither do any of the Ohio cases cited by the Yateses. True, Ohio agency law provides that a principal will not be bound by the acts of an agent made in excess of the agent’s authority, Hairston v. Goodman, No. 58193, 1991 WL 39715 at *6-7, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1176 *16-17 (Ohio Ct.App. Mar. 21, 1991), but even according to the cases cited by the Yateses, questions of agency are evi-dentiary in nature. See, e.g., Minnielli v. Davidson, No. 95-05-090, 1995 WL 631606, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4788 (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 30, 1995); Hairston, 1991 WL 39715 at *1, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1176 at *1; Ottawa County Comm’rs v. Mitchell, 17 Ohio App.3d 208, 478 N.E.2d 1024 (1984). Thus, whether JoAnn Yates actually authorized Brent to arrange for the sale of the Eckert Road property, and what the scope of that authority was, are questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage, and may even turn on a credibility determination that is unsuitable for summary judgment. Accordingly, we hold that in pleading that Sluss and Eicher told them that Brent was authorized to arrange for the sale; that Brent did, through Sluss and Eicher, negotiate the sale terms and accept the signed purchase agreement and the earnest money; that Brent himself signed the purchase agreement; and that everything proceeded without incident until the sale was canceled one day after Brent learned they were black, the Lindsays have adequately stated a claim for relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
.
.
.
. Unlike a
. The district court couched its order as one granting relief under
.
Swierkiewicz
was discussed extensively by the dissent in the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Twombly
addressed requirements for pleading an antitrust claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The dissent argued that the
Twombly
majority had devised a “new pleading rule” that called into question the continued vitality of
Swierkiewicz.
127 S.Ct. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Supreme Court majority distinguished
Swier-kiewicz
and nowhere expressed an intent to overturn it, we have no basis for concluding that
Swierkiewicz
is no longer good law. Moreover, although this case does not present the question of if, or exactly how,
Twombly
has changed the pleading requirements of
. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework applies only when discrimination plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence to prove their claims. Thus, if, after discovery, the Lindsays are able to present direct evidence of discrimination, there will be no need to evaluate their claims under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting approach. See, e.g., Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., 61 F.3d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir.1995) (“The McDonnell Douglas formula is inapplicable ... to cases in which the Title VII plaintiff presents credible, direct evidence of discriminatory animus.”) (citation omitted).