120 Ala. 156 | Ala. | 1897
The bill was filed by the appellant to be let ixx to redeem real estate she had by mortgage conveyed to the appellee, a cox-poration.organized and existing under the laws of the State of Minnesota, having therein its domicile or principal place of business, and to enjoin the appellee from the exercise of a power of sale contained in the mortgage. The transactions involved, in all their legal aspects, are identical with the transactions which were the subject of extended discus
The further insistance of the appellant is that legalizing past transactions — the purging from the taint of usury the particular transactions to which the fifth section refers — is not a subject expressed in the title of the
The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been législative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the States in which a like limitation prevails. They are : “First, to prevent ‘hodgepodge’ or ‘logrolling’ legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and which might, therefore, be overlooked, and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they
The intent that this section shall operate retrospectively is clearly expressed in the section itself, rendering it, as we have already said, an expository act, and a usurpation of judicial power. Is the intent expressed in the title? Does the title fairly indicate that such is the operation of the section? Does it fairly suggest or give a clew that such is the legislative intention? The general words - employed as expressive of the subject, “to regulate the business of building and loan association in this State,” if dissociated from the abstract or catalogue. of the contents of the act immediately follbwing them, - are Of a very wide signification. They belong to a class of words, of .frequent use in the title of legislative enactments, such as “to provide,” “alter,” “ under take,” whichmay mislead the legislature and the public.-Ordronaux, Const. Leg. 591. If we dissociate these from the succeeding words, “defining premiums, fines, and stock taken to represent premiums,” to which this section must be referred, they are not capable of a construction which would comprehend the legalization of past transactions of the association, and, of consequence, a retrospective operation to the section. In Brunswick v. Mayor, etc., 51 Ga. 639, the legislature had passed- an act the title of which was, “To consolidate and amend the several acts incorporating the city of Brunswick, and for other purposes therein mentioned and it contained a provision to make valid and confirm “all the ordinances of the mayor and city council of the city of Brunswick heretofore passed, and not in conflict with the constitution of
There are several objections taken to the validity of the enactment, some of which, in relation to the title, if well taken, it may be, would annul it in its entirety; but we have not deemed it necessary to consider them, preferring, as- all the necessities of the case are met, to confine ourselves to the particular questions we have considered. The chancellor, in the decree rendered, proceeded on the theory of the validity of the enactment, and that it had legalized the past transactions of the association, removing them from the influence of the Falls Case. For the reasons given, in that conclusion he erred; the error compelling a reversal of the decree-: The mode of computing the account between the parties is indicated in the opinion in the Falls Case, and must be observed.
Reversed and remanded.