270 S.W. 451 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1925
Reversing.
The appellant, Henry Linde, was convicted in the Hardin circuit court of the offense of selling intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, and on this appeal from the judgment pronounced on the verdict counsel urge two errors as grounds for reversal (1), improper questions propounded by Commonwealth's attorney in cross-examining defendant's character witnesses and (2), improper remarks made by him in his closing argument to the jury and to which the court overruled objections. The foundation for ground (1) arose in this way: Defendant introduced witnesses to prove his good moral character, as he had a right to do, and on their cross-examination by the Commonwealth's attorney he asked them, "Have you heard them (defendant's neighbors and acquaintances) talk about him being indicted for false swearing? Haven't you heard about him being indicted in this court?" Defendant objected, but the court overruled the objections and the witnesses answered that they had heard of no such thing. We think it well settled that even *100 proof only of an indictment against a witness whose character is sought to be impeached is incompetent, and clearly, merely an insinuation that such indictment had been returned, without proof of the fact, would be still more incompetent. At the time the questions were propounded to the witnesses by the Commonwealth's attorney no proof of such a charge, by indictment, had been introduced, nor did he attempt to do so at any time thereafter. A mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to condemn the practice, and we feel that further argument to demonstrate its incompetency as well as its prejudicial effect is entirely unnecessary. But, whether such an error alone would authorize a reversal of a judgment where the entire proof sustains the verdict of conviction with reasonable clearness, we need not determine, since the error complained of in ground (2) is undoubtedly sufficient for that purpose.
The facts with reference to ground (2) were: That in the closing argument to the jury by the Commonwealth's attorney he said, "Is it not strange that these witnesses for the defense had not heard of as serious a thing as being indicted or charged with false swearing, about which I asked them?" Defendant objected to that remark, but his objections were overruled, and he excepted. The Commonwealth's attorney then said, "I do not blame you for objecting to the testimony on that question," to which defendant objected and the court sustained the objection to it, but did not admonish the jury in any manner, and the defendant moved to discharge it because of the objectionable remarks, but the court overruled the motion and he excepted.
We have often had occasion, particularly in recent years, to lay down the limitations of the right of counsel, including Commonwealth's attorneys, in their arguments to the jury, the substance of which were, that they had the right to comment on the proof in the case and to draw all reasonable deductions therefrom and to even state to the jury their conclusions though they might be supported only by legitimate inferences drawn from facts for which there was testimony to support. Lawler v. Commonwealth,
It is also argued in brief for appellant that he should have been permitted to establish his good character as an observer of our prohibition statute by showing that he had the reputation of obeying it; but it is our conclusion that his rights in that respect were fully protected when the court permitted him to establish his good character for morality, uprightness and good citizenship in the community, for after all the one is included in the other, since it could scarcely be true that one possessed a good moral reputation and at the same time also possessed one for being a constant violator of the prohibition law.
For the errors above indicated, the judgment is reversed, with directions to set it aside and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.