125 Wis. 210 | Wis. | 1905
It is argued tbat tbe functions of tbe personal representatives of Jeremiab M. Rusk, deceased, bad terminated at tbe time tbey were given tbe right to file tbe cross-bill in tbis action, and tbat tbey therefore could not prosecute it for tbe benefit of bis estate and of the legatees imder bis will. It is undisputed that tbey bad been appointed in January, 1894, as executors of bis will, more than six years prior to tbe application and tbe order permitting them to be made parties in tbis action; tbat tbe estate bad not been finally settled; and tbat no order extending the time for tbe settlement of tbe estate bad been made by tbe county court, wherein the proceedings were pending. Tbe claim is tbat tbe statutes providing for tbe payment of debts and legacies and tbe rendering of an account by an executor or administrator impose a time limit wherein tbey must act, and tbat their functions cease at tbe expiration of such period. Tbe statute (Stats. 1898, sec. 3850) relating to settlements of estates provides tbat, on application of an executor or administrator for further time tq settle tbe estate, “the-court may, in its discretion, grant such further time for tbe payment of tbe debts and legacies and tbe settlement of tbe estate as tbe nature of tbe case may require, and may extend tbe time upon like petition and notice; but in no case shall
It is contended that the alleged cause of action set out in; the cross-bill for the wrongful appropriation of the good will by William E. Lindemann, as administrator of the bank’s affairs, does not suiwive his death, under sec. 4253, Stats. 1898. Assuming for the time that the cross-bill is sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is clear that the relationship of the deceased to the assets of the bank was that of a trustee, under the powers given by sec. 1764, Stats. 1898. He, in his capacity as such trustee, is charged in this bill with a wrongful appropriation of the assets. Any misconduct in his administration of the bank’s affairs is misconduct in his
It is also claimed that tbe cross-bill cannot be maintained in this action in tbe circuit court, since Mr. Lindemann is deceased, and bis estate is solvent and in process of administration,- and since tbe time for filing claims against -it has not expired; in other words, that the claim on wbicb tbe action is founded must first be presented to and passed upon by tbe county court. Tbe position is tahen that tbe county court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of all claims and demands, of whatever nature, against estates of decedents. This jurisdiction is not as exclusive as here insisted, but is subject to tbe modification established in Gianella v. Bigelow, 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. 111, wherein it is. said:
■' '“Although tbe ordinary jurisdiction .of courts of equity -over administrations has been taken away and conferred on probate courts, or has become obsolete; yet there still remains an auxiliary or supplementary jurisdiction, to be exercised in exceptional cases, where the jurisdiction of tbe probate courts is confessedly inadequate, or has been found insufficient; and tbe jurisdiction over estates, interests, and primary rights, purely equitable, and to administer equitable remedies, is nowhere lost merely because tbe interest, right, or remedy grows out of or is connected with tbe estate of a deceased person wbicb is in tbe course of administration,*227 even tbougb tbe administration proper, the accounting, and final settlement are carried on under tbe exclusive jurisdiction of another tribunal.”
It must also be remembered that when a circuit court has determined that an exceptional case of this nature is presented, and has taken jurisdiction thereof, unless clearly erroneous its decision will not be disturbed. Burnham v. Norton, 100 Wis. 8, 75 N. W. 304 The judicial policy on this. subject received legislative approbation by the amendment to sec. 3845, Stats. 1898, by ch. 5, Laws of 1899, which designates specifically what actions may be prosecuted against executors and administrators, and then adds the class, “and other actions in which the county court cannot afford a remedy as adequate, complete, prompt, or efficient as the circuit court.” Under the facts presented it is apparent that it was important that, if any liability existed against the estate,, all the parties beneficially interested in the recovery, as well as the bank, should be before the court, and- that this recovery be enforced in its right, which result could be most effectually and efficiently accomplished in an action for wind-, ing up the bank’s affairs and for. the distribution of its estate among creditors and stockholders.
It is also asserted that the receiver has the right to prosecute this claim against the estate, and that he could have proceeded as effectually in county court as in this action in circuit court. This contention disregards the interests of those beneficially interested in the bank property and their right to participate in the litigation for the enforcement of their interests in the matter. As equitable owners they have the rights of parties in the litigation, and they must not be deprived of the right to prosecute for the protection of those interests. These circumstances clearly bring the case within the exception above mentioned, and the circuit court acted properly in retaining jurisdiction and in directing that the claim be litigated and adjudicated in this action. Among
Another claim urged upon our attention is tbat, if any cause of action existed against tbe Lindemann estate upon tbe grounds alleged in tbe cross-bill, it could only be maintained by tbe receiver of tbe bank, and it was therefore error to permit tbe personal representatives under tbe Rusk will to prosecute it by cross-bill in this action. Under sec. 1764, Mr. Lindemann, as surviving director, bad tbe right to take possession of tbe bank’s property for its administration and final distribution. In this capacity be acted as trustee for those interested either as creditors or stockholders in tbe property. We then have a trustee and cestuis que trustent, tbe former holding tbe property subject to tbe equitable ownership of tbe latter. Any wrongful act by tbe one in possession through which the corpus of 'the estate was impaired was a direct injury to tbe beneficial owners, and equity recognizes their right to protect their interest and tbat of tbe estate if it can be reached by some equitable remedy. Since tbe trust relation existed between tbe Rusk executors and Lindemann as tbe surviving director and administrator of tbe property, which it is alleged be wrongfully appropriated, tbe former could, in an appropriate proceeding, enforce an accounting by tbe latter for tbe value of tbe property so wrongfully converted. This liability, being germane to tbe principal cause of action for tbe winding up of the bank’s affairs, is properly enforcible as a part of such proceeding. It was held in Gores v. Day, 99 Wis. 276, 74 N. W. 787:
“Directors are liable to be charged as trustees of property fraudulently misapplied or wasted by them, independent of any statute on tbe subject, but tbe duty of enforcing such lia*229 bility is in the managing officers of the corporation, though, it may be performed by the stockholders or creditors or possibly the assignee or successor of a corporation, when the circumstances are such as to make that necessary, independent ■of any statute on the subject.”
No difference in result is apparent whether the receiver appointed in this action or the Eusk executors, as equitable •owners of the property diverted by the trustee, prosecute the claim to compel restitution of the amount converted by the trustee, since the recovery, under either course, is for the benefit of the estate in the court’s custody, to be administered by it through the receiver. The object of the proceeding “is to accumulate in custodia, legis, in the form of money, the assets properly belonging to trust funds, so that an order of distribution may be made.” The executors of the Eusk estate had an interest in the bank’s property, and were under obligation to enforce every right growing out of it for the conservation of the estate, and to this end the court properly permitted them to prosecute the cross-bill. Land, L. & L. Co. v. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 245, 75 N. W. 964; Cunningham v. Wechselberg, 106 Wis. 359, 81 N. W. 414; Michelson v. Pierce, 107 Wis. 85, 82 N. W. 707; Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N. W. 909.
This action was prosecuted to final judgment after three years from the time the bank ceased to conduct a banking business under its articles of incorporation. It is strenuously insisted that at this time the corporation was extinct for all purposes, and that all actions then pending by or for it in its behalf abated. The claim is made upon the grounds that the power conferred by sec. 1764, Stats. 1898, to extend the corporation for three years to wind up its affairs .is exclusive of any other right or remedy for that purpose, and that, under the common-law rule, debts due it or owing by it are extinguished, and that its personal property then undis-posed of escheats to the state and its real estate reverts to its
“The rule of the common law has in fact become obsolete and odious. It never has been applied to insolvent or dissolved moneyed corporations in England. The sound doctrine now is, as shown by statutes and judicial decisions, that the capital and debts of banking and other moneyed corporations constitute a trust fund and pledge for the payment of creditors and stockholders, and a court of equity will lay hold of the fund and see that it be duly collected and applied.” 2 Kent, Comm. 307, note.
The reason usually assigned for rejecting the old rule and holding it inapplicable is that the rule had its origin at a time when corporations dealt almost exclusively with municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary affairs, and when the modem business corporation was unknown, and that the growth of these moneyed corporations necessitated the application of principles which would protect the private property interests of persons dealing with them under the changed conditions. To this end the rights aud interests in and to the property of business corporations are, in their essentials and nature, considered to be like those pertaining to partnership organizations; and when such corporation dissolves and thereby loses legal capacity to preserve its estate, a court of equity will, if necessary, lay hold of its assets to compel a final liquidation of its affairs and a distribution of the capital among the stockholders as in partnership associations.
“The stockholders stand on substantially the same footing as though they were partners of an incorporated association, save only the responsibility of each is limited to a sum equal to his share or shares of stock . . . and their liability more nearly resembles that of copartners than any other with which it can be compared.” Mason v. Pewabic M. Co. 133 U. S. 50, 10 Slip. Ct. 224; Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480; Bewick v. Alpena H. I. Co. 39 Mich. 700.
It is argued that the provision of sec. 1764 was intended by the legislature to furnish a remedy under these conditions, and that it therefore is exclusive of any other remedy to liquidate corporate affairs. The contention seems an unwarranted construction of this statute, in view of the requirements for the protection of private rights and interests in its assets. This section, in effect, extends the life of a corporation for three years to accomplish final liquidation of its affairs through its directors, and there is nothing which suggests that the usual equitable remedies should not be resorted to at the expiration of such period, if the directors fail to accomplish this 'object within that time. The statute prescribes that the directors shall continue to act for the corporation as legal administrators, with full power to settle its affairs, “subject to the power of any court of competent jurisdiction to make in any case a different provision.” This provision is indicative of a legislative intent not to limit or abrogate the powers vested in the courts to take in custody corporate property and assets for liquidation of its affairs and distribution of. its property. This construction is in accord with the usual practice in the wind-up action under the statutes of the state, and is sustained in principle by those cases.
This action was commenced within the three years immediately following the time to which the articles of incorporation limited the corporation to do a banking business, but
The trial court found that, at the time the bank ceased to do a going business under its charter, it “owned and was possessed of a good will, which was of the reasonable value at that time of sixteen thousand dollars,” and held that it had been wrongfully appropriated by William E. Lindemann, the
The record shows that the personal representatives of Jeremiah M. Rusk, deceased, commenced an action against William E. Lindemannj and those associated with him in organizing the new bank, shortly after the old bank ceased to do-a banking business and the new bank had commenced business, in which they charge the facts showing the organization of the old bank, its course and amount of business, the termi--nation of its banking business under the charter provisions,, the organization of the new bank by William E. Lindemann- and his children, the beginning- of their business on the day succeeding the cessation of the business of the old bank, using the same name, conducting its business in the same place, using the furniture and books of the old, and so conducting its business as to appropriate the good will of the old bank, and that Lindemann, as surviving director and administrator-of the affairs of the old bank, so manipulated its affairs as to endanger the security of the property of the old and opérate-lo the advantage of the new bank, in violation- of his duty as such surviving director, and prayed that he and his associates be restrained from using the name “Bank of Viroqua” as file-name of the new bank, and from handling, discharging, collecting, or intermingling the affairs or business of the old bank with that of the new one, and that a Receiver be appointed to take charge and possession of the affairs and assets of the old bank as well as the banking offices formerly-occupied by it, and then being used by the new bank for the-■purpose of settling and winding up its affairs. The defendants demurred to this complaint upon the grounds: (1) wan*"
“Tbe rule tbat a judgment in bar, or as evidence in es-toppel, is binding not only as to every question actually presented and considered and upon wbicb tbe court rested its decision, but as to every point tbat might bave been presented and decided in tbe case, ... is strictly accurate when applied to tbe cause of action in which tbe adjudication occurs, whether in tbe same or in some other case, but not when the-same question is subsequently raised between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. In tbe latter situation, tbe former judgment is binding only as to tbe matters actually presented and litigated in tbe former case.” Wentworth v. Racine Co. 99 Wis. 26, 14 N. W. 551; Grunert v. Spalding, 104 Wis. 193, 80 N. W. 589; Hart v. Moulton, 104 Wis. 349, 80 N. W. 599; Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 72 N. W. 390, 74 N. W. 220, 75 N. W. 945; Rowell v. Smith, 123 Wis. 510, 102 N. W. 1; Ellis v. N. P. R. Co. 80 Wis. 459, 50 N. W. 397; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Lewis v. Ocean N. & P. Co. 125 N. Y. 341, 26 N. E. 301; Waterhouse v. Levine, 182 Mass. 407, 65 N. E. 822.
Tbe records show tbat tbe causes of action in these cases are not identical, and it does not appear that tbe precise questions arising in tbis action were presented and decided in the-former; hence tbe rule of res adjudicata does not apply.
Some exceptions are presented on tbe Lindemann appeal as to tbe inclusion of some facts in the hypothetical questions submitted to tbe experts on tbe value of tbe good will wbicb are irrelevant to tbe matters alleged and not competent proof'
Tbe same appellants presented numerous requests for specific findings of facts, wbicb were refused by tbe court. Tbis action of tbe court is justified, since all material facts involved in tbe case are sufficiently covered by its findings.
It was found as fact tbat William F. Lindemann on January 4, 1901, borrowed $18,000 from tbe old Bant of Viro-■qua and gave bis promissory notes therefor, with interest, and tbat be pledged collateral to secure payment, and tbat be applied tbe money so obtained in payment of bis stock in the new bank. These notes, with interest, were paid by him during bis lifetime; and these sums went into tbe bands of a receiver and were by him, under order of tbe court, paid to tbe owners of tbe fund. It is urged tbat tbe court erred in denying tbe demand of tbe Bush heirs, declaring tbat tbe sum so borrowed be treated in equity as a trust fund in bis bands, and tbat its investment in the new bank be held as one made for tbe benefit of those interested in tbe fund of tbe old bank, and tbat "tbe stock purchased with it and tbe accumulated profits of tbe new bank be apportioned between tbe Bushs and tbe Lin-■demanns in proportion to their original interests in tbis amount. Tbe argument proceeds upon tbe basis tbat such an appropriation was an appropriation by a trustee having no interest in tbe trust- fund in bis bands. If such were tbe fact before us, tbe court’s decision would be surrounded with difficulties. It appears, however, tbat be obtained tbe money as a loan from tbe old bank, of wbicb be was a half owner, tbat bis interest in its assets exceeded tbe amount so. obtained by Tn'm, and tbat be dealt with tbe fund in every respect as a borrower from tbe bank. These circumstances tend to justify treating tbe transaction as a loan. Nor is it clear, under
An exception is urged to tbe amount of tbe allowance compensating William E. Lindemann for the services rendered by bim in winding up the bank’s affairs. It appears that be rendered services incident to settling tbe greater portion of its affairs, .and that tbe rate of compensation was less tban the court allowed tbe receiver for like services after Linde-mamn’s decease. It is shown that be received a salary as officer before tbe bank ceased doing a general banking business, and tbat tbe court allowed bim compensation for bis services at tbe same rate be bad been paid by salary. We -find no injustice or want of validity in tbis allowance.
Tbe foregoing covers all tbe questions presented for review. We find nothing in tbe record demanding a reversal or modification of tbe judgment.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed on both appeals.