ALICIA G. LIMTIACO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GUAM v. FELIX P. CAMACHO, GOVERNOR OF GUAM
No. 06-116
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 8, 2007—Decided March 27, 2007
549 U.S. 483
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, post, p. 492.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Randolph D. Moss and Jonathan G. Cedarbaum.
Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Seth M. Galanter, Seth M. Hufstedler, Shirley M. Hufstedler, Arthur B. Clark, Rodney J. Jacob, Daniel M. Benjamin, Kathleen V. Fisher, and Arne D. Wagner.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
I
In 2003, Guam lacked sufficient revenues to pay its obligations. To supplement revenues, the Guam Legislature authorized the Governor to issue bonds worth approximately $400 million. See Guam
In response, the Governоr sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance of the authorized bonds would not cause Guam‘s debt to exceed the debt limitation. That determination turned, in part, on the meaning of the phrase “aggregate tax valuation” in Guam‘s Organic Act. The attorney general calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the assessed valuation of property in Guam. But the Governor calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the аppraised valuation. Because Guam assesses property at 35 percent of its appraised value, Guam Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 24102(f), the attorney general‘s interpretation resulted in a much lower debt limit. The Guam Supreme Court agreed with the Governor and held that
The attorney general filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Court of Appeals for thе Ninth Circuit. See
The attorney general then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. By statute, certiorari petitions must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of . . . judgment” in a lower court.
II
Only “a genuinely final judgment” will trigger
The same reasoning applies here. In 2003, the Court of Appeals appropriately exercised discretionary jurisdiction over the attorney general‘s appeal. See
The Governor argues that the judgment was made final earlier—either when Congress enacted the statute depriving the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction or when the Court of Appeals decided in Santos that the statute applied to pending cases. But when Congress removed the Ninth Circuit‘s jurisdiction over appeals from Guam, it did not dismiss this appeal. Likewise, when the Ninth Circuit determined in Santos that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction over pending appeals, the court did not finally determine the rights of the parties in this case. The jurisdiction-stripping statute and Santos may have signaled the Court of Appeals’ ultimate dismissal of the appeal, but neither created a final judgment in the still-pending case. The attorney general‘s appeal remained pending until the Ninth Circuit issued its dismissal order. And the pendency of the appeal continued to “raise the question whether” any further action by the court might affect the relationship of the parties. Hibbs, supra, at 98. Accordingly, we hold that the judgment of the Guam Supreme Court did not become final, for purposes of this Court‘s review, until the Court of Appeals issued its order dismissing the appeal.
We emphasize that our holding is limited to the unique procedural circumstances presented here. Specifically, our holding does not extend to improperly filed appeals or filings used as delaying tactics. See Morse v. United States, 270 U. S. 151 (1926) (holding that second application for leave to file motion for new trial did not suspend the finality of the lower court‘s judgment).
III
Having determined that we have jurisdiction, we turn to the merits. As always, we begin with the text of the statute. See Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U. S. 123, 128 (1994). Guam‘s Organic Act states that “no public indebtedness of Guam shall be authorized or allowed in excess of 10 per centum of the aggregate tax valuation of the property in Guаm.”
Though it has no established definition, the term “tax valuation” most naturally means the value to which the tax rate is applied.2 Were it otherwise, the modifier “tax” would have almost no meaning or a meaning inconsistent with ordinary usage. “Tax valuation” therefore means “assessed valuation“—a term consistently defined as a valuation of property for purposes of taxation. See Black‘s 149; see also id., at 116 (6th еd. 1990) (defining “assessed valuation” as “[t]he worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied“).
One would not normally refer to a property‘s appraised valuation as its “tax valuation.” Appraised valuation is simply market value. And market value may or may not relate to taxation. Usually market value becomes relevant to taxation only because a specified percentage of mаrket value is the assessed value to which taxing authorities apply the tax rate. It would strain the text to conclude that “tax valuation” means a valuation a step removed from taxation.
The Guam Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion by interpreting the word “tax” to limit the kinds of property that qualify for inclusion in the debt-limitation calculation. But that interpretation impermissibly rearranges the statutory language. The word “tax” modifies “valuation,” not “рroperty.” The phrase “tax valuation” therefore refers to the type of valuation to be conducted, not the object that is valued.
The Guam Supreme Court also contrasted
Our interpretation comports with most States’ practice of tying the debt limitations of municipalities to assessed valuation. See 15 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 41:7, p. 422 (3d ed. rev. 2005) (“Most of the constitutional and statutory provisions make the assessed value of the taxable property of the muniсipality the basis for ascertaining the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred . . .“). States that depart from the majority approach use clear language to do so. See id., at 424-425 (“The standard is generally the assessed value of the property for taxation, rather than the actual value, where the two are different; but where the constitution or statute uses the term ‘actual value,’ such value governs rather than the taxable value” (citing N. W. Halsey & Co., supra; footnotе omitted)). Congress has not used such language here. Indeed, as discussed earlier, only a strained reading of “tax valuation” would suggest a departure from the majority approach.
The Governor suggests that our interpretation would result in no debt limitation at all because Guam may arbitrarily set its assessment rate above 100 percent of market value. For two reasons, we think the Governor has overstated this concern. First, most States have long based their debt limitations on assessed value without incident. Second, a strong political check exists; property-owning voters will not fail to notice if the government sets the assessment rate above market value.
Finally, the Governor mistakenly argues that we owe deference to the Guam Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Organic Act. It may be true that we accord deference to territorial courts over matters of purely local concern. Seе Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363, 366 (1974) (reviewing District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ interpretation of D. C. Code provision). This case does not fit that mold, however. The debt-limitation provision protects both Guamani-ans and the United States from the potential consequences of territorial insolvency. Thus, this case is not a matter of purely local concern. Of course, decisions of the Supreme Court of Guam, as with other territorial courts, are instructive and are entitled to respect when they indicate how statutory issues, including the Organic Act, apply to matters of local concern. On the other hand, the Organic Act is a federal statute, which we are bound to construe according to its terms.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Guam Supreme Court and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the petition for writ of certiorаri was timely, and join Part II of the Court‘s opinion. I disagree, however, that the phrase “tax valuation” in the Organic Act of Guam, § 11, 64 Stat. 387, as amended,
The words “tax valuation” can plausibly be read in either of the ways the parties
I see no tie-breaker in comparing Guam‘s debt limitation with those of other Territories. In each Territory mentioned by the parties, when Congress imposed a territorial debt limitation the assessed value was equal to the actual value of the property.3 Thus the attorney general can stress
the significance of assessed value and argue that because the debt limitation in the other Territories was based on the assessed value, the same should be true for Guam. And the Governor can argue that because the debt limitation in the other Territories was based on the actual value, that should go for Guam, too. Nor is the tie to be broken by arguing that pegging the territorial debt limit to “tax valuation” suggests that this Territory was meant to be treated more conservatively than a limit turning on full value; the
Comparing state practices is no help, either. The Court says that “States that depart from the majority approach” of linking debt limitations to assessed value “use clear language to do so,” ante, at 491, but in the preceding paragraph the majority recognizes that state courts “have understood ‘valuation,’ standing alone, to mean the market or cash value of property,” ante, at 490. So it seems a stretch to suggest that state laws offer a clear rule that Congress may be pre-
sumed to have understood as background; better to read the state cases as products of the specific wording of their particular limitations and the state history of рroperty taxation. See, e. g., Phelps v. Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 509, 511-514, 219 N. W. 872, 873-874 (1928) (relying on text of limitation, other related provisions, and history of property taxation); N. W. Halsey & Co. v. Belle Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 470-474, 104 N. W. 494, 495-497 (1905) (same). It almost goes without saying that neither side has cited a state case involving language and background the same as Guam‘s.
In sum, the congressional mind does not emerge from the words “tax valuation” or any settled construction of that phrase. Fortunately, though, the purpose of the legislation does point to a likely reading. The statute itsеlf makes clear that what Congress meant to provide was a practical guarantee against crushing debt on the shoulders of future generations, and insolvency with the inevitable call for a bailout by Congress. See United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439, 455 (1993) (“[L]ook to the [law‘s] . . . object and policy” (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))).
The attorney general claims that her reading is a better fit with these objectives because it ties the legislature‘s ability to incur debt to its willingness to tax. But this is hardly so. Under the attorney general‘s аpproach (now the Court‘s), the Guam Legislature could double the debt limitation without increasing taxes by a single penny, simply by doubling the assessment rate and cutting the tax rate by half.5
Although it is arguable that tying the debt ceiling to the assessed value may to some vague degree enhance legislative accountability by requiring action to raise the debt ceil-
ing as debt piles up, I know of no independent suggestion that the debt limit was designed to operate as a politiсal discouragement, not as a hard cap. It would, after all, have been strange for Congress to set a debt cap to constrain the Guam Legislature, only to leave the limiting figure subject to easy manipulation by the legislature. While I know that actual valuation can be manipulated, too, manipulation of that figure could only be done by officials acting in bad faith and subject to an obvious political or judicial challenge.
The more practical understanding of what must have been intended is a statute tying the debt limitation to Guam‘s capacity to tax property. The actual, market value of property is the only economic index of Guam‘s ability to collect property taxes to pay its bills,7 the only figure under consideration that is fixed in the real world, and the only figure that provides a genuine limitation. This was the figure employed or required by Congress in each of the other Territories mentioned above, see n. 3, supra, and I presume that its practical significance was in Congress‘s mind when it set the debt caps for each of them. I see no reason not to attribute the same practical assessment to Congress in this instance.
I would affirm.
