Lindа J. DARNELL (Rose), et al., Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.
Appeal No. 85-1578
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
Nov. 26, 1986.
807 F.2d 943
Conclusion
When a court acts beyond the jurisdiction granted it by Congress, a situation most grave is created. The gravity of that situation is compounded when a court acts to appropriate, or acquiesces in another court‘s gift of, the jurisdiction previously and currently exercised by other courts. In the present case, the assertion of jurisdiction not granted also gravely injures the jurisprudence surrounding
Jurisdiction is not properly granted by judicial fiat. It was concern for just such judicial overreaching that produced in the Constitutional Convention such deep distrust of the notion that there should be a federal judiciary at all. See Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (Rev. Ed.1937); Prescott, Drafting the Federal Constitution, Ch. 17 (1941). Harkening as I do here to a “different drummer” from that heard by my colleagues, I am compelled to dissent from the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
NIES, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal of this type of suit from the District Court for the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Circuit has so held. Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532 (D.C.Cir.1986). The question is close, and I see no reason to create a conflict with our sister circuit. Clearly, we are not reaching out aggressively here to preempt that court‘s jurisdiction.
It may be that conflicts over jurisdiction will arise with other circuits which will require a definite resolution. If a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court is rendered which would in theory mean that Wyden should have taken this appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment will not, under current jurisprudence, be void. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982).
With respect to this case, it is ripe for resolution at this level of the federal court system. The District of Columbia Circuit has said that it has no jurisdiction in such an appeal. Appellant is entitled to a decision and we are the only other available forum. Accordingly, in my view, it is appropriate to defer to the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit and resolve the matter.
On the merits, I would affirm.
Hillary A. Stern, Commercial Litigation Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued for respondent. On brief were Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director and Sandra P. Spooner, Commercial Litigation Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.
Before RICH and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge.
RICH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from the February 25, 1983, final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (board), in Nos. DC075281F1026 and DC075281F1097, sustaining the decisions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to remove petitioners Linda J. Darnell and Robert Martinkovic from their positions as air traffic controllers based on their participation in the illegаl strike called in 1981 by the Professional Association of Air Traffic Controllers (PATCO) and for being absent without leave (AWOL) during the strike. Oral argument was heard on April 28, 1986. We affirm.
I. Background and Issue Presented
The background facts of the PATCO strike are set forth in the “lead cases” of this court in the air traffic controller litigation. See Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 735 F.2d 477 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 432, 83 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984).
Petitioner Robert Martinkovic was on approved leave or regular days off from sometime in July, 1981, through August 9, 1981. He was charged with striking and being AWOL on August 10 after he failed to report for duty on his deadline shift that day.
Petitioner Linda J. Darnell (Linda J. Rose at the time of these events) was charged with striking and being AWOL from August 4 tо 6, 1981, in a notice of proposed removal issued August 6, 1981.
Both petitioners replied in writing * to their notices of proposed removal within the proper seven-day period, notifying their facility chief of their intent to answer the charges in person, requesting an opportunity to review the evidence on which the charges were based and stating, inter alia, that “there is no basis to the charge that I have committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed.” Petitioners were removed before these written replies were received. Upon receipt, the agency reviewed the replies and determined and advised pеtitioners that they contained nothing to alter the removal decisions.
Petitioners appealed to the MSPB urging reversal of their removal on various technical grounds.
The broad issue presented by this appeal is whether petitioners’ constitutional rights were abridged because the FAA did not give them “an explanation of the employer‘s evidence and an opportunity to present their side of the story” basing their arguments on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). “Their side of the story” includes the specific arguments made to the MSPB which presumably would have been made to the agency including adequacy of the notice of proposed removal, failurе of the FAA to prove the strike was still going on when they were AWOL, that the facility would not have permitted petitioners to work if they had tried, and the fact the FAA made a mistake in sending out a form letter saying they had made no reply.
II. Opinion
In Loudermill, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action [to remove a public employee] should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. All that is required to meet the essential requirements of due process “are notice and an opportunity to reply.” Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The August 6 and August 10, 1981, notices of proposed removal provided petitioners with detailed reasons for the adverse action and the location and the person to contact for review of the materials relied upon by the agency to support the removal action. The notices further stated that “you may reply to this notice personally, in writing or both, and furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your answer to me, within 7 calendar days after you receive this letter.”
Both petitioners replied in writing to these notices within the seven-day period. Unfortunately, the replies were not received by the agency until after the expiration of the seven-day period and after issuance of the removal letters. However, the agency reviewed the replies and determined and advised petitioners that they contained nothing to alter the removal decision. Hence the petitioners were afforded an opportunity to present their side of the story at the agency level and any errors committed by the agency were in the nature of procedural errors and were not errors of constitutional dimension.
In the context of criminal cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Similarly, in the context of federal employee cases, the Supreme Court stated:
We do not believe that Congress intended to force the Government to retain these erring employees solely in order to “penalize the agency” for nonprejudicial procedural mistakes it committed while attempting to carry out the congressional purpose of maintaining an effective and efficient Government.
Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 663, 105 S.Ct. 2882, 2891, 86 L.Ed.2d 515 (1985) (citation and footnote omitted).
The initial replies filed by petitioners in this case do not indicate that petitioners could or would have presented proof prior to the issuance of the removal letters that could have affected the FAA‘s factual conclusion that both petitioners participated in the strike. Thus, the perhaps premature issuance of the removal letters in the context of this case, where the written replies by the petitioners were considered by the agency after the fact and do not on their face give any indication that receipt of the replies prior to issuance of the removal letters could have affected the agency‘s underlying factual conclusion, was harmless error. Moreover, petitioners had a full opportunity to present their additional defenses at their de novo hearings before the board. None of the defenses were legally sufficient, and none was a defense which might invoke the discretion of the agency‘s deсiding official not to remove them. Thus, they were not denied “the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision-maker.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. at 1494. Accord Smith v. U.S. Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1540 (Fed.Cir.1986). The arguments in the briefs before this court have all been considered and none justifies any change in the board decision.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the decision of the board is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the court‘s decision. I believe that the crucial facts, most of which are omitted from the opinion of the majority, demonstrate that the rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Due Process Clause were violated, because they were not granted a pretermination hearing before they were discharged. A discussion of the constitutional rights to whiсh petitioners were entitled is set forth in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). I am convinced that in holding that the denial of due process in this case was harmless error, the majority failed to follow the teaching of the Supreme Court in that case.
I.
Most of the facts upon which I rely are established by documentary evidence, copies of which are included in the appendix to this dissent. Except for immaterial differences in dates, the facts pertinent to the cases of both petitioners are substantially identical, so that an account of the facts pertaining to the claim of Linda J. Darnell will suffice for both petitioners.
On August 7, 1981, petitioner Darnell received a form letter (App. Exhibit 1) from the Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), dated August 6, 1981, and signed by the Facility Chief at Andrews Air Force Base Control Tower, Camp Springs, Maryland. The letter stated that the chief proposed to terminate petitioner‘s position as an air traffic control specialist for participation in an illegal strike (“a crime for which a sentence and imprisonment can be imposed“), and
On August 11, 1981, petitioner responded to the notice by letter (App. Exhibit 2), which was received in the Jamaica, New York office of FAA on August 17, well within the 7-day reply period. The reply requested (1) an extension of time in which to file a written answer to the notice of proposed action; (2) copies of the materials relied on to support her proposed removal, and (3) an extension of 20 days time after receipt of the materials to personally answer the charges. The reply also stated: “There is no basis to the charge that I have committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed.”
On August 11, 1981, petitioner sent a written request (App. Exhibit 3) to the Washington office of the FAA, under the
Petitioner‘s reply to the charges, timely received in the Jamaica, New York office on August 17, 1981, was not forwarded to and received by the Camp Springs facility until August 20, 1981. In the meantime, by form letter (App. Exhibit 4) dated August 18, 1981, signed by the Facility Chief, petitioner was notified of her removal. The letter stated that the chief had given full consideration tо the fact that petitioner had made no oral or written reply, and that the evidence fully supported the charges and warranted petitioner‘s removal. The letter, referred to herein as the initial decision, also showed the Jamaica, New York address as the return address for replies. Apparently the chief had not seen and did not know that petitioner had replied to the proposed action by letter to the New York address.
On August 22, 1981, petitioner Robert Martinkovic and another air traffic controller delivered an unsigned letter (App. Exhibit 5) to the Camp Springs Facility. The letter stated that the responses to the lеtters proposing the removal of several air traffic controllers had not been received at the facility, because of the slow processing of the replies by the Eastern Region of the FAA in Jamaica, New York. In her handwritten note on this letter, the chief stated that there would be no response since the letter from Martinkovic had been received after the issuance of the initial decisions in which petitioners were terminated.
After petitioner‘s initial reply of August 11, 1981 had been forwarded to Camp Springs from Jamaica, the Facility Chief issued her final decision (App. Exhibit 6) in a letter dated August 21, 1981. The letter stated that petitiоner‘s reply requesting additional time to respond had been received, but that since the request had not been received until after the end of the 7-day period, the removal decision of August 18 had been issued. This letter further stated: “However, we have carefully considered your request and find no reason to alter our decision.” This letter, referred to herein as the final decision of the Facility Chief, used the Camp Springs, Maryland return address for the first time in the correspondence between the parties.1
In Loudermill, the Supreme Court prescribed the minimum requirements of a pretermination hearing as follows:
The essential requirements of due рrocess * * * are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. See Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer‘s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. [134] at 170-171, 94 S.Ct. [1633] at 1652-1653 [40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974)] (opinion of POWELL, J.) * * *.
(470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.)
It is implicit in the Court‘s decision that the employee‘s constitutional right to respond to a proposed dismissal must be a meaningful opportunity and one which receives the consideration of the decision maker. That much is clear from the Court‘s observation in Loudermill, as follows:
Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect.
(Id. at 543, 105 S.Ct. at 1494.)
When the quoted pronouncements of the Supreme Court are applied to the facts of this case, it is plain that each petitioner was denied “an opportunity to present his side of the story” or to invoke the discretion of the Fаcility Chief (the decision maker) before being terminated. Although the petitioners sent timely responses to the return address shown on the notices, the Facility Chief terminated them without seeing the responses in the mistaken belief that they had made no oral or written reply. The delay in the decision maker‘s receipt of the replies was due to the slow processing of the replies by the Eastern Region of the FAA and was not the fault of petitioners.
As indicated above, petitioners’ responses consisted almost entirely of requests for extensions of time to answer the charges with the aid of documents they hoped to obtain. After their replies had been forwarded from Jamaica, New York, to the Facility Chief, she should have realized that the letter terminating petitioners had been erroneously issued. At that time, she could have rescinded the removal actions and granted petitioners’ requests to reply in person. Instead, the Facility Chief denied the requests in a decision, which I think was nothing more than a perfunctory reiteration of her erroneous conclusion that petitioners had failed to submit oral or written replies within the required 7-day period.
It is true that the final decision contained the statement that after careful consideration of petitionеrs’ requests, the chief had found no reason to alter the decision terminating them. However, I would hold that this statement did not remedy the denial of due process. The statement was part of a printed form (App. Exhibit 6), which had been prepared long before, and when the final decision was made, the chief did not have petitioners’ answers to the charges, which they would have submitted if the chief had rescinded the removal actions and granted them an oral hearing. Consequently, except for petitioners’ assertions that they had not committed a criminal offense, there was nothing for the Facility Chief to consider—nothing to “invoke the discretion of the decision maker“—except the requests for extensions of time. By that time, petitioners had already been fired (App. Exhibit 4) because of the chief‘s erroneous belief that they had not responded within the 7-day period. Thus, all the circumstances indicate that the final decision was based mainly, if not entirely, on that erroneous assumption.
III.
Although the majority holds that the denial of a pretermination hearing in these cases was harmless error, it is my opinion that the harmful error rule, which is codified in
In the first place, the majority bases its conclusions on Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 105 S.Ct. 2882, 86 L.Ed.2d 515 (1985) and Smith v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1540 (Fed.Cir.1986)—two decisions which are inapposite.
In Nutt, the Supreme Court held that the harmful error rule does not permit an arbitrator to overturn agency disciplinary action on the basis of a significant violation of the collective-bargaining agreement that is harmful only to the union. The Supreme Court also upheld the interpretation by the Merit Systems Protection Board that the rule requires the individual employee to show error that causes substantial prejudice to his individual rights. However, the constitutional issue before us was in no way involved in Nutt. It was never raised by the parties, nor was it considered or even mentioned in the Supreme Court‘s deсision.
Smith v. United States Postal Service is even less pertinent. The controlling facts on which that decision was based do not bear even a remote resemblance to the facts in this case. In contrast to the facts before us here, the court‘s decision in Smith shows that his union representative made an oral reply to the agency‘s deciding official, and the court found that there was nothing of record to indicate that Smith attempted to present, or that he was prevented from presenting, either an oral or a written reply to the deciding official. The court also found that Smith had failed to avail himself of his statutory right to answer orally, and that he made no effort to obtain a Step 1 hearing at which he might be present. The court concluded: “No basis exists for Smith‘s assertion respecting constitutional due process.” 789 F.2d 1541-42.
Secondly, the majority declares that since none of the defenses which petitioners presented at the de novo hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board was legally sufficient, the premature issuance of the removal letters was harmless error which would not have affected the agency‘s decision. The majority then moves from this premise to the conclusion that since petitioners did not prevail in the MSPB hearing, none of petitioners’ defenses was a defense which might have “invoked the discretion of the decisionmaker.” In my opinion, these conclusions ignore the teaching of Loudermill that the tenured employee who is denied due process is not required to establish that if he had been granted a proper pretermination hearing, his presentation would have met with “certain success.” Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the employee‘s “right to a hearing does not depend upon a demonstration of certain success.” Id. 470 U.S. at 544, 105 S.Ct. at 1494.
For that proposition, the Supreme Court cited Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), in which the Court declared:
Because the right to procedural due process is “absolute” in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a clаimant‘s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 [91 S.Ct. 780, 784-85, 28 L.Ed.2d 113] (1971); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. [123] at 171-72 [71 S.Ct. 624, 648-49, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)] (Frankfurter, J., concurring), we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. (Emphasis supplied). [Footnote omitted.]
For the reasons stated, I would vacate the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board and remand the case, with instructions to the agency to restore petitioners to their former positions and to grant them back pay as provided by law.
APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 1
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
August 6, 1981
EASTERN REGION
FEDERAL BUILDING
JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
JAMAICA, NEW YORK 11430
Linda J. Rose
3331 Huntley Square Drive, T 1
Temple Hills, MD 20748
Dear Ms. Rose:
This is notice that I intend to remove you from your position of Air Traffic Control Specialist, GS-2152-9/01, $18,585 per annum at the Andrews AFB Control Tower, Camp Springs, MD. The reasons for the proposed action are:
Reason 1: Violation of
Specification: Beginning at approximately 7 A.M. EDT, on August 3, 1981, a nationwide strike by air traffic controllers occurred. Beginning at 4:00 PM on August 04, 1981, when you failed to report for duty, until the present, you participated in a strike against the United States Government.
Reason 2: Unauthorized Absence
Specification: Beginning first at the 4:00 PM EDT to 12:00 AM shift on August 04, 1981, you failed to report for your scheduled tour of duty. On August 03, 1981, you were sent a telegram that an illegal strike was in progress, and that you must return to duty for your regularly scheduled shift. You failed to return to duty, and instead remained absent without authorization.
The material relied upon to support this proposed action is available for review at Andrews AFB Control Tower, Camp Springs, MD. If you wish to review this material, please contact Charlesan Neugebauer.
The foregoing action constitutes a strike against the government prohibited by
Charlesan Neugebauer
Facility Chief
Andrews Tower
EXHIBIT 2
11 August 1981
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Eastern Region, Federal Building
John F. Kennedy International Airport
Jamaica, New York 11430
Re: Linda J. Rose
Dear Ms. Neugebauer:
This is to request an extension of time in which to file a written answer to the notice of proposed action against me for the reasons stated below.
First, there is no basis to the charge that I have committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. Therefore, the crime exception to the rule set forth in
I also understand that even if the crime exception to the 30-day rule is invoked, the controlling criterion is that I am entitled to a “rеasonable time,” (which may not be less than seven days) in which to file my answer,
I request that copies of all the materials relied on by the FAA to support its proposed action be sent to me. By separate letter to the Freedom of Information Office of the FAA, I am also requesting disclosure of all notices of proposed actions issued since January 1, 1978, and between January 1, 1969, and January 1, 1971. As I am entitled to review all of the materials relied on by the FAA to support its proposed action, see
I hereby designate Mr. Michael W. Ferman as my representative in this proposed action. Please send copies of all communications in this action to:
Mr. Michael W. Ferman
P.A.T.C.O.
1455 Veterans Highway
Hauppauge, New York 11788
Sincerely,
Linda J. Rose
EXHIBIT 3
11 August 1981
Freedom of Information Act Request
Freedom of Information Office (ATA-10)
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to request that the Federal Aviation Administration make disclosure and provide copies of certain materials available under the
Specifically, I request disclosure to me of records held in any form that (a) document adverse personnel action proposals and final decisions by the FAA since January 1, 1978, and from January 1, 1969, through January 1, 1971; (b) indicate hоw FAA determines whether there is “reasonable cause to believe that a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed” has been committed, within the meaning of
The FAA has initiated disciplinary proceedings against me, and access to the materials requested above is necessary for me to prepare an adequate defense. If any portion of this request is denied, I request a detailed statement of the reasons for the withholding and an index or similar statement of the nature of the documents withheld.
Pursuant to the Act, I request waiver of all charges, but if waiver is denied, I promise to pay reasonable charges incurred for an appropriate search and copying of these documents upon presentation of an invoice along with the finished documents.
If search and copying fee will exceed $25.00, please notify my representative, Mr. Michael W. Ferman, or myself at P.A.T.C.O., 1455 Veterans Highway, Hauppauge, New York, 11788. You may notify us whether this request will be granted at the address below. I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible so that I may begin to prepare my defense. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Linda J. Rose
3331 Huntley Square Drive, T 1
Temple Hills, Md. 20748
EXHIBIT 4
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
August 18, 1981
EASTERN REGION
FEDERAL BUILDING
JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
JAMAICA, NEW YORK 11430
Linda J. Rose
3331 Huntley Square Dr, T 1
Temple Hills, MD 20748
Dear Ms. Rose:
My letter of August 6, 1981, informed you of a proposal to remove you from your position of Air Traffic Control Specialist, GS-2152-9/01, $18,585 per annum at the Andrews AFB Control Tower, Camp Springs, MD. I have given full consideration to all the facts and circumstances in this case including:
( ) Your written reply of ______________.
( ) Your oral reply of ______________.
( ) Your written reply of ______________, and/or oral reply of ______________ to the designee, his summary and recommendation.
(X) You made no oral or written reply.
I have found that all reasons and specifications cited in the proposal letter are fully supported by the evidence and warrant your removal to promote the efficiency of the service. It is my decision, therefore, that you be removed effective August 22, 1981.
The enclosures with this letter explain your rights to appeal or grieve this action, and include an Appeal/Grievance Procedure Addendum, the MSPB Appeal Form and a copy of MSPB Regulations. In this connection you should know that the FAA has filed an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charge against PATCO for its role in the strike and is seeking to have the Union decertified. The case is now being processed by the Federal Labor Relations Authority and a determination that PATCO committed a ULP could impact on the processing of grievances under the PATCO/FAA agreement. If the Union is decertified and the agreement terminated, this avenue of appeal may not be available to you.
Sincerely,
Charlesan Neugebauer
Chief, Andrews Tower
Enclosures
EXHIBIT 5
August 19, 1981
Charlesan Neugebauer, Chief
Andrews Air Force Base Control Tower
Camp Springs, Maryland
Dear Ms. Neugebauer;
Certain individuals have received letters which indicate that your office failed to receive a timely response to your “proposed dismissal” correspondence.
The following is a copy of the individuals receipts with corresponding names as proof that the letters were sent within the seven day time parameter after receipt. The answer to the delay problem is due to slow processing in the Eastern Region of the FAA.
The individuals involved plan to have any future correspondence delivered by carrier with a receipt requested.
Received August 22, 1981 by SATCS Chris Matiz.
Delivered by David Noble and Robert Martinkovic
I did not respond to the attached letter as it was received after the decision letter was mailed.
Charlesan Neugebauer
EXHIBIT 6
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
DATE: August 21, 1981
Airport Traffic Control Tower
Andrews Air Force Base
Camp Springs, MD 20331
TO: Linda Rose
Your letter dated August 11, 1981 requesting additional time in which to respond to your notice of intended removal issued August 6, 1981 was received in this office on August 20, 1981.
Since substantially more than the allowed seven days had expired without any response from you, I issued the decision letter on August 18, 1981. The decision letter was forwarded to you by first class and certified mail August 18, 1981.
However, we have carefully considered your request and find no reason to alter our decision.
The material relied upon to support the decision is available for review at Andrews AFB Control Tower, Camp Springs, Maryland. If you wish to rеview this material, please contact me.
CHARLESAN NEUGEBAUER
Chief, Andrews Tower