148 N.E. 497 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1925
This was an action for the partition of real estate. The cause was tried upon an agreed statement, in writing, as to the material facts. From a finding and decree adjudging that the parties hereto were the owners of the land sought to be petitioned in equal shares, as tenants in common, this appeal is prosecuted. The errors assigned challenge the rulings of the trial court in sustaining certain demurrers, and in overruling the motion for a new trial.
It has been many times held that where there is a special finding of facts by the court and the facts are fully *382
and correctly found, any antecedent ruling as to the 1. sufficiency of the pleadings, even though erroneous, is harmless and, therefore, not reversible. Woodward v.Mitchell (1895),
The facts of this case, as stipulated by the parties, are, in substance, as follows: That on and prior to February 10, 1923, the appellant and his then wife, Elizabeth Lind, were the owners as tenants by entireties of the land in this action sought to be partitioned; that, on said date, the appellant herein was granted a divorce from his wife and that, by reason thereof, said parties then became tenants in common of said real estate; that, on the same day said divorce was granted, said Elizabeth Lind brought this action asking for the partition of said real estate; that Perry Douglass, the appellee herein, was the attorney for Elizabeth Lind and as such brought said suit for partition; that on February 13, 1923, said Elizabeth Lind executed her warranty deed to her undivided one-half interest in said real estate to said Perry Douglass as grantee, and that said deed was duly recorded; that thereafter, on his petition in that behalf, the appellee was substituted as party plaintiff herein instead of said Elizabeth Lind; that on March 17, 1923, said Elizabeth Lind executed her quit-claim deed to the appellant herein, to her undivided interest in and to said lands; that "the defendant herein is in possession of said real estate and is excluding Perry Douglass therefrom"; that said real estate is not susceptible of division without great loss in the value *383 thereof, and if partition is ordered, the same should be sold and the money divided.
It is the claim of the appellant that the deed from Elizabeth Lind to Perry Douglass is void as being champertous, and that, therefore, said Perry Douglass has no interest in said 2-4. real estate and cannot, therefore, maintain this action; that by virtue of the said quit-claim deed to appellant, he is the sole owner of the lands in question, and that, therefore, the court was in error in finding that the appellee was a part owner of said lands and entitled to partition thereof. This is the only question we need to consider, as all other questions are waived by the appellant by his failure in his brief to address any "proposition" thereto. The appellant relies upon the case of West v. Raymond (1863),
Upon the facts as agreed upon, the court did not err in the matter complained of.
Affirmed. *385