94 Ala. 170 | Ala. | 1891
— It is sought by the bill in this case to declare and enforce a trust against the respondents in respect of an one-third undivided interest in a certain quarter-section of land, to which they have the legal title, and of which they have been in possession, actually or by privity, since 1870. Complainant’s theory is, that she has a perfect equity in and to that interest; that the respondents hold the legal title in trust for her, and should be decreed to execute that trust by vesting title in her, and held to account for rents and profits accruing pending the existence of the trust. The facts are complicated, but the evidence which goes to establish them is substantially free from conflict. We encounter no difficulty in finding them to be as follows, as far as material:
William H. Price became seized and possessed of.the land in fee simple absolute about the year 1853, and continued in its occupancy for four or five years. In 1857, or 185S, lie sold the land by executory contract to Isaac H. Walker, and put the purchaser in possession. Early in 1860 Walker died, without having paid the purchase-money to Price, and without having received a conveyance of the land. Price became Walker’s administrator, and, in that capacity, took possession of the tract in controversy, together with other lands held by the intestate; and applied to the Probate 'Court for an order to sell all these lands for the payment of decedent’s debts. An order of sale was made; and, acting under it, Price sold on December 17th, 1860, all of said lands as the property of the intestate. At this sale Thomas E. Winston became the purchaser of the quarter-section in question. In accordance with the terms of the sale, 1 he purchaser executed his several notes with sureties for the purchase-money, and Price executed to him a bond for title, binding himself as such administrator to convey all the right, title and interest of the intestate upon payment of the purchase-money notes. Winston was let into possession immediately, and rented the land for the year 1861 to John A. Steele, who was a surety on .the notes given by Winston to Price as Walker’s administrator. At the close of 1861 Steele and Winston had a parol understanding and
After Price’s death, one Weatherford became the administrator de bonis non of the estate of Isaac Walker. Weather-ford having died, this administration was committed to Abner W. Ligón, general administrator for the county of Franklin, on January 25th, 1869. It does not appear that either Weatherford or Ligón ever made any efforts to realize on the Winston notes, by proceedings against the makers thereof personally, or against the land, until 1872. Then Ligón, as administrator of Walker, filed a statement of the notes as a claim against the estate of Thomas E. Winston. Lewis B. Thornton, having qualified as administrator de bonis non of Winston’s -estate, reported the same insolvent, and a decree passed so •declaring. The claim by Ligón was filed while the estate of 'Winston was being administered under this decree as insolvent, and ¡sending this state of things Ligón obtained an .order to sell the Winston notes, along with other claims belonging to Walker’s estate. At a sale under this order, James E. Moore bought these notes at the price of fifty dollars, which was distributed to the creditors of Walker’s estate, and was let into the representation of the claim based upon them against Winston’s estate. This claim was contested by Winston’s administrator, but whether meritoriously or not we are not-advised, as the objection was held not to have been seasonably made, and the estate wasujxm that ground adjudged to be liable for it (Thornton v. Moore, 61 Ala. 347), and the administrator compromised it with Moore by paying one
Whether or not Price and his privies are estopped to assert his legal title against Winston and those claiming under him and, among the rest, the present complainant, is a prominent, if not, indeed, a vital question in the case. The facts specially bearing upon this inquiry, which have not before been adverted to, are the following: In his petition to the Probate Court for an order to sell this along with other land as the administrator of Walker, Price alleged that his intestate died “seized and possessed” of all the lands sought to be sold ; and this averment is not in any manner qualified by the statement of any other fact or circumstance in limitation of Walker’s ownership. There is no intimation that Price himself and in individual capacity held the legal title, naked or otherwise, or any beneficial interest in the land, or any lien for the unpaid purchase-money. The order of sale which passed in response to this petition is likewise without intimation that any less estate, than an unincumbered fee in the land was to be sold. The sale under this order was made by Price in person. It is not pretended for respondents that, at the time and place of the sale, or at any other time and place, Price advanced, asserted or made known in any manner to those present at the sale, or to Thomas E. Winston who then purchased the land, that he, Price, had the legal title to the land and a lien upon it for the purchase-money due from Walker to him, or either, or that any other or less estate than the unincumbered fee was in the estate of his intestate, or intended to be passed by the sale he was then making. To the contrary, this record can not be read without enforcing the conclusion, that he gave no notice whatever of his personal title, or interest or claim in and to the property. Persons present at the sale testify, that the land was sold by Price as t-lie property of Walker’s estate. The bond for title, which he executed in his representative capacity to Winston, recites that the land was sold as Walker’s, and evidences an undertaking to convey the title thereto as
The estoppel thus on Price is equally efficacious in its operation upon all who claim under' or through him. They too will not be heard to say, as against Winston, or his privies, that Price, at the time of his sale as Walker’s administrator, had any claim or title to the land in his individual capacity. Wood v. Seely, 32 N. Y. 105; Parker v. Crittenden, 37 Conn. 148; International Bank v. Bowen, 80 Ill. 541; Kinnear v. McKey, 85 Ill. 96; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 383; Kennedy v. Brown, 61 Ala. 296; Hendricks v. Kelly, 64 Ala. 388; Taylor v. A. & M. Association, 68 Ala. 229; Wortham v. Gurley, 65 Ala. 356.
And this principle has been carried, in the decisions of this court, to the extent of giving effect to the estoppel even upon Iona fide purchasers for value and without notice of the facts operating the estoppel upon their grantor. The one fact that they are privies of him who is estopped, and in respect of the estate upon which the estoppel operates, is, according to these cases, quite sufficient to estop them also, notwithstanding their good faith, want of notice, and payment of a valuable consideration. — McCravey v. Remson, 19 Ala. 430; Adler v. Pin, 80 Ala. 354.
This doctrine, however, does not appear to be fully supported by the weight of authority, and, its soundness being questioned by some members of the court as now constituted, our conclusion, that the respondents are bound by the estoppel which rested on Price, will be rested upon another consideration. They are purchasers, it is true, in good faith, without actual notice, and for value. They are also, however, purchasers at a judicial sale, the sale made by Price’s administrator to Barton in 1872 under an order of the Probate Court. To such sales the rule of caveat emptor applies in its utmost vigor and strictness. The court orders the sale, in such cases, only of such interest and estate and rights in the premises as. he had and could have asserted ; no more, no less. The purchaser succeeds to his rights and attitude in respect of the property sold, “takes his shoes,” stands in his place, acquires his interest as the same existed in his hands, subject to all infirmities of title then attaching to the estate, and to all equities, known or secret, which operated a limitation upon the nominal or apparent estate of the intestate in his life-time. The purchaser buys at his peril; he takes upon himself the-risks of any outstanding rights that could have been asserted
There are some expressions to be found in opinions handed down here, indicative of a doubt in the minds of the writers as to “whether the rule of caveat emptor, which applies to judicial sales, will go further than to cover those defects which may be disclosed by an examination of the chain of title; or, at least, whether it would cover such secret equities as no ordinary diligence could discover.”— Wilson v. Hall, 83 Ala. 539. We do not share in this doubt. To give that limitation to the doctrine of caveat emptor, would be to emasculate it altogether. To hold that the purchaser at an administrator’s sale made under an order of the court of probate need only look out for defects disclosed by the proceeding in which the order is entered, and by the muniments of the intestate’s chain of title, would be to put such purchaser upon the footing of a vendee from an individual, and to strip the fact that .he buys at a judicial sale of all significance whatever; thus destroying the doctrine that he buys at his peril, and takes, not the estate the record and paper muniments indicate the intestate held, as would a vendee at private-sale, but the interest only which was so held in point of extraneous fact. We can not subscribe to the limitation suggested; but, on the contrary, adhere to the broad doctrine announced in the authorities cited, that the purchaser at such sale gets only such right, interest or estate as resided in the intestate, the apparent title being qualified and limited by • every fact or circumstance, whether in pais or of record, which would have constituted an outstanding equity against the decedent in his life-time; and applying this principle to the case at bar, we hold that Barton and those holding under him are estopped in like manner, and to the same extent, that Price would now be were he yet living.
We have not been inattentive to the argument for appellees against an estoppel upon Price and his privies, which proceeds on the theory that the estoppel is sought to be based on the acts of Price as Walker’s administrator. The theory is at fault in that it is Price’s conduct as an individual that is relied on to. estop him. His averment that Walker was “seized and possessed” of the land, his report of the sale, the title-bond executed by him as administrator, and his acceptance, as such administrator, of Winston’s notes — all repre
It may be conceded that the sale to Winston was originally inoperative to pass the interest of Walker’s estate, because of the absence of jurisdictional allegations from the petition for the order to sell, and hence that neither Price, as Walker’s administrator, nor any successor to him in that office, nor the heirs of Walker, would be estopped to question its validity, or to deny the claims of Winston and his privies under - it. All that may be conceded without in any degree affecting the rights of the present complainant, as against those of the respondents who claim under Price. They assert no right under Walker’s administrator or heirs, and their position is essentially in denial and repudiation of all rights in Walker’s estate. Their position is, that they have succeeded to the right and title which Price had, as they claim, as well alter as before the administrator’s sale, and which were not affected by that sale because, they say, it was Walker’s interest alone, and not Price’s at all, which was sold, and the only interest Walker had, they contend, was the naked privilege of paying for the land, and by payment acquiring title to it. They have no right to attack the sale by Walker’s administrator, because no interest they now assert, or have ever asserted, was involved in that sale, or passed by it. Whether the sale was valid or invalid can not concern them. Price originally could have attacked it, but only as the representative of Walker. Price’s successor in that administration could, at one time, have drawn it in question, but only in the interest of Walker’s estate. Walker’s heirs, had the estate been administered as a solvent one, might likewise have had its invalidity declared. So, too, it may be that Winston could have repudiated it. But no assault has ever been made upon it from any of these sources. On the contrary, it has all along been treated by every party having the right to avoid it, as a valid sale. So far as strangers are concerned, it has been a valid sale from the first, and parties to it have been, and are
The case is not like that of Owens v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547. The interest which the administratrix in that case had as an individual, in the land which she sold in her representative capacity, was an interest conferred by law, the right of dower, and attaching to all the lands of an intestate. The presumption is that all men have knowledge of this interest, as all men are presumed to know the law. The opinion proceeds on this theory, and can be supported upon no other. The court, among other things, said: “If the purchaser blindly bids off' the land, without inquiring whether the widow had relinquished her dower, or consented to a sale of it, electing to take a share of the proceeds in lieu thereof, it is his folly, and he has no one to blame but himself.”
Our conclusion that Price incurred an estoppel on the assertion of his individual rights in the land, and our views as to the effect of this estoppel upon the present holders of his title, dispose of the defense advanced on the idea that the respondents, who are now in possession claiming under Price, are entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers for value, adversely to them; and leaves for consideration the defense of laches on the part of complainant, and consequent staleness of the demand now asserted by the bill.
This defense is to be considered from two points of view— as respects the representatives and heirs of Walker’s estate, and with reference to the purchasers from Price’s estate. It may be conceded that, had twenty years elapsed from the last recognition on the part of Walker’s representatives and heirs of the sale to AYinston, the latter’s heirs, though infants during the whole of that period, could not demand a specific enforcement of the contract of sale. But, even passing over the fact that possession under that sale was held on the par/ of,
Mrs. Lindsay can not therefore be said to have lost any right against Walker’s estate, by negligent delay in asserting it. Has she been guilty of laches which will defeat her claim against those now holding under Price individually? On considerations already adverted to, the rights of these parties can not be helped out by any reference to the title or interest of Price in the land prior to the sale to Winston. Whatever rights they have are such only as have accrued to them by their own dealings with and attitude toward the land since Price’s death. What are these? The first transaction on their part, or which can be said to have taken place in their behalf, respecting the land, was in 1870. Till then they bear the relation of strangers to the subject-matter of controversy. At that time, Steele surrendered the possession of the land to Jones, as Price’s administrator. It can not be successfully contended that this act of Steele had any other effect than to put Price’s estate in the actual possession of the premises. There is no ground for any" insistance that under his parol agreement with Winston, assuming its validity and binding efficacy upon Winston and his heirs, Steele had any authority to surrender the land to Walker’s estate even, without saving
The complainant is, of course, entitled to the relief prayed against Walker’s heirs. The purchase-money having been in the manner detailed paid to the administrator of his estate, and distributed to his creditors, Mrs. Lindsay has a right to demand a conveyance to her of whatever interest his estate had in the undivided third part of the land which has descended to her, regardless of the original invalidity of the sale to her ancestor.
The effect of the estoppel on Price individually was not to pass the title out of him into Winston; and that title having passed into the respondents now in possession, the operation of the estoppel on them has not been to divest the legal title out of them and to vest it in Winston’s heirs, but only to prevent an assertion of it by them against the complainant, who is entitled moreover to whatever rights would have been hers had Price in fact had no title to or claim upon the land as he led her ancestor to believe. — Bigelow on Estoppel, 461; Grissler v. Powers, 81 N. Y. 57; Fall River Bank v. Buffington, 97 Mass. 498. And upon this principle, primarily she has a right to claim the conveyance of the legal title to a one-third undivided interest by those respondents in whom it is now vested, since, had the truth as to Price’s want of title been as he lead her ancestor to believe it to be, she would now be entitled to investiture of it by Walker’s heirs..
The decree of the chancellor is reversed, and that this aspect of the case may be further considered, if the respondents desire, the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.