Thе Michigan Department of Transportation appeals by leave granted from a *753 circuit court order denying its motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), lack of subjеct matter jurisdiction. We reverse.
On March 22, 1985, plaintiff brought an inverse condemnation action against the department in the Wayne Circuit Court under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (ucpa), MCL 213.51 et seq.; MSA 8.265(1) et seq. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he owned a gasoline service station located on Ford Road in Westland. He further alleged that his western driveway, which provides access to the sole pump island of his station, was relocated as part of a road-widening project undertaken by defendant on Ford Road. According to plaintiff, defendant’s relocation of his driveway "substantially and mаterially” impaired his right of ingress and egress so as to amount to a taking of his right of acсess. Because defendant refused to offer just compensation for this taking, plаintiff alleged that defendant’s actions and omissions resulted in a de facto taking of his property without just compensation.
Subsequent to the filing of plaintiff’s complaint, defendant brought a motion for summary disposition, seeking the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint on thе ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim. The trial court denied defendant’s motion.
The sole issue before this Court for resolution is whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to adjudicate an inverse condemnation claim brought pursuant to the ucpa.
The Court of Claims is a court of legislative creation. Its statutory powers are explicit and limited.
Feliciano v Dep’t of Natural Resources,
The Court of Claims is the proper forum in which to seek redress where a plaintiff alleges an already accomplished inverse сondemnation by the State of Michigan.
Hill v State Highway Comm,
We, therefore, hold that an inverse condemna *755 tion action is a claim ex сontractu. Moreover, because our research has failed to reveal any statute expressly conferring upon the circuit court jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of inverse condemnation, we further hold that the Court of Claims is the exclusive forum to adjudicate such claims.
Plaintiff argues that in enacting the ucpa the Legislature expressly conferred jurisdiction upon the circuit court to hear claims of inverse condemnation initiated by aggrieved property owners. Plaintiff is mistaken. The ucрa has no application to inverse condemnation actions initiated by аggrieved property owners. Instead, the ucpa only governs actions initiated by an agency tо acquire property on the filing of a proper complaint and after the agency has made a good-faith written offer to purchase the propеrty. MCL 213.55; MSA 8.265(5). The agency must be authorized by law to condemn property. MCL 213.51(g) and (i); MSA 8.265(1)(g) and (i).
Finally, plaintiff argues that the right to just compensation is constitutional and not contractual or tortious in nature and, therefore, because the claim is grounded in the constitution it should bе adjudicated in a court created by the constitution and not one created by the Legislature. We find plaintiffs argument to be without merit. Thom, supra; Hunter, supra.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is reversed. Its order is vacated.