156 Minn. 317 | Minn. | 1923
Plaintiff John Lindblood on October 31, 1908, was the fee owner of the property involved in this action, namely, lots 8 and 25 of block 6 of the town of Hibbing, St. Louis county, and on that day, his wife and coplaintiff joining, mortgaged the same to defendant Fitger Brewing Company to secure the payment of the sum of $5,500 then loaned to him by the company. The mortgage was duly recorded. Default having been made in the payments thereby stipulated, the mortgage was foreclosed by due proceedings had for the purpose, and at the sale therein on September 9, 1912, the mortgaged property was struck off and sold to the brewing company as the best bidder. The usual certificate of sale was executed and recorded. No redemption was made. A prior mortgage upon the same property had been given by plaintiffs to one Corey, which was subsequently acquired by the brewing company under an assignment from the mortgagee; the mortgage was for the sum of $3,500,
Thereafter and on September 21, 1921, plaintiffs, claiming the property as owners, brought this action to determine the adverse claims of defendants, thus challenging the validity of the foreclosed mortgage as well as the foreclosure proceedings. Issue was joined by the answers of defendants and upon a trial before the court without a jury the court found that plaintiffs had no title or right to the property, and judgment accordingly was ordered against them. They appealed from an order denying their motion for amended findings or a new trial.
The facts stated and outlined are not in substantial dispute. The execution of the mortgage under the foreclosure of which defendants claim title is not questioned, nor is the fact of foreclosure controverted. The contentions made by plaintiffs are: (1) That the mortgage was procured by fraud; (2) that the foreclosure is invalid and a nullity because no notice thereof was served on plaintiffs as required by law; and (3) that the mortgage is void and unenforceable for the reason that the consideration thereof was illegal, since the purpose thereof was to enable plaintiff John Lindblood to con
There was no direct finding by the trial court upon the question whether the mortgage was procured by fraud or fraudulent representations. But the question whether the evidence sustains plaintiffs’ contentions upon that issue is presented by the denial of their motion for an affirmative finding of fraud. Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the evidence fails to sustain the allegations of fraud, and the court therefore was right in refusing the requested finding.
The mortgage included the lots in suit together with certain lands in the state of Michigan. Mrs. Lindblood testified that she did not understand that the lots were included, yet the trial court was justified in finding that she made no inquiry on the subject, relying wholly upon her husband as to the contents and purpose of the mortgage, and the record discloses no representation to her from any one acting in the transaction for the mortgagee. She apparently had confidence in her husband, and did not seek independent information. Dobbin v. Cordiner, 41 Minn. 165, 42 N. W. 870, 4 L. R. A. 336, 16 Am. St. 683. That the husband tendered the lots as security and knew that they were included in the mortgage is quite clear. And later plaintiffs were brought face to face with the fact by the foreclosure, and permitted matters to remain from 1914 to the commencement of this action, over 6 years, unchallenged by any legal proceeding; and, in full recognition of the mortgage and the foreclosure, leased the property for future use and occupancy. Such passive as well as active conduct and acquiescence has strong evidentiary force against the good faith of their present attitude in the matter. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Chisholm, 55 Minn. 374, 57 N. W. 63. But we pass the question; discussion of the evidence could serve no useful purpose. We have attentively considered the whole thereof, and reach the conclusion that the refusal of the trial court to find the alleged fraud as to either plaintiff is well supported. That is all we are required to do. Carver v. Bagley, 79 Minn. 114, 81 N. W. 757. And in reaching that con-
The trial court also refused to find a failure of the service of notice of foreclosure; the basis of plaintiffs’ contention that the foreclosure is void. The record justifies and sustains the action of the court on that branch of the case. The record on its face shows a valid and proper service of the notice, supplemented and confirmed by extrinsic evidence presented on the trial. The record proof is not to be lightly set aside, particularly where as here it has so long remained unquestioned. Jensen v. Crevier, 33 Minn. 372, 23 N. W. 541; Vaule v. Miller, 69 Minn. 440, 72 N. W. 452; Kueffner v. Gottfried, 154 Minn. 70, 191 N. W. 271. The evidence contradictory of the return to sustain a finding of falsity must be clear and free from fair doubt. The evidence here tendered is not clear or at all pursuasive, and the action of the trial court in the premises must be sustained.
But if it be conceded that the evidence does not clearly show a personal service on Mrs. Lindblood, the effect thereof is entirely overcome by the fact that service of the notice upon her was unnecessary. Coles v. Yorks, 28 Minn. 464, 10 N. W. 775. She was residing upon the property with her husband in amicable relations, he was the fee owner and debtor, and her rights and interests were those of a wife, with no independent or adverse claim. The situation would be different were she the owner of the mortgaged property and the debtor, or perhaps in the case of strained relations and separation between husband and wife. But, in the absence of a showing of that character, the rule of the Coles case applies. Havel v. Costello, 144 Minn. 441, 175 N. W. 1001.
. It is doubtful whether the facts bring the case within the rule of that decision. There the transaction, a loan of money to a liquor dealer, was in furtherance of the unlawful business, in which all concerned became by the transaction directly interested. In the case at bar Lindblood was indebted to third persons in the aggregate sum of $5,500, and that amount was loaned him by the brewing company to enable him to discharge his obligations to creditors holding such claims. The nature of the claims, the basis and foundation thereof, do not appear. It is doubtful, we say, whether the real transaction was rendered wholly illegal and void by the concurrent understanding that if the loan was made to Lindblood he would thereafter purchase his supply of beer from the mortgagee. The brewing company had a perfectly valid and legal claim for the repayment of the money loaned, which probably was not destroyed or rendered invalid by the supplemental beer agreement. Disbrow v. Creamery Package Mnfg. Co. 110 Minn. 237, 125 N. W. 115; Kipp v. Walsh, 141 Minn. 291, 170 N. W. 222. But aside from that feature of the case, and conceding for present purposes the illegality of the contract, we have a case where the parties are in pari delicto, and without right in law or equity to affirmative relief. The contract by action of the parties, and operation of law, has become by
This covers the case. The record presents no error and the order appealed from must be and is affirmed.