Lincoln National Life Insurance v. Payne
374 F.3d 672
8th Cir.
2004
Check Treatment
Docket

LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; Lincoln Financial Advisors Corporation; Appellants, v. Thomas W. PAYNE, Appellee. Mary Ann Burris, and Barbara Crosby, Appellants, v. Thomas W. Payne, Appellee.

Nos. 03-2997SI, 03-2998SI

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

July 8, 2004

374 F.3d 672

Submitted: April 12, 2004.

regarding fractures, because expert was not an orthopedist, and did not have experience treating fractures like the one at issue in the case). And even assuming arguendo that Dr. Burrows could qualify as such an expert, his testimony did not set forth a standard of care or a departure from such standard by the Mayo pathology department.

The Mattkes argue that testimony at trial by Mayo Clinic‘s witnesses established a standard of care. Assuming that this is the case, all of Mayo‘s witnesses testified that no malpractice occurred. Since Dr. Burrows was the Mattkes’ only expert witness, no expert called by either the Mattkes or Mayo Clinic testified as to a breach of a standard of care by the Mayo pathology department. In order to prove medical negligence in a malpractice action, a plaintiff “must offer expert medical testimony both to state the standard of medical care and the treatment recognized by the medical community and to establish that the defendant physician in fact departed from that standard[.]” (emphasis added); see also ; .

The exception to this rule is that “expert testimony is not necessary where the matters to be proved fall within an area of common knowledge and developing lay comprehension of medical techniques ....” . As discussed above in the context of appellants’ res ipsa loquitur claim, we do not believe that this is a situation falling into such an area. This conclusion is especially strong in light of Dr. Burrows’ testimony that he was not familiar with the phenomenon of cellular floaters prior to the trial. If a licensed and practicing physician is not aware of a particular medical phenomenon, we cannot expect it to be something with which a reasonable layperson would be familiar. The actions of the pathology department here involve facts that would not be within “an area of common knowledge and developing lay comprehension of medical techniques.” . Minnesota law therefore requires that expert testimony be presented regarding a departure from an established standard of care before a negligence claim based on the actions of Mayo Clinic‘s pathology laboratory could be considered by the jury. There was no such evidence, and the district court‘s jury instructions were a correct statement of Minnesota law in light of the evidence in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Todd A. Strother, argued, Des Moines, Iowa (Denny M. Dennis, Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for appellant.

David L. Charles, argued, Des Moines, Iowa (Mark McCormick, Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for appellee.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal from the District Court‘s1 denial of their motions to vacate arbitration awards entered against them. Plaintiffs allege that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, and that the District Court erred by upholding the panel‘s decision even though the panel refused to clarify its award in accordance with the District Court‘s remand order. We review a district court‘s decision to confirm an arbitration award de novo, . Finding no error, we affirm.

“Judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited. Beyond the grounds for vacation provided in the [Federal Arbitration Act], an award will only be set aside where it is completely irrational or evidences a manifest disregard for the law.” (quoting ).

Plaintiffs argue that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. In this case, neither the record nor the award convinces us that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. “We have been careful to distinguish[ ] an arbitrator‘s interpretation of the law, which is insulated from review, from an arbitrator‘s disregard of the law, which may open the door for judicial scrutiny.” , citing . Any disregard “‘must be made clearly to appear’ and may be found ‘when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same.‘” (quotations omitted). In Stroh, we held that the terseness of an award is not grounds for finding that a panel of arbitrators disregarded the law. “Arbitrators are not required to elaborate their reasoning supporting an award, and to allow a court to conclude that it may substitute its own judgment for the arbitrator‘s whenever the arbitrator chooses not to explain the award would improperly subvert the proper functioning of the arbitral process.” (quotations omitted). Furthermore, there must be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the arbitrators were aware of the law and intentionally disregarded it. See . Manifest disregard requires something more than a mere error of law. If an arbitrator, for example, stated the law, acknowledged that he was rendering a decision contrary to law, and said that he was doing so because he thought the law unfair, that would be an instance of “manifest disregard.” Nothing of the kind appears here. To require anything less would threaten to subvert the arbitral process.

Although the plaintiffs argue that the arbitrators’ decision was mistaken, and perhaps it was, they have not convinced us that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. The panel was presented with voluminous evidence and held five weeks of hearings in this case. Although plaintiffs’ briefs attempt to characterize the facts of the case in the light most favorable to themselves, the arbitrators were not bound to accept the plaintiffs’ version of the facts. Plaintiffs also argue that the arbitrators misapplied the law, but these purported errors of law are not reviewable. Even if we would have reached a different conclusion, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the arbitrators.

Initially, the District Court remanded this case to the arbitrators, asking that they clarify their award, and stating that clarification was necessary in order for the Court to exercise its reviewing power properly. In the course of its order of remand, the District Court stated that remand was “necessary and appropriate ... for the limited review allowed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the extra-statutory grounds recognized in the Eighth Circuit.” The arbitrators declined to follow this direction, perhaps having in mind the doctrine of functus officio, under which, on occasion, arbitration panels consider themselves powerless to amend or clarify an award. According to plaintiffs, this action by the arbitration panel should have led the District Court to vacate the award. We do not read the words “necessary and appropriate” in the District Court‘s remand order so literally. Certainly the District Court would have preferred clarification from the arbitration panel, but evidently the Court, having received no clarification, considered itself able to exercise its reviewing function. We agree with this decision.

The judgment of the District Court, confirming the arbitration award, is affirmed.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD

Circuit Judge

Notes

1
The Hon. Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.