Lindsay v. . AustinLindsay v. . Austin
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Brown
This was an action of ejectment to recover two tracts of land. The court submitted the following issues:
1. Are the plaintiffs the owners and entitled to the possession of the lands described in the complaint? Ans. Yes.
2. Was the defendant in the possession of the lands at the time this action was brought? Ans. Yes.
From the judgment rendered upon the verdict, the defendant appealed. The plaintiffs claim two tracts of land, containing five and one-half, and thirty-five acres, the former under certain deeds and the latter under a grant to William Mullis, dated 1822, and through mesne conveyances to themselves. The defendant claimed under an entry made in 1889 and a grant issued in 1890, and undertook to show continuous adverse possession from February, 1889, to the time of trial. The record in the case presents thirty-five exceptions, to which we have given consideration, notwithstanding a large number of them seem to have been abandoned, or not noticed by the defendant in his brief.
The defendant‘s principal exception is to his Honor‘s refusal to nonsuit the plaintiffs upon the evidence. This exception cannot be sustained as to the thirty-five acre tract. As to that tract, plaintiffs showed a grant in 1822 to William Mullis, registered between 1819 and 1824; a deed from Lindsay, executor, to Mary J. Lindsay, registered 20 April,
Of the other exceptions insisted upon by the defendant, we deem it proper to consider the tenth and eleventh, which relate to the location of the William Mullis grant, upon the locating of which, plaintiff‘s title to the thirty-five acre tract depends. The court instructed the jury as follows:
“If the jury find from the greater weight of evidence that the large rock pointed out on the plat at C is one of the natural objects in the line of the boundaries of the grant to William Mullis, then the plaintiffs had the right to reverse the calls in the grant, and run from said rock to find the beginning corner.”
This instruction was given at the request of the plaintiffs and the defendant excepted.
The calls of the William Mullis grant are: “Beginning at a red oak, John Mullis‘s corner, about 60 links from said branch and runs north 53 degrees east, 2 chains and 42 links, to a post oak, Jenkins’ corner; then north 73 degrees east, 20 chains to a pine, Jenkins’ other corner; then north 47 degrees west, 10 chains to a large rock; then north 9 degrees east, 18 chains and 50 links, to Pinion‘s corner stake, one post oak and pine pointers; then, with Pinion‘s line, south 51 degrees west, 22 chains and 50 links to Weatherford‘s branch; then down the various courses of said branch to the beginning.” The surveyor testified in substance that he failed to find any evidence to locate the red oak John Mullis’ corner, 60 links from Weatherford‘s branch, which is the beginning corner of the William Mullis grant; that he also failed (466) to find any evidence of the post oak at the end of the course north 53 east, 2 chains and 42 links to a post oak, Jenkins’ corner, and failed to locate by evidence Jenkins’ corner. The surveyor further testified that he did find the pine stump on the course reading north 73 east, 20 chains to a pine and that there was a solid line to the pine stump, “Jenkins’ other corner.” The next call is north 47 degrees west, 10 chains to a large rock, etc. The surveyor testified that he found
We think his Honor‘s charge is justified by the eminent authorities we have cited. If the large rock and the pine, “Jenkins’ other corner,” are located to the satisfaction of the jury, we see no reason why the method pursued by the surveyor, in following the reversed course, with proper adjustment, should not establish the beginning corner with reasonable certainty. We see nothing in Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N.C. 518, which militates against the position that this is a proper method of determining the beginning corner of this grant. There is testimony upon the part of the surveyor tending to prove that there was a solid line to the pine stump, being “Jenkins’ other corner” ; that he found the pine stump there. When he found the large rock and reversed his course, with proper adjustment, it carried him back to “Jenkins’ other corner,” and by continuing the reversed course it should bring him back to the beginning. The conditions seem to be present in this evidence which would make this case one of the exceptions
We think his Honor erred in respect to the title to the 5 1-2 acre tract. The plaintiffs showed no grant to themselves or to any one under whom they claimed for that tract. The plaintiffs offered evidence of possession of this tract during the years of 1866 and 1867, and from that time until 1889 there is no evidence of actual possession, consequently the possession followed the legal title which was in the State. Plaintiffs also offered evidence of possession from 1889 to the fall of 1896, and for the purpose of showing title out of the State relied upon the grant from the State to John M. Austin, dated 19 December, 1890. The right of the defendant to this 5 1-2 acre tract did not accrue until the date his grant was issued. At that time the title was in the State, the plaintiffs having failed to show title out of the State either by possession or grant. Inasmuch as the right of the defendant to sue did not accrue until 19 December, 1890, and as his grantor, the State, was not barred, the seven year statute (sec. 141 of The Code) did not begin to run until the date of his grant. Therefore, the plaintiffs have failed to show seven years possession under color of title since the date of that grant. Hamilton v. Icard, 114 N.C. 542. (470)
The judgment of the Superior Court in respect to the 35 acre tract is affirmed. As to the 5 1-2 acre tract the judgment is reversed and a new trial is awarded. Let the costs of this Court and the appeal be divided equally between the plaintiffs and defendant.
Partial new trial.
Cited: Land Co. v. Lang, 146 N.C. 315; Hanstein v. Ferrall, 149 N.C. 243; Gunter v. Mfg. Co., 166 N.C. 166.