OPINION
{1 Aaron M. Lilly, who physically resides in California due to his active duty service in the military but claims legal residence in Utah, appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition to modify a child support order that was originally issued in California as part of a California divorce decree. In dismissing the petition to modify, the district court concluded that under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-14-205, -618 (2008) (setting forth the relevant provisions regarding jurisdiction to modify a child support order), 1 subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is determined by a person's physical residence rather than that person's domicile or legal residence. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
12 Aaron M. Lilly (Father) is an active duty member of the United States Marine Corps. He is currently stationed in California. Father was born and raised in Utah and graduated from high school in Utah. His home of record 2 is Utah as he was a Utah resident when he enlisted in the Marines in 1994. Father claims that he has maintained his Utah domicile since his enlistment in the Marines by paying Utah taxes, registering to vote in Utah, having a Utah driver license, listing his home state as Utah, and declaring his intent to return to Utah when he is released from military service.
T3 In 2001, Father married Korilee Lilly (Mother). One child (Child) was born during the marriage. In April 2005, Mother attempted to file for divorce in Utah but could not because, at that time, she resided in California with Father and Child. Mother then filed for divorce in California, which was finalized in December 2006. The divorce decree included an order that Father pay Mother child support in the amount of $1000 every month. -In June 2005-after filing for divorce but before the divorcee was finalized-Mother and Child moved to Utah. Mother and Child have resided in Utah ever since.
1 4 In November 2007, Father filed a petition in Utah to modify the child support order to take into account Mother's increased income from employment she obtained after moving to Utah. In support of his petition, Father asserted that Utah has jurisdiction to modify the child support order because Utah is the resident state of Father, Mother, and Child. In September 2008, a commissioner recommended that Father's petition be de
15 While Father's petition to modify was pending in Utah, Mother filed her own petition in California to modify the child support order. In December 2007-before any decision had been reached on Father's Utah petition to modify-the California court dismissed Mother's petition, essentially deferring the issue of which state had jurisdiction to the earlier-filled Utah petition, but explained that "[if Utah refuses to exert jurisdiction over the issue, ... either party may file a motion requesting modification of child support to be heard before this court." Before the Utah court had acted on the matter, however, Mother renewed her petition in California; and in September 2008-after the Utah commissioner recommended denial of Father's petition but before the district court acted on Father's objection-the California court granted Mother's petition to modify the child support order, raising Father's monthly obligation from $1000 to $1225. Father now appeals the district court's determination that Utah lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. 3
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
T6 This appeal presents two related issues for our review. First, Father challenges the district court's denial of his petition, arguing that Utah, and not California, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order because Utah is the resident state of Father, Mother, and Child. Father supports his position by arguing that Utah's subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is based on a person's domicile or legal residence rather than physical residence. "Whether a [district] court has subject matter jurisdiction [to modify a child support order] presents a question of law which we review under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the [district] court's determination.'' Case v. Case,
ANALYSIS
17 All the issues here involve the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). UIFSA governs "the establishment, enforcement, [and] modification of support orders across state lines," and has been enacted in every state "to further national uniformity in the enforcement of child support orders.'' Case,
18 Two particular provisions of UIFSA are relevant to our analysis, both of which govern when a state has subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order. These provisions as adopted in Utah and California are virtually identical. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(1)(a) (2008), with Cal. Fam.Code § 4909(a)(1) (Deering
T9 As we have explained, this appeal presents two issues for our review: (1) whether Utah has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order and (2) whether California's modification of the child support order is entitled to full faith and credit. Ordinarily, a full faith and eredit analysis is a threshold issue that must be considered before reaching any other issues raised on appeal. However, the issue of whether California's modified child support order is entitled to full faith and credit is resolved by determining whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. See infra ¶¶ 24-26. And whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order is governed by UIFSA. See infro 126. Moreover, the central issue presented by this appeal is whether Utah or California has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order under UIFSA. Thus, both issues raised on appeal require interpretation of UIFSA; and resolution of the full faith and credit issue will ultimately turn on resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue. Accordingly, for ease of analysis, we will first address the subject matter jurisdiction issue and will conduct the required analysis under UIFSA; we will then address the full faith and credit issue.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
{10 The central issue presented for our review is whether Utah or California has subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA to modify the child support order. Father asserts that the district court erred in denying his petition, arguing that Utah, and not California, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. Father re
T11 The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'' State v. Burns,
T12 The terms "residence" and "reside" are open to a diverse array of usages and interpretations. "The word resident has different shades of meaning, depending upon its context." Government Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dennis,
1183 Thus, in exploring the meaning of the terms "resident" and "reside," it is important to recognize that a distinction of legal significance exists between the concepts of physical residence and legal residence or domicile. See Keene,
14 Ultimately, the terms "residence" or "reside" can be read to mean either domicile or physical residence. See Black's Law Dictionary 1423 (Oth ed. 2009) (acknowledging that the terms "residence" and "domicile" are "{slometimes ... used synonymously"). Accordingly, our interpretation of these terms as used in UIFSA sections 205 and 618 will depend upon the meaning that best supports the purpose of UIFSA,. See Anderson,
1 15 California has already had the opportunity to interpret the terms "residence" and "reside" as used in UIFSA sections 205 and 613 in In re Marriage of Amezsquita, 101 Ath 1415, 124 Cal.Rptr2d 887 (2002)-a case factually similar to this one. In Amezquita, the state of New Mexico had issued a child support order in a divorce proceeding. See id. at 888. Subsequently, the mother and children moved to California and petitioned a California court to modify the child support order. See id. The father, who was an active duty member of the United States Air Force, was stationed in California and thus physically resided in California but nonetheless maintained a New Mexico domicile. See id. at 888, 890. The California trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction to modify the child support order because the father's physical residence was in California. See id. at 888. The father appealed, contending-as Father does here-that under UIFSA sections 205 and 618, subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is determined by domicile rather than physical residence. See id. at 888-89; see also Cal. Fam.Code §§ 4909(a)(1), 4962(a) (Deering 2010). Thus, the father argued that California did not have jurisdiction to modify the child support order because he was a domiciliary of New Mexico and not California. See Amezquita,
{16 The California appellate court began its analysis by acknowledging that the purpose of UIFSA was "to ensure that ... only one valid support order may be effective at any one time." Id. at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also recognized the legal distinction between the concepts of residence and domicile, in that a person may have multiple physical residences but can only maintain one domicile at a time. See id. at 889. The court then read UIFSA sections 205 and 618 in conjunction, which together provide that a state that has issued a child support order has "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over that order so "long as [that] state remains the residence of" the father, the mother, or the children, id. at 890 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cal. Fam.Code § 4909(a)(1), but another state may obtain jurisdiction to "modify [the] ... child support order if all the parties ... reside in [that other] state," Amezquita,
T 17 The California court interpreted these provisions in light of UIFSA's purpose to ensure that only one valid support order be in effect at any one time, and thus read these provisions as meaning that only one court at a time could have jurisdiction to modify a child support order. See Amezquita,
118 We find the reasoning in Amezquita to be persuasive in interpreting our own substantially identical versions of UIFSA sections 205 and 613. Although the terms "residence" and "reside" are ambiguous in the sense that the words themselves can support two reasonable meanings-physical residence or domicile-see generally Arnold v. Grigsby,
19 An additional factor of importance in our reasoning here is the Utah Legislature's recognition that UIFSA is a "uniform act." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901 (2008). Thus, "[iJn applying and construing it[s terms] consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it." Id. Therefore, our interpretation of UIFSA's provisions must not be merely parochial but must be consonant with and supportive of UIFSA's overarching goal of promoting nationwide uniformity. On appeal, Father has cited several cases, including Amezquita, in which other state courts have come to the conclusion that UIFSA sections 205 and 613 are based on a parent's domicile rather than physical residence. See Lattimore v. Lattimore,
120 Having concluded that subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order under UIFSA sections 205 and 618 is based on a person's domicile, resolution of this case requires a determination of whether Father is a domiciliary of Utah or California. If Father is determined to be a Utah domiciliary, then Utah, and not California, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. Conversely, if Father is determined to be a California domiciliary, then California, and not Utah, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order.
121 In dismissing Father's petition to modify the child support order, the district court made no findings regarding whether Father is a Utah domiciliary and, instead, based its decision solely on the fact that Father physically resides in California. In so doing, the district court suggested that, should this court reverse and remand its decision, an evidentiary hearing would be needed to determine Father's domicile: We agree and, accordingly, remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine Father's domicile. Although we leave this factual determination to the district court, we recognize that it is not, as the district court described, simply a "fiction" that a military service member serving outside the state for even extended periods of time may nevertheless maintain a domicile or legal residence in Utah. Rather, it is widely acknowledged that military service members can maintain a domicile in a place where they do not physically reside despite a lengthy absence from that place of domicile: See generally 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicil § 28 ("Generally, an adult does not gain or lose a domi-cille] or residence by serving in the military. Thus, ... a person does not acquire a new domicile] by entering the military and does not abandon or loge the domicil[e] that he or she had upon entering." (footnote omitted));
1 22 Having concluded that, under UIFSA, subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is determined by a person's domicile rather than physical residence, we now address the full faith and eredit issue to determine whether further proceedings in this case have been precluded by a valid, supervening modified child support order issued by the California court.
IIL. Full Faith and Credit
123 Mother argues that this court must recognize California's modification of the child support order under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, as interpreted by Utah law. Father, however, has brought to our attention the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (the FFCCSOA), which specifically addresses when one state must give full faith and credit to a child support order issued by another state. 8 See generally 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B (LexisNexis 2010). We will address the full faith and credit issue under both the FFCCSOA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause in turn. But because both analyses are similar and result in identical conclusions, we need not decide which is controlling.
¶24 The FFCCSOA mandates that "each State ... shall enforce ... a child support order made consistently with this section by a court of another State." 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B(a)(1). To be "made consistently with" the FFCCSOA, a state issuing a child support order must have "subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter such an order," and must also have "personal jurisdiction over the contestants." 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B(c)(1); see also United States v. Big-ford,
T25 Pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, a state must give full faith and credit to the judgments of other states. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. But to be given full faith and eredit, these foreign judgments must be both valid and final, See In re Estate of Jones,
127 Under UIFSA section 205, whether California had subject matter jurisdiction- or continuing, exelusive jurisdiction-to modify the child support order turns on interpretation of the term "residence" as used in that provision-the exact analysis we have conducted here, concluding that the term "residence" as used in UIFSA section 205 means a person's domicile or legal residence rather than physical residence. See supra 118. Therefore, resolution of whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order-thus entitling that order to full faith and credit-is contingent upon whether, on remand, the district court determines Father to be a domiciliary of Utah or of California. If it is determined that Father is a Utah domiciliary, then not only does Utah have jurisdiction to modify the child support order, but California also did not have jurisdiction to modify the child support order; thus, that modified order is not entitled to full faith and credit under either the FFCCSOA or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Conversely, if it is determined that Father is a California domiciliary, then not only does Utah not have jurisdiction to modify the child support order, but California did have jurisdiction to modify the child support and that modified order is entitled to full faith and credit under both the FFCCSOA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Therefore, the full faith and credit issue will necessarily be resolved on remand.
128 As a final matter, however, we must address one other component of the full faith and credit analysis under Utah's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause: whether the California court itself decided that it had jurisdiction to modify the child support order, thus conclusively resolving the jurisdiction question under the doe-trine of res judicata. See generally Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson,
29 We conclude that the issue of California's subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order is not barred by res judicata because, although raised before the California court, the issue of subject matter
30 Our analysis, therefore, stands. And whether California had jurisdiction to modify the child support order, thus entitling that order to full faith and credit under both the FFCCSOA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is contingent upon the district court's determination of whether Father is a Utah or California domiciliary.
CONCLUSION
131 We conclude that the district court erroneously dismissed Father's motion to modify the child support order because subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order under UIFSA sections 205 and 613 is determined by a person's domicile or legal residence rather than physical residence. We therefore reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine Father's domicile. If Father is determined to be a Utah domiciliary, then Utah, and not California, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. We further conclude that if Father is determined to be a Utah domiciliary, then not only does Utah have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order but California's modification of the child support order is not entitled to full faith and credit under either the FFCCSOA or the Full Faith and Credit Clause as interpreted by Utah law. 10 Furthermore, under Utah law, the issue of whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order is not barred by res judicata because although the issue was raised before the California court, it was not adjudicated.
32 We therefore reverse and remand. 11
Notes
. Because the relevant provisions are unchanged, we cite to the current version of the Utah Code as a convenience to the reader. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-14-205, -613 amend. notes (2008) (stating that these sections were previously codified as Utah Code sections 78-456-205 and 78-45f-613 before being renumbered in 2008).
. Home of record is a military term for the place of a person's residence at the time he or she enlists into the military. This term, however, does not necessarily coincide with the concept of domicile or legal residence. See Rod Powers, About.com, Military Legal Residence and Home of Record, http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/ militarylaw1/a/homeofrecord.htm (last visited February 17, 2011). See also infra % 12-14 (explaining concept of legal residence or domicile).
. Father has not appealed the California court's modification of the child support order.
. Utah Code section 78B-14-205(1)(a) states,
A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if the order is the controlling order, and . at the time of the filing of a request for modification, this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(1)(a) (2008). In comparison, California Family Code section 4909(a)(1) states, "A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order ... [als long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued." Cal. Fam.Code § 4909(a)(1) (Deering 2010).
. Utah Code section 78B-14-613(1) states, "If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order...." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-613(1). California Family Code section 4962(a) states, "If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order...." Cal. Fam.Code § 4962(a).
. Because In re Marriage of Amezquita,
. In the proceedings below, the concern was expressed that this interpretation of UIFSA would permit a person seeking to modify a child support order to engage in forum shopping. Because it is usually more difficult for a person to change domicile than physical residence, however, the concern that a statutory focus on domicile would increase the temptation to forum shop seems misplaced. Under the facts of this case, for example, we are skeptical that a military service member could so easily change his domicile to take advantage of the perceived benefits of a more favorable jurisdiction.
. The FFCCSOA "was enacted by the United States Congress to facilitate enforcement of child support orders among the states, to discourage interstate controversies over child support, and to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict among the states in the establishment of child support." 18 ALR. 6th 97 (summary); see also 28 U.S.CS. § 1738B congressional findings, statement of policy, and declaration of purposes (LexisNexis 2010). The FFCCSOA became law following Congress's mandate that the states adopt UIFSA and was, from its inception, intended to be consistent with UIFSA. See Basileh v. Alghusain,
. It is worth noting that when Mother first petitioned to have California modify the child support order, the California court dismissed Mother's petition, explaining that "[ilf Utah refuses to exert jurisdiction over the issue, ... either party may file [a] motion [requesting modification of the child support order] to be heard before this court." California, therefore, deferred to Utah's decision on whether it would exercise subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. And being subject to appellate review, the issue of whether Utah will exercise subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order has not yet been finally decided. Why the California court decided to go forward with Mother's renewed modification proceeding before a Utah court had determined whether it had jurisdiction is not discernible from the record before us.
. Our conclusion here further complies with UIFSA and the FFCCSOA, which both provide methods for determining which child support order is controlling when multiple child support orders are issued by multiple states. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-207(2) (2008), with 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B(f) (LexisNexis 2010). Specifically, both UIFSA and the FFCCSOA provide that if two competing child support orders are issued by two different states, then the order issued by the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is the controlling child support order. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-207(2)(a), with 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B()(2).
. In dismissing Father's petition to modify the child support order, the district court awarded Mother attorney fees as the prevailing party. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (Supp. 2010) (providing for reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in child support actions); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-313(2) (2008) (providing for reasonable attorney fees under UIFSA).