37 Wash. 532 | Wash. | 1905
This was an action to quiet title, and resulted
in a decree in favor of the respondent. The trial court made and filed separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only exception shown to have been taken to the findings is found in a minute in the clerk’s docket, as follows:
“Plaintiff, by his attorney, O. A. Riddle, now files findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree herein, to which defendants Oluf Eklund and Pauline Eklund, his wife, by their attorneys, Revelle & Revelle, except, and request thirty d%vs from May 4,1904, in which to file statement of facts. Allowed by the court.”
This court has repeatedly held that exceptions taken in this manner are insufficient under the statute, and that they will not be considered except when it appears that each and all of the findings are erroneous. It is not contended that all are so in this- case. Respondent, in his brief, objects to the consideration of the statement of facts filed herein, and moves to strike said statement and affirm the judgment, for the reason that appellants have not made or taken any proper or sufficient legal exceptions to the findings of fact, and that there is no basis for an appeal. Appellants urge that, inasmuch as findings are not required to be made and filed in equity cases, the taking of excep
Appellants also urge that they are entitled to have this court review the action of the- trial court in denying their
Being unable to consider the question of the nonsuit, we are left to- examine solely those rulings where appellants tendered evidence which the trial court excluded. One instance of this was where appellants offered to prove that they were not indebted to the Columbia & Puget Sound Railway Company, at the time they were sued by said company — the judgment in said suit being the one upon which the property involved in this case was subsequently sold, and through which proceeding respondent claims title. If this evidence had been admitted, it could not have changed the result. There are findings (not excepted to) that the action just mentioned was commenced by the filing of a complaint and service of summons and complaint upon both of appellants personally; that they defaulted; that trial was had, verdict rendered, and judgment duly entered against appellants; that, upon said judgment, execution issued and the property in question sold to Edgar Whipple and Amelia Whipple; that the sale was duly confirmed; and that appropriate proceedings were thereafter had by which the title was passed from the Whipples to respondent. Hence, it will be seen that the question of whether or not appellants owed the railway company anything at the time of the commencement of that action must be treated as res adjudicaba. As the evidence, if admitted, could avail nothing, appellants are not prejudiced by its absence.
Appellants also excepted to the action of the court in ex-
The judgment and decree of the trial court is affirmed.
Mount, C. J., Dunbar, Crow, and Rudkin, JJ., concur.
Hadley and Fullerton, JJ., took no part.