523 F.2d 999 | 2d Cir. | 1975
Lead Opinion
This appeal involves the entitlement of a child to insurance benefits under Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
The facts are simple, compelling and not in dispute. The infant was born on January 29, 1958, in James and Lillian Williams’ West Virginia home, the son of their 14-year-old unmarried, and sometimes institutionalized daughter, Geraldine. The child has lived with his grandparents all his life and at all times he was treated and supported financially by them as if he were their child. The doctor who delivered him, the mother, other members of the family, and friends all corroborated the immediate and constant intention of the grandparents to adopt Wendell because of his mother’s age and mental impairments. Indeed, when Wendell was less than two months old, his grandparents went to the local courthouse to commence formal proceedings, but were advised of West Virginia’s mandatory six months’ waiting period prior to the filing of all petitions for legal adoption.
Shortly thereafter, on March 11, 1958, James Williams died of a cerebral hemorrhage. With a resultant lack of funds, Lillian Williams, his wife and Wendell’s grandmother, could not pursue formal adoption procedures until more than two years after her husband’s death. The legal adoption proceedings were pursued to completion on November 13, 1961.
The Secretary argues that under Section 216(e)(1), note 2 supra, the child, Wendell, could not be “deemed” to be James Williams’ legally adopted child within the meaning of subparagraph (A) since “proceedings for the adoption of the child” had not been “instituted by [James Williams] before his death. The Secretary also maintains that subparagraph (B) of Section 216(e)(1) cannot apply here since Wendell was not “legally adopted by [James Williams’] surviving spouse” before the end of two years after his death. The Secretary further argues that there could be no “equitable adoption” by James Williams under, e. g., Davis v. Celebrezze, 239 F.Supp, 608 (S.D.W.Va.1965), since West Virginia law imposes a six-month waiting period before adoption proceedings can be commenced, 14 W.Va. Code § 48-4-l(b), and the law of “equitable adoption” may apply only if the adoption in question could have been legally effected. Spiegel v. Flemming, 181 F.Supp. 185, 188-89 (N.D. Ohio 1960). Here no legal adoption could have been effected by James Williams during his lifetime since his death occurred prior to the expiration of the six months’ waiting period.
While respectable arguments to the contrary of each of the first and third points may be made,
The concept of adoption in equity is recognized both by the Secretary and by courts for the purpose of allowing benefits absent strict compliance with statutory requirements. Broussard v. Weinberger, 499 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1974) (equitably adopted child entitled to Social Security Act life insurance benefits); Smith v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 431 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1970) (equitably adopted child entitled to disability insurance benefits); Davis v. Celebrezze, supra, 239 F.Supp. at 610—11 (equitably adopted child entitled to child insurance benefits).
Under Section 216(e)(1)(B) the child, Wendell, may be deemed to be the “legally adopted child” of the wage earner James Williams if “such child was adopted” by Lillian Williams within two years of James’ death. The questions for us are whether there was an equitable adoption by the grandmother, Lillian Williams, within two years of the death of her husband, the wage earner, under West Virginia law and whether an equitable adoption by the spouse within two years satisfies the Section 216(e) requirements.
The equitable adoption doctrine is an established tradition in West Virginia: Smith v. Richardson, 347 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.W.Va.1972); Meadows v. Richardson, 347 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.W.Va.1972); Pittsenbarger v. Richardson, 345 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D.W.Va.1972); Slaughter v. Gardner, 292 F.Supp. 568 (S.D.W.Va.1968); Davis v. Celebrezze, supra.
The undisputed evidence requires the conclusion that an equitable adoption of Wendell by Lillian under West Virginia law did take place. After Wendell’s statutorily required six months of living in the Williams home, that is to say, after July 29, 1958, there was no impediment under West Virginia law to Wendell’s legal adoption by his grandmother, Lillian Williams, and thus no impediment to the occurrence of equitable adoption. See Spiegel v. Flemming, supra.
The acts and conduct of the parties here, Lillian and her daughter Geraldine, the 14-year-old mother, provide the requisite “clear, strong, and satisfactory evidence” that it was the intention of both the adopting and real parent in mutual, though unwritten, agreement that Lillian Williams adopt Wendell. See Meadows v. Richardson, supra. The hearing examiner found that
[subsequent to the birth of the child . the mother of the child, Geraldine Williams, and the claimant and the wage earner agreed among themselves that because of the youth of the mother of the child, and her mental impairments that in the best interest of the child the wage earner and the claimant would adopt this child as their own.
Although the hearing examiner focused in his findings upon the agreement between the parties before the wage earner’s death, the only evidence is that the same agreement and intentions of the mother and grandmother prevailed six months after the birth of the child and constitute clear, continuing, unchallenged evidence of an equitable adoption at that time. Between the time of the wage earner’s death and the ultimate le
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether Congress intended in Section 216(e)(1)(B) to require that a child, to be “legally adopted by [the wage earner’s] surviving spouse,” be adopted in formal court proceedings within the two-year period of that provision, or whether it is sufficient that the law of the locality recognize the concept of equitable adoption as a part of its adoption law, and that the child be equitably adopted, without formal proceedings, within the two-year period. We take the latter interpretation in the light of the remedial policies underlying the Act as a whole, as to which see, e. g., Norton v. Richardson, 352 F.Supp. 596 (D.Md.1972); Branch v. Finch, 313 F.Supp. 337 (D.Kan.1970).
The legislative history of the Act reveals little of specific moment to the narrow problem of construction we have here. The Senate Report on the 1958 Act which added the original language of subparagraph (B) relating to adoption by the wage earner’s surviving spouse does not discuss whether the phrase “legally adopted” was intended to encompass all adoptive relationships which have legal efficacy under state law or was designed to prescribe the manner in which the relationship is created.
There is an entire body of case law which has interpreted the phrase “child” as it appears in the first clause of the
In our case, however, unlike in Craig and Smith, the term “legally adopted” is not cabined by any prerequisite of formal proceedings. To the contrary, Section 216(e)(1)(B) merely requires that the “legally adopted child” be “adopted by such individual’s surviving spouse” within the two years following the insured’s death. As we believe the court in Craig realized, the remedial purposes of Section 216 do not support a niggardly construction of the term “legally adopted” as used in Section 216(e)(1), see Craig v. Finch, supra, 425 F.2d at 1008, note 10 supra.
For these reasons, we conclude that the requirement that Wendell Williams be “legally adopted” by his grandmother within the meaning of Section 216(e)(1)(B) was fulfilled when, within the two-year time limit of that provision, the adoption became fully legal and enforceable under West Virginia law under the doctrine of equitable adoption. Accordingly, Wendell qualifies under Section 216(e) for the benefits there made available.
We reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment awarding benefits in accordance with this opinion.
. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) provides:
(1) Every child (as defined in Section 416(e) of this title) of an individual . . who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child .
(C) was' dependent upon such individual
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death . . shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.
. Section 216(e) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), provides:
(e) The term “child” means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual . . For purposes of clause (1), a person shall be deemed as of the date of death of an individual, to be the legally adopted child of such individual if such person was at the time of such individual’s death living in such individual’s household and was legally adopted by such individual’s surviving spouse after such individual’s death but only if (A) proceedings for the adoption of the child had been instituted by such individual before his death, or (B) such child was adopted by such individual’s surviving spouse before the end of two years after (i) the day on which such individual died .
. 14 W.Va.Code § 48-4-l(b) provides:
No petition for an adoption shall be made or presented until after the child sought to be adopted shall have lived in the home of the adopting parent or parents for a period of six months.
. The adoptive mother, Lillian Williams, the infant’s grandmother, was held entitled to mother’s benefits. This entitlement turns on the same questions presented concerning the child’s benefits.
. The case is here because appellant, Lillian Williams, moved to New York.
. Under a generous reading of the Social Security Act, it might be argued that “proceedings” were commenced by the grandfather before his death by going to the West Virginia court seeking to file the necessary papers. And under Meadows v. Richardson, 347 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.W.Va.1972), and Davis v. Celebrezze, 239 F.Supp. 608 (S.D.W.Va.1965), there was clearly the requisite intent and conduct on James Williams’ part essential to call the doctrine of “equitable adoption” into play. Under this view the legal disentitlement brought about by the six-month waiting period
. S.Rep.No.2388, to accompany H.R. 13549, quoted in 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at p. 4332, states:
(3) Benefits for an adopted child after the worker’s death
An adoptable child living as a memoer of a worker’s family and supported by him is, from the point of view of the purposes of the social security program, just as much in need of replacement of the support the child had received from the worker as is the worker’s own child. If after the worker’s death the surviving spouse adopts the child, the child should, for purposes of receiving child’s insurance benefits, be treated as an adopted child of the deceased worker. The committee-approved bill provides for payment of benefits to a child in such cases if at the time of the worker’s death the child was a member of the worker’s household, if the child was not being supported by any other person, and if the worker’s spouse adopts the child within 2 years after the worker dies.
. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(8)(D) provides eligibility for certain benefits only to children who are “legally adopted by [an eligible] individual in an adoption decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.”
. It is only of passing interest here to note that certainly as of the effective date of the 1972 amendment, benefits payable for months after December, 1972, Wendell would to all intents and purposes qualify as James’ grandchild since a formal decree had been entered and his mother, Geraldine, was not making regular contributions to his support at the time of James’ death, thus satisfying the other requirement of the 1972 amendment.
. This has usually been done in the context of determining whether the child would satisfy the state law inheritance test of Section 216(h)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A):
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts . of the State in which [the insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death .
This section has been said to limit the scope of the term “child” in Section 216(e). Craig v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1005, 1008 (5th Cir. 1970).
. The Fifth Circuit, in Glaze v. Richardson, 438 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1971), has even questioned the propriety of limiting the term “legally adopted” to cases involving formal proceedings where the statute itself, then Section 202(d)(9), refers to a requirement of such proceedings. We need not go so far to find Wendell eligible under Section 216(e)(1)(B) in this case.
. Some cases have referred to Section 216(h)(2)(A), 42 U.$.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), as limiting the scope of Section 216(e) by its imposition of an “inheritability” test for children who apply for benefits under that section. We believe, however, that the inheritability test of Section 216(h)(2)(A) does not and cannot apply to adoptions under Section 216(e)(1)(B). Since children adopted by a surviving spouse after the insured’s death can obviously not qualify as an intestate heir of the insured, reliance solely upon Section 216(h)(2)(A) to define the limits of eligibility would render Section 216(e)(1)(B) meaningless.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
Because our holding accords with the remedial purposes of the Social Security Act, I concur. I must, however, express my concern over the greatly expanded concept of the doctrine of “equitable adoption” which is emerging as a result of this and similar Social Security decisions. See, e. g., Broussard v. Weinberger, 499 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 431 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1970).
Traditionally, the doctrine of equitable adoption has served only as the basis for a claim of property rights against the estate of a deceased would-be adopter, and an agreement to adopt has not been legally enforceable during the lifetime of the adoptive parent. The relationship of parent and child is a closely personal one; and, as a general rule, equity will not enforce a contract to create such a relationship. Where, as in West Virginia, there exists a statutory scheme of adoption, the statute itself precludes the court from compelling performance of a non-statutory agreement to adopt. Erlanger v. Erlanger, 102 Misc. 236, 168 N.Y.S. 928 (Sup.Ct.), aff’d without opinion, 185 App.Div. 888, 171 N.Y.S. 1084 (1st Dep’t. 1918); Besch v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 544, 59 A.2d 499, 501 (1948); Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took Him Into Their Home And Called Him Fred, 58 Va.L.Rev. 727, 730 (1972).
So long as appellant was alive, it is unlikely that, in matters unrelated to the Social Security Act, the Courts of West Virginia would have treated her grandson as her adopted child prior to the culmination of statutory adoption proceedings. The doctrine of equitable adoption would have come into play, if at all, only after appellant’s death.
My endorsement of my brothers’ definition of equitable adoption is therefore limited to its usage solely within the framework of the Social Security Act and under the peculiar facts of this case.