The plaintiff is a disabled worker whose benefits are in dispute, as the result of a series of statutory amendments and judicial decisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission, which granted the contested benefits. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated by the concurring member of the Court of Appeals panel.
i
In 1966, the plaintiff suffered serious leg injuries in the сourse of his employment at a General Motors plant in Flint. These injuries left him totally and permanently disabled.
A person who has lost the industrial use of both legs is presumed to be disabled for a period of eight hundred weeks. This prеsumption, now stated in MCL 418.361(3)(g), 418.351(1); MSA 17.237(361)(3)(g), 17.237(351)(1), was in effect at the time the plaintiff *485 became disabled. 1 After the eight hundred weeks had passed, he continued to collect basic weekly benefits from his employer, and also differential benefits from the Second Injury Fund (SIF), as nоw provided in MCL 418.521(2); MSA 17.237(521)(2).
In
Eva King v Second Injury Fund,
The special status of
Eva King
people was later codified by
A totally and permanently disabled employee whose date of injury preceded July 1, 1968, is entitled to the compensation under this act that was payable to the employee imme *486 diately before the effective date of this subsection, or compensation equal to 50% of the state average weekly wage as last determined under [MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355)], whichever is greater.
In 1968, the Legislature enacted a provision that reduces benefits by five percent each year from a person’s sixty-fifth birthday until the seventy-fifth birthday. The section took effect July 1, 1968, 5 and is now found in MCL 418.357(1); MSA 17.237(357)(1). It reads;
When an employee who is receiving weekly pаyments or is entitled to weekly payments reaches or has reached or passed the age of 65, the weekly payments for each year following his or her sixty-fifth birthday shall be reduced by 5% of the weekly payment paid оr payable at age 65, but not to less than 50% of the weekly benefit paid or payable at age 65, so that on his or her seventy-fifth birthday the weekly payments shall have been reduced by 50%; after which there shall not be a further reduction for the duration of the employee’s life. Weekly payments shall not be reduced below the minimum weekly benefit as provided in this act.
An issue soon arose regarding whether
Eva King
people were subject to these age-related reductions. Initially, the SIF assumed that the reductions applied only to persons injured on or after the effective date of the new measure (July 1, 1968) and that they were thus inapplicable to the
Eva King
people. However, the Court of Apрeals held in 1982 that the reductions
*487
were
applicable.
Lopez v Flower Basket Nursery,
The SIF responded to Lopez by applying the age-related reductions to all surviving Eva King people. It also attempted to recoup a portion of what appeared to have been overpayments to these claimants. 6
Without farther appellаte guidance, the SIF also concluded that payments to these claimants could not fall below a floor set by MCL 418.356(3); MSA 17.237(356)(3), which now provides:
The minimum weekly benefit for 1 or more losses stated in [MCL 418.361(2), (3); MSA 17.237(361)(2), (3)] shall be 25% of the state average wеekly wage as determined under [MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355)].
This approach was challenged by some of the Eva King people, but most accepted without protest the sif’s handling of this matter in the wake of Lopez.
One of the persons who challenged the approach taken by the SIF persuaded the Court of Appeals that it had erred in
Lopez
by holding that the age-related reduction could be applied to the
Eva King
people.
Wozniak v General Motors Corp,
The sif did not appeal Wozniak I. Instead, it increased differential benefit payments for Eva King *488 people to at least fifty percent of the current average weekly wage, as required by MCL 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2). The SIF refused, however, to compensate the Eva King people for the benefit reductions between the 1985 date when Lopez became final and the 1993 decision in Wozniak I.
This refusal was premised on several grounds, including the one-year-back rule of MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1), the two-year-back rule of MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381)(2), and the belief that Wozniak I should not be applied for the benefit of Eva King people who did not seek the disputed benefits until after Wozniak I was decided. 7
In
Wozniak I,
the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the wcac for further proceedings regarding whether the sef’s repayment obligation to Ms. Wozniak (who had protested immediately) was limited by either the one-year- or two-year-back rules. The eventual result was that the two-year-back rule was found inapplicable by the WCAC (the SIF did not appeal that ruling) and the one-year-back rule was found inapplicable by the Court of Appeals.
Wozniak v General Motors Corp (After Remand),
*489 The panel in Wozniak II did not reach an issue that pertains to many of the Eva King people, including the plaintiff in the present case.
We decline defendants’ invitation to decide whether [Wozniak i] should be applied retroactively to employees who did not object to the benefit reduction. [212 Mich App 44 .]
n
In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition in which he sought recoupment of the benefits he lost during the years when Lopez controlled. On appeal from the decision of a magistrate, the wcac held that the plaintiff was entitled to these benefits.
The SIF appealed to the Court of Appeals,
8
which affirmed the decision of the WCAC.
m
Issues concerning the interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law for this Court to
*490
decide de novo.
Mager v Dep’t of State Police,
The issue before us is whether to apply the holding of Wosniak I to this plaintiff, so that he can obtain the statutoiy benefits that were denied him in the years following the decision in Lopez. 9 In resolving this question, we repeat what we said a few months ago in Michigan Educational Employees Mut Ins Co v Morris, supra at 189. In the course of deciding whether a 1993 decision called Profit 10 should be applied retroactively, we explained:
*491 In these companion cases, both defendants argue that this Court’s decision in Profit should be applied prospectively rather than retroactively. “[T]he general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect .... [C]omplete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law.” Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,426 Mich 223 , 240;393 NW2d 847 (1986).
Accordingly, the first question is whether
Wozniak I
overruled clear and uncontradicted prior case law. In turn, that leads to the question whether
Lopez
constituted a clear and uncontradicted ruling on the subject of these proceedings—the relationship among the three statutory provisions discussed in
Wozniak I.
MCL 418.351(2), 418.356(3), and 418.357(1); MSA 17.237(351)(2), 17.237(356)(3), and 17.237(357)(1). Since both MCL 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2) and MCL 418.356(3); MSA 17.237(356)(3) were enacted by
In this Court, the SIF acknowledges that “Wozniak I did not overrule settled precedent,” though the panel disagreed with Lopez. Arguing against retroactive application of Wozniak I, the sif characterizes that decision as “unforeseeable.” It also writes of its reliance upon Lopez and its fear that the administration of civil justice will be hampered by retroactive application. We appreciate these concerns, but disagree. *492 The language of the controlling statutes was correctly interpreted in the Wozniak decisions, and we see no sound reason to depart from the normal course of granting full retroactivity to a judicial decision that interprets a statute.
In the end, this complex case must be decided on the basis identified by Judge Whitbeck:
Simply put, this issue here is not the type of first impression question that supports prospective application. As the Wozniak I panel found, [MCL 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2)] is quite specific while [MCL 418.356(3); MSA. 17.237(356)(3)] is quite general. Because the two subsections were once part of the same amendatory act, the legislative intent was manifestly clear: [MCL 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2)] established a minimum benefit rate of fifty percent of the state average weekly wage, or the benefit rate in effect on December 31, 1969, whichever is greater, for totally and permanently disabled workers, such as Lincoln, whose date of injury preceded July 1, 1968. The fund’s internal and purely administrative determination to the contrary was in error and its persistent reliance on that determination was without support in the wdca. Applying Blackstone’s formulation,[ 11 ] the interpretation of the wdca in Wozniak I was always the “true law” and it must therefore be given full retroactive effect. [231 Mich App 314 .]
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission.
Notes
The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (wdca), MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq., has been amended often. For the sake of clarity, we will present current statutory language, noting history where appropriate.
King
concerned amendments enacted in
An
Eva King
person is someone who was totally and permanently disabled before July 1, 1968. That cutoff reflects the effective date of
MCL 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2) marked a legislative acknowledgment of the
Eva King
people. However, the effect of the measure actually was to reduce benefits that
Eva King
people would otherwise have received as the result of the current language of MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355) (from
This provision was enacted in
The sif reduced the continuing payments until it had recovered a year’s worth of the apparent overpayments. MCL 418.833(2); MSA 17.237(833)(2).
Another potential defense relates to the fact that there аre subclasses of
Eva King
people, and Ms. Wozniak (who was injured in 1964) and the present plaintiff (injured in 1966) belong to different parts of the larger group. As interpreted in
Rotondi v Chrysler Corp,
The Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal. Unpublished order, issued September 11, 1996 (Docket No. 194191). This Court then remanded the case for cоnsideration as on leave granted.
The sip also continues to argue that the one-year- and two-year-back rules limit its liability in this matter. However, we are satisfied with the analysis offered by the Court of Appeals:
Defendant fund argues that any retroactivity should be limited by the one-year-back rule, MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1). However, this question has been conclusively [we would say “correctly”] decided in the successor case of Wozniak II, supra. A plaintiffs attempt to recovеr payments improperly withheld does not constitute an application for further compensation as defined by the statute. The two-year-back rule, MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381)(2), is inapplicable where the plaintiff has been receiving total and permanent disability benefits for an injury received before July 1, 1968. Brecht v Save-Way Food Center,407 Mich 743 ;288 NW2d 576 (1980). [231 Mich App 269 .]
See also
Profit v Citizens Ins Co of America,
1 Blackstone, Commentaries (3d ed, 1884), p 69.