This сase involves allegations of breach of contract and bad faith denial of claims for benefits under an employee benefit plan as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (ERISA). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case on ERISA preemption grounds.
I.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On May 1, 1989, appellant Linda Swerhun applied for health insurance with The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America (Guardian) through her employer’s group hеalth insurance plan. Guardian approved Swerhun's application and, effective August 1, 1989, she became a plan participant. The parties agree that Guardian’s plan covers chiropractic services.
After the plan’s effective date, Swerhun sought treatment from Dr. Camilla S. Su-person, a chiropractic physician in Downers Grove, Illinois. Dr. Superson diagnosed and treated Swerhun for “severe biochemical imbalance compounded with possiblе neurological damage,” and prescribed laboratory testing, massage therapy, and vitamin supplements. Swerhun submitted her initial claims for Dr. Superson’s services to Guardian. Guardian denied these claims. In March 1990, Swerhun received medical treatment from Dr. Rick M. Smith, a chiropractic physician in Winter Haven, Florida. Swerhun submitted claims for Dr. Smith’s services, which Guardian denied months later.
In August 1990,, Swerhun filed suit against Guardian in Florida state court, alleging that Guardian had breached its insurance contract by refusing to pay her claims. Guardian removed the action to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988), asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), because Swerhun’s claims arose under ERISA. On October 22, 1990, the district court denied Swerhun’s motion to remand the case to state court and held that ERISA preempted the breach of contract claim, On November 7, 1990, the court granted Sw;erhun’s motion voluntarily to dismiss the case. "
By mid-November 1990, Swerhun resubmitted, and Guardian again denied, her claims for services rendered by Drs. Super-son and Smith. On November 29, 1990, after learning that Dr. John O. Susac, a neurologist in Orlando, Florida, had diagnosed Swerhun as having multiple sclerosis, Guardian paid nearly all of Swerhun’s previously submitted claims for services rendered by Drs. Smith and Superson. Guardian still declined to pay for the vitamin supplements that Dr. Superson had prescribed.
In January 1991, Swerhun filed a two-count complaint in Florida state court. Count I alleged that Guardian had (1) breached its insurance contract by failing to recognize and pay Swerhun’s claims in a timely manner, and (2) construed its insurance policy contrary to the provisions of Fla.Stat.Ann. § 627.419(4). 1 Count II al *197 leged that Guardian’s refusal to pay Swer-hun’s claims in a timely manner constituted bad faith in violation of Fla.Stat.Ann. § 624.155. 2
On February 6, 1991, Guardian again removed the case to federal district court. Asserting that ERISA preempted Swer-hun’s claims, Guardian filed a motion to dismiss. After briefing and oral argument, the district court, on April 8, 1991, granted Guardian’s motion and dismissed Swer-hun’s complaint with prejudice. Swerhun appeаls.
II.
The district court’s decision to dismiss counts I and II of Swerhun’s complaint on ERISA preemption grounds is subject to our plenary review.
See O’Reilly v. Ceuleers,
ERISA is a comprehensive statute that subjects employee benefit plans to federal regulation.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
ERISA’s preemptive effect upon state law operates in three stages. First, as a general rule, ERISA preеmpts all state laws that relate to ERISA covered plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Second, the exception to the general rule is the “saving clause” which provides that nothing in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance_” 29 U;S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Third, the exception to the exception is the “deemer clause” which provides that no employee benefit plan “shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies_” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
Swerhun does not dispute that the Guardian plan is an ERISA-covered plan.
3
Nor does she dispute that her сomplaint is based on state laws that “relate to” an ERISA plan and, hence, fall within ERISA’s preemption clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has determined that a state statute “relates to” an ERISA plan “if it has a connection with” such a plаn,
see Shaw,
A.
In count I of her complaint, Swer-hun alleged that Guardian breached its contract by failing to pay her claims in a timely manner, and violated section 627.419 by refusing to provide coverage for her chiropractic care. We have consistently held that ERISA preempts state law breach of contract claims.
See, e.g., First Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
Swerhun argues, howevеr, that section 627.419 is a law “which regulates insurance,” and thus “saved” from ERISA preemption. Section 627.419 declares that insurance policies must be construed to include chiropractic services and may very well be a law regulating insurancе. Section 627.419, however, neither creates a private right of action nor is a necessary element of count I; count I is simply a breach of contract claim. Because the Florida statute through which Swerhun hopes to reaсh the saving clause is irrelevant, count I remains preempted.
First, Swerhun has failed to establish that section 627.419 creates a private right of action enabling her to sue for violation of the statute. In
Farlow v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
Second, because Guardian’s policy covers chiropractic services, it is unneсessary to construe the policy to include such services under section - 627.419. Count I of Swer-hun’s complaint states a straightforward claim for breach of contract. Section 627.419 simply never comes into play.
Even so, Swerhun maintains that seсtion 627.419’s looming presence somehow converts her breach of contract claim into a claim that implicates a statutory concern, which she apparently believes is a different beast altogether. That section 627.419—mere surplusage though it is in this case—is a statute does not thwart ERISA’s preemptive force. Section 514(a) preempts “all State laws,” not merely common law causes of action. Congress defined “State law” as used in section 514 to include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1);
see also Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
498 U.S. at -,
B.
Swerhun argues that her bad faith claim based on section 624.155 survives preеmption. In
Anschultz v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,
Swerhun nevertheless suggests that we not follow
Anschultz
in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. -,
III.
■ We conclude that ERISA preempts counts I and II of Swerhun’s complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing this case.
AFFIRMED,
Notes
. As it did when Swerhun filed her complaint, § 627.419(4) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when any health insurance policy, health care services plan, or other contract provides for the payment for medical expense benefits or procedures, such policy, plan, or contract shall be construed to include payment to a chiropractic physician who provides the medical service benefits or procedures which are *197 within the scope of a chiropractic physician’s license.
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 627.419(4) (West Supp.1992).
. Section 624.155 provides:
(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towаrd its insured and with due regard for his interests....
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 624.155 (West 1984).
. ERISA plans include
any plan, fund, or program, which ... is ... established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, ... mеdical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
. The Supreme Court has demonstrated none of Swerhun’s suggested misgivings about holding that ERISA preempts state statutory law.
See, e.g., FMC Corp.,
498 U.S. at -,
. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that ”[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988). The Supreme Court borrowed its test for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s saving clause from its jurisprudence surrounding the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
.Swerhun also contends that the distinction between fully insured and self-funded plans that the Court drew in
FMC Corp.
and
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
fundamentally alters ERISA preemption analysis. This is of no moment in the present case. The Supreme Court addressed this distinction strictly in the context of the interplay between the saving clause and the deemer clause.
See FMC Corp.,
498 U.S. at -,