MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The defendant Arab Bank pic (“Arab Bank”) has moved to compel the production of documents by nonparty respondents Israel Discount Bank of New York (“IDBNY”), Israel Discount Bank Ltd. (“IDB”), and Bank Hapoalim (“Hapoalim”), and to compel depositions of certain persons employed by the respondents. As discussed below, Arab Bank’s motions are granted in part, and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The above-captioned related actions involve claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 et seq. and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for damages arising from injuries and deaths caused by suicide bombings and other attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, primarily since the onset of the second intifada in 2000. Arab Bank is alleged by the plaintiffs to have knowingly sponsored such attacks by providing banking and administrative services to various organizations identified by the United States and Israeli governments as terrorist organizations. Many of the transactions that Arab Bank is alleged to have processed were for the benefit of charities that were actually fronts for the terrorist organizations that committed the attacks at issue. The various complaints include allegations that Arab Bank “knew,” or was “willfully blind to” the fact that its conduct would cause injury to the plaintiffs. Some of the complaints also allege that Arab Bank “should have known” or “recklessly disregarded” that its conduct would cause plaintiffs’ injuries.
The documents Arab Bank seeks to obtain from respondents include account and transaction records for charitable entities, documents concerning compliance protocols, and documents demonstrating the respondents’ knowledge of the nature of the terrorist front organizations. It argues that evidence that Israeli banks processed transactions for the very same terrorist front organizations that Arab Bank allegedly assisted is essential to counter the plaintiffs’ allegations that it “should have known” the charitable entities were terrorist fronts. After this motion was briefed, Arab Bank moved by letter to compel the respondents to produce certain individuals for depositions.
IDBNY has substantially complied with the subpoenа, but opposes Arab Bank’s motion to the extent that the subpoena requests that IDBNY produce documents held by IDB in Israel. IDB opposes Arab Bank’s motion on the grounds that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. Hapoalim, on the other hand, does not contest jurisdiction, but opposes discovery by Arab Bank on the grounds that various Israeli laws prohibit disclosure of the information sought, that international comity weighs against compelling production, and that the requests are overly broad and burdensome. The arguments concerning document discovery are discussed seriatim below, with the last section addressing the issue of depositions.
DISCUSSION
I. Israel Discount Bank New York & Israel Discount Bank
Respondent nonparty IDBNY is a bank chartered by the State of New York, with headquarters in New York City. It is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of respondent nonparty IDB, an Israeli corporation with headquarters in Israel. On October 31,
IDBNY has essentially complied with the subpoena. It has searched for and produced responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control, apart from those documents which are protected from disclosure under the bank examination privilege. To the extent that the subpoena seeks privileged documents and IDBNY locates such documents, IDBNY has agreed to identify such documents in a privilege log. (See, e.g., Resps. to Doc. Reqs. 3, 7, 8, 9.) It has made only limited objections to the requests on the grounds of relevance. (See Resp. to Doc. Req. 8.) It lodged a general objection, however, to the extent that the subpoena purported to require IDBNY to produce IDB documents located in Israel. (Objs. and Resps. of IDBNY to Subpoena, Ex. 4 to Young Deck, at 3.) Arab Bank argues that IDBNY should be compelled to produce these documents because IDBNY has the practical ability to obtain documents from its foreign parent.
Arab Bank also attempted to serve on IDBNY a subpoena seeking the production of identical information from its parent, IDB; IDBNY accepted service only on behalf of itself, however, not of IDB. Arab Bank argues that IDB should be compelled to respond to the latter subpoena served on IDBNY, because IDBNY is a “mere department” of IDB such that it establishes IDB’s presence in New York for purposes of personal jurisdiction.
A. IDBNY Should Not Be Compelled to Produce Documents Held By IDB in Israel
Under Rule 45(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena may command a nonparty served to produce documents that are in its “possession, custody, or control.” Arab Bank asserts that IDBNY has “control” over the documents in IDB’s possession, and accordingly, should be compelled to produce them. As the submissions make plain, however, IDBNY does not have “control” over IDB’s documents, and is thus unable to produce them.
“Control is defined not only as possession, but as the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand.” Searock v. Stripling,
IDBNY has submitted sworn statements that IDBNY does not have access to its parent’s documents in the regular course of business. IDBNY and IDB have separate cоmputer systems, and neither can access information in the other’s system. (Cappello
There is no evidence to indicate that the documents sought “flow[ed] freely” between subsidiary and parent. Hunter Douglas Inc.,
Finally, Arab Bank argues that an agreement by IDBNY to service seven loans originated by IDB through a Florida branch is evidence that IDBNY uses IDB’s documents in the regular course of business. The agreement at issue provided that IDBNY’s office in Floridа would service a small number of loans issued by IDB, after ownership of the Florida office was transferred from IDB to IDBNY. As a result, IDBNY had access to a number of IDB customer files related to the loans — none of which was located in Israel. This was apparently an isolated event which fails to demonstrate that, in the regular course of business, IDBNY has access to IDB customer files, and the fact that a separate agreement was needed in order to govern the access to the files only confirms that, as a general matter, IDBNY does not have such access.
These three pieces of evidence are insufficient to overcome the showing made by ID-BNY that it lacks control over the documents Arab Bank seeks from IDB. Accordingly, Arab Bank’s motion to compel IDBNY to produce documents of IDB is denied.
B. IDBNY Is Not A “Mere Department” Of IDB
Arab Bank next argues that IDB should be compelled to comply with the subpoena because service on it through its subsidiary IDBNY was effective. For New York courts to acquire personal jurisdiction over the parent based on a subsidiary’s presence in New York, the parent’s “control over the subsidiary’s activities ... must be so complete that the subsidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the parent.” Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfsburg, Germany,
There is no dispute in the instant case that IDBNY is wholly owned by IDB. The first factor — common ownership between the parent and subsidiary — is perhaps better characterized as a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign related corporation by a New York court. See, e.g., Delagi
As to the second factor, IDBNY, with significant assets of its own,
The third factor similarly weighs in favor of IDBNY. IDBNY typically appoints its executive level personnel without consulting IDB. IDB appears to have been involved in the appointment of only one executive, in which its role was simply to recommend a candidate for CEO, whom IDBNY ultimately selected. While three of IDBNY’s twelve-member board are directors or officers of IDB, they are not also executives or employees of IDBNY. In any event, “[h]av-ing common directors and officers is a normal businеss practice of a multi-national corporation and absent complete control [it] is no justification to labeling a subsidiary a mere department of the parent.” In re Ski Train Fire,
Moreover, IDBNY observes corporate formalities: it has its own board of directors, which holds regular mеetings, holds annual shareholder meetings, and maintains separate books and records from its parents and prepares its own financial statements. See, e.g., Stutts v. De Dietrich Group,
Finally, IDB does not exert control over IDBNY’s marketing and operational policies. IDBNY runs its own day-to-day operations, determines marketing and operational policies without interference by IDB, and hires, trains, and pays its own employees. The two entities have separate computer and phone systems, and the computer systems cannot access each other. They also maintain separate customer records and accounts, which they treat as highly confidential, and lack access to each other’s customers’ information. IDBNY designs and pays for its own advertising and promotional materials, including its website, as well as its own forms for banking transactions, without parental interference. Finally, it publishes its own policy manuals without prior review by IDB. (Spiegal Deck ¶¶ 15-19). IDBNY’s operational independence stands in stark contrast to the subsidiary in Beech Aircraft, where the court found the pаrent maintained “tight” operational control by (1) controlling virtually every aspect of the subsidiary’s marketing; (2) prescribing the subsidiary’s advertising campaigns; and (3) training the subsidiary’s employees.
IDBNY’s showing of operational and marketing independence is not overcome by the three facts relied on by Arab Bank to undermine that conclusion. First, Arab Bank focuses on IDB’s promise to banking regulators to “act to the best of its ability to assure the fulfillment of [IDBNY’s] commitments” to correct compliance deficiencies. (Young Deck, Ex. 6 at 51). But there is no indication that IDB exerted any operational control, took any measures to influence ID-BNY’s regulatory compliance, or assisted ID-BNY in paying $20.5 million in related fines. IDB’s assurances that IDBNY would comply with the regulators “to the best of its ability” is not a declaration of “tight control,” but rather of limited influence.
Similarly, the brief two paragraph memorandum written by lian Hadani, a Senior Vice-President of International Banking about his lunch with a banking contact at Arab Bank and carbon copying IDB executives does not reflect that IDB maintains operational control over IDBNY.
Finally, caselaw strongly supports the conclusion that IDB’s reference to IDBNY as an “overseas office” and an “Israeli bank operating abroad” is nothing more than a general description of a global enterprise of the kind typically found in advertising that does not demonstrate the parent’s control over the subsidiary’s marketing and operational policies. See, e.g., Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co.,
The caselaw relied on by Arab Bank for the argument that IDBNY is a “mere department” of IDB only serves to show how far they are from meeting the standard set out in Beech Aircraft. In Taca Int’l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd.,
Arab Bank also asserts that two inconsistencies emerge from the respondent’s submissions which are evidence that IDB has greater control than it admits, or at the very least, raises a question as to the level of control it exerts over IDBNY. The first is a discrepancy between IDBNY’s initial statement that it lacked all authority to accept service of legal process on behalf of IDB, and its amended position that it has authority to accept service of process only to comply with the USA PATRIOT Act.
In conclusion, Arab Bank’s motion to compel IDB to comply with the IDB subpoena served on IDBNY is denied because this court does not have personal jurisdiction over IDB through IDBNY’s presence in New York.
C. Jurisdictional Discovery is Unwarranted
In the alternative, Arab Bank seeks jurisdictional discovery to examine the range of IDB’s contact with the United States as well as the nature of its dealings with ID-BNY. Courts have broad discretion in determining whether to permit jurisdictional discovery. Some courts have required movants seeking such discovery to first establish a prima facie ease of personal jurisdiction over the targeted party. Jazini,
Thus, the court’s determination concerning whether to permit jurisdictional discovery in the context of a non-party subpoena is informed by several factors, including the relationship of the non-party from whom discovery is sought to the litigation, the likelihood, based on the information before the court, that personal jurisdiction will be established, and the likely usefulness of any information that may be obtained if jurisdiction is established. The party from whom discovery is sought — IDB—has a limited relationship to the litigаtion. It apparently had some involvement in processing some transactions of interest in this litigation, but the court has already determined that IDB’s role cannot serve as a basis for the imposition of any
third-party liability on it. The few facts asserted by Arab Bank to suggest personal jurisdiction do not persuade the court that jurisdictional discovery is likely to lead to a finding of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, none of the evidence suggests that IDB had anything more than an insignificant involvement in the affairs of its independently managed and operated subsidiary, giving “this [c]ourt ... no reason to ignore the corporate form between the entities.” Gurvey v. Co-wan, Liebowitz & Latman, PC,
While it may be difficult for Arab Bank to establish jurisdiction over IDB without the benefit of discovery, this is but the consequence of seeking discovery from a nonparty “foreign corporation that has carefully structured its business so as to separate itself from the operation of its wholly-owned subsidiaries in the United States.” Jazini,
Arab Bank served on Hapoalim subpoenas calling for the production of twelve categories of documents. Requests 1 and 4 seek documents concerning account transactions on behalf of fifteen charitable entities that involved Hapoalim facilities in New York and Israеl, respectively; Requests 2 and 5 seek detailed account information for accounts held on behalf of those entities in New York and Israel, respectively. Requests 3 and 6 seek documents concerning regulatory, judicial, and investigatory inquiries with respect to accounts held for any of the fifteen charitable entities at New York and Israeli Ha-poalim facilities. Request 7 seeks documents pertaining to investigations of Hapoalim’s compliance practices and procedures, including those related to a December 2005 investigation by Israeli prosecutors for Hapoalim’s failure to report suspicious money transfers, and the possible indictment of Hapoalim Hayarkon branch managers and others for failure to maintain proper procedures concerning suspicious money transfers. Request 8 seeks documents concerning rules, guidelines, or restrictions issued by regulatory authorities in Palestine, Israel, the United States, and New York State that reference Hapoalim’s procedures fоr possibly suspicious entities, transactions, or accounts. Request 9 seeks documents .concerning any communications between the above-mentioned regulatory authorities and Hapoalim involving instructions to exercise caution with respect to a transaction for, or account held by, a Palestinian or Arab entity. Request 10 seeks documents concerning Hapoalim’s potential or actual failure to comply with Israeli money laundering laws, especially as they may relate to statements in Hapoalim’s 2005 Annual Report expressing doubts about, and difficulty with, compliance. Request 11 seeks documents related to the October 2006 decision by Israeli authorities to rescind an injunction that had required the reporting by all Israeli banks of all transactions with banks in the Palestinian Territories, and agreeing to grant Israeli Banks immunity from criminal prosecution for money transfers through banks in the Palestinian Territories. Finally, Request 12 seeks documents relating to Hapoalim’s relationship with Arab Bank.
There is no dispute that Hapoalim is subjeсt to personal jurisdiction in this court, and therefore, the issue that remains is the extent to which it should be compelled to comply with the above document requests. Ha-poalim argues that much of the information sought is protected from discovery under a host of Israeli laws, that international comity weighs against compelling production, and that the requests are overly broad.
A. Hapoalim’s Objections Based on Israeli Law
At the outset, Hapoalim argues that some of the information Arab Banks seeks is protected from disclosure by Israeli bank-client privilege laws, a regulatory ordinance, money laundering and anti-terrorism laws, laws against self-incrimination, and laws protecting commercial secrets. Arab Bank does not dispute that these laws are applicable, arguing instead that Hapoalim “stands in no different a position in this Court than Arab Bank with regard to the imposition of objections based on foreign bank secrecy law and similar foreign restrictions against disclosure,” and that they should be overruled as Arab Bank’s objections were in the Court’s Decision and Order of Nov. 25, 2006. Thе court, however, must first analyze whether the requests indeed implicate the production of documents prohibited from disclosure by Israeli law.
Upon review, it is clear that the laws against self-incrimination and protecting commercial secrets do not prohibit discovery of documents sought by Arab Bank, and that appropriate measures can be taken to address Hapoalim’s concerns. First, Hapoalim asserts that several of the Requests call for documents that would violate Hapoalim’s right against self-incrimination, and that an Israeli court would be unlikely to compel their production. Israeli law provides a privilege against self-incrimination which protects persons, including corporate entities,
These laws do not present a true conflict with United States law such that a comity analysis is necessary. Societe Nationale In-dustrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for Southern Dist of Iowa,
The remaining laws, however, do erect prohibitions on disclosure that raise a true conflict between United States discovery rules and Israeli confidentiality laws. First, Israeli bank-confidentiality laws protect bank customer account and transactional information from disclosure to third parties.
In addition, Section 15A of Israel’s Banking Ordinance of 1941 imposes a duty of confidentiality upon any bank exchanging information or documents with the Bank of Israel, Israel’s banking regulatory authority. The violation of this duty may result in fines or imprisonment of up to one year. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43). This provision has been interpreted by the Israeli high сourt to immunize information or documents sought in civil discovery, due to the public interest in having commercial banks freely exchange information with the Bank of Israel without fear that it will be used as evidence in civil litigation. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47) (citing Leave to Civil Appeal
Finally, under Israeli law, a bank must maintain the confidentiality of information it receives pursuant to the provisions of the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law, 5760-2000, and the Prohibition on Terror Financing Law, 5765-2005. (Id. ¶ 51). The Prohibition on Money Laundering Law obligates providers of financial services to report the activities of their clients to a centralized authority, which analyzes the information and determines whether further executive or prosecutorial actions are required. (Id. ¶¶ 52-54). The Prohibition on Terror Financing Law sets up a reporting mechanism. (Id. ¶ 60). Civil and criminal sanctions apply to the disclosure of information reported to the centralized authority, even if it occurs through negligence. (Id. ¶ 56, (quoting Section 31A of the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law), 60 (quoting 48(b) of the Prohibition on Terror Financing Law)). Hapoalim asserts that disclosure of certain of the documents requested under Requests 4, 7, 9, and 10, to the extent that they refer to information collected pursuant to the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law and the Prohibition on Terror Financing Law, would constitute an infringement of the accompanying obligations of confidentiality, and would lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions on Ha-poalim.
Thus, of the twelve requests, eight — Requests 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 — are asserted by Hapoalim to be seeking documents that are protected by bank confidentiality provisions. (It bears noting that implicit in Hapoalim’s failure to make these arguments with respect to the requests seeking account-related information held by Hapoalim in its New York facility — Requests 1, 2, and 3 — is the assumption that the Israeli laws at issue do not apply extraterritorially.) Hapoalim concedes that only those documents requested by Requests 6, 8, 9 10 and 11 which were exchanged with the Bank of Israel are prohibited from disclosure under the Banking Ordinance, and that only those documents requested by Requests 4, 7, 9, and 10 that are reports of information disclosed to the administrative enforcement mechanism are protected by the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law and the Prohibition on Terror Financing Law. The court will refer to this subset of materials, along with the documents in Requests 4, 5, 6 and 9, all of which are asserted to be prohibited from disclosure pursuant to bank confidentiality laws, as the “Protected Materials.” The comity analysis below addresses whether Israel’s laws relieve Hapoalim from producing the Protected Materials.
B. International Comity Analysis
As discussed in the court’s Decision and Order of Nov. 25, 2006, Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
First, it is undisputed that, with respect to the Protected Materials, the bulk of the documents and informatiоn sought, and the individuals who created and maintained those documents, originated in or are located in Israel, not the United States.
Second, the importance of the documents requested to the litigation is in question. Arab Bank asserts that evidence of Hapoalim’s failure to successfully identify terrorist organizations and operations and to prevent the completion of transactions involving these entities, as well as Hapoalim’s lack of knowledge of the impropriety of such transactions, is relevant to Arab Bank’s defense that, to the extent it also failed to prevent such transactions, it did so in good faith. (Mem. of Law. of Arab Bank pic in Supp. of its Mot. to Compel Prod’n by Hapoalim, at 18.) In other words, if the documents discovered pursuant to the requests relating to customer accounts and transactions and to compliance protocols reveal that Hapoalim performed banking services for terrorist front organizations and employed similar compliance procedures as Arab Bank, they will be useful in refuting the plaintiffs’ allegations that Arab Bank exercised insufficient caution in dealing with entities that it “should have known” were terrorist fronts.
The relevance and importance of the Protected Materials, therefore, depends on the extent to which plaintiffs will be permitted to argue that, based on publicly available information at the time, Arab Bank should have known that the charitable entities for which it was processing transactions and holding accounts were terrorist fronts. It appears, at this juncture, however, that evidence of what Arab Bank “should have known” will be insufficient to establish the claims against it. In Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, Judge Gershon indicated that the plaintiffs will have to prove more than recklessness to be successful on their claims against Arab Bank.
It bears noting that the analysis regarding the relevance of the documents sought by Arab Bank from Hapoalim is not the same as the analysis in the court’s November 25, 2006 Order regarding the relevance of the documents sought from Arab Bank by the plaintiffs. The documents sought by the plaintiffs which were protected by bank secrecy laws were essential to their claims: the very transactions that were at issue could constitute direct evidence of Arab Bank’s liability. Here, however, the connection between the evidence sought and the litigation is much more attenuated. The documents sought by Arab Bank here would not be direct evidence of a claim or defense; at best, they would serve as circumstantial evidence of Arab Bank’s lack of knowledge. They would not serve to prove that Arab Bank did not know that the organizations about whom information is sought from Hapoalim were terror fronts.
Third, because Arab Bank seeks to discover evidence which is based on its own transactions with Hapoalim, Arab Bank has alternative means of obtaining some of the account and transactional evidence sought in Requests 4 and 5. In addition, some of the information Arab Bank is demanding is publicly available information.
Unlike the circumstances addressed in the November 25, 2006 Decision and Order, noncompliance with the requests here would not greatly undermine important interests of the United States. There, the discovery sought concerned transactions and the provision of financial services for which Congress, through statutes which some of the claims in the litigation rested, had expressly criminalized and provided a tort remedy. The court observed, “Without discovery, the interests expressed in the statutes will be difficult if not impossible to vindicate in this action.” Linde,
Fifth, the potential hardship that would be imposed on Hapoalim by an order compelling the requested discovery of the Protected Materials could be significant. As discussed above, violation of the confidentiality provisions in the bank-client privilege law, the Banking Ordinance, and anti-money laundering/terrorism laws could lead to substantial civil liability and criminal punishment for Hapoalim. Moreover, Hapoalim’s status as a nonparty in this litigation weighs against issuing an order, as “an order compelling production should be imposed on a nonparty . .■. only in extreme circumstances.” Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,
Thus, the above faсtors weigh in favor of denying Arab Bank’s discovery of the Protected Materials. The sole remaining factor — the specificity of the Bank’s requests — weighs in favor of disclosure because the requests are reasonably specific. But that is hardly enough to outweigh the others and avoid the conclusion that an order compelling Hapoalim to produce documents in violation of the foreign confidentiality laws discussed above is inappropriate. This conclusion is limited, however, to those documents that actually fall within the confidentiality provisions of those laws — the Protected Materials — which are but a subset of the requested material.
Discovery of the remaining documents, as to which the non-disclosure laws do not apply, and to which comity deference is not applicable, is subject only to limitations imposed by United States law. These documents include (1) account, transactional information, and investigatory documents related to accounts held at charitable entities in Hapoalim’s New York Facility (Rеqs. 1-3), (2) compliance practices, procedures and regulations, to the extent they are not implicated by the confidentiality provisions in the Bank Ordinance and Prohibition on Money Laundering Law and the Prohibition on Terror Financing Law (Reqs. 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11), and (3) Hapoal-im’s business relationship with Arab Bank (Req. 12).
The relevance of these documents is, to some extent, predicated on the extent to which the plaintiffs are permitted to argue that Arab Bank “should have known” about the terrorist front organizations, or that inadequate compliance protocols were ultimately responsible for Arab Bank’s provision of financial services to the charitable entities. As discussed above, the information sought is of admittedly limited relevance, in that it does not appear that the plaintiffs will be able to use this type of evidence to establish their claims. However, the question at this stage is one of discovery, and to the extent that plaintiffs may be permitted at trial to use evidence about what Arab Bank “should have known,” Arab Bank should be afforded the means to meet that evidence by showing that Hapoalim, an Israeli bank, employed the same or similar compliance protocols as Arab Bank, held accounts and processed transactions for the same or similar entities as Arab Bank, and had access to the same kinds of information as Arab Bank.
The court rejects Hapoalim’s argument that Arab Bank is required to show a substantial need for all the requested material under Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i), given that it provides no support for the assertion that internal compliance protocols and procedures are commercial secrets. The court also rejects Hapoalim’s argument that the subpoena is overbroad because Arab Bank had previously accused Hapoalim of engaging in transactions with only five of the fifteen charitable entities that are named in the requests. Ha-poalim’s concern that some of the requests are overly broad temporally has merit, however. The requests are accordingly limited to documents for thе time period covering the events alleged in this action — January 1, 1995 through the present.
III. Depositions
The remaining issue is Arab Bank’s motion to compel depositions of certain individuals employed by IDBNY and Hapoalim. Arab Bank is entitled to conduct depositions of IDBNY and Hapoalim limited to the documents those banks have produced (or will produce as a result of this decision) and the issues those documents concern. Thus, Arab Bank may serve subpoenas on IDBNY and Hapoalim pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) seeking testimony on topics delimited by the permitted document discovery. It will be up to IDBNY and Hapoalim to identify the individuals who will provide testimony. Arab Bank has not demonstrated a sufficient basis for requiring the specific individuals
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Arab Bank’s motion is denied in part and granted in part. If the parties, after working together to resolve any other issues concerning burden-someness, are unable to resolve their disрute, they may submit letters, supported by detailed affidavits, as to what the issues are and how they should be resolved.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Searock discussed the meaning of “control” in the context of Rule 34, which governs discovery from parties. The meaning of "control" is the same under Rule 45, which governs discovery from nonparties. See First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP,
. As of June 30, 2006, IDBNY had $9.1 billion in assets, and $6.9 billion in depositor liabilities. (Am. IDBNY Mem. in Opp’n, 5.)
. It is unremarkable that IDB issues consolidated financial statements that include IDBNY's income. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP”) require the consolidation for subsidiaries that are more than 50 percent owned; consolidation, therefore, does not distinguish between independent and controlled subsidiaries under New York Law. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
. Arab Bank also asserts that the memorandum reveals that Hadani was operating as an "agent” of IDB. For a local subsidiary to qualify as "agent” such that the foreign parent may be subject to jurisdiction for discovery purposes it must perform services for the parent so important to the parent’s business that it would have otherwise have its own officials to perform them. Stutts v. De Dietrich Group,
. Initially, IDBNY asserted that it had no authority to accept service of legal process on behalf of IDB. (Mastragiacomo Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Cappello Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13.) IDB, however, asserted that IDBNY is authorized to accept service of legal process albeit under limited circumstances not present in this instance (Misholi Decl. in Opp'n to Mot. to Compel ¶ 16), and it was later clarified that IDBNY is authorized to accept service on behalf of IDB, pursuant to the USA PATRIOT ACT fоr purposes of accepting service from the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General of the United States. (See Misholi Decl. in Supp. of Surreply of IDB in Opp’n to Mot. to Compel, ¶ 3; Lee Decl. in Supp. of Surreply of IDB in Opp'n to Mot. to Compel, ¶ 8.)
. Arab Bank relies on Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan in urging this court to grant jurisdictional discovery.
. In conducting this analysis, the court has considered the Declaration made by Ehud Arzi concerning the applicablе Israeli laws pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1.
. This protection is rooted in Israel’s quasi-constitutional Basic Laws relating to the Protection of Privacy, 5741-1981, and Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, which defines privacy as a "basic right.” (Arzi Decl. ¶ 25.) Section 2(8) of the Protection of Privacy Law prohibits “infringing a duty of secrecy laid down by express or implied agreement in respect of a person's private affairs,” and Section 2(9) prohibits “using, or passing on to another, information on a person’s private affairs otherwise than for the purpose for which it was given.” (Arzi Decl. ¶ 38.)
. While Hapoalim suggests that an alternative way to obtain information concerning banking protocols and practices could be obtained from an expert witness with knowledge of Middle Eastern banking practices, the court is not sure how adequate a substitute this would be, given
. The Decision and Order noted that Jordan and Lebanon, the foreign states where the information was located, had signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which contained provisions that specifically renounced bank secrecy as a basis for refusing requests for mutual legal assistance in money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
