Case Information
*2 Before W OOD Chief Judge , and K ANNE and S YKES , Circuit Judges .
W OOD Chief Judge . The first rule holes, according to old saying, is to stop digging. The two appeals before us bring mind, for reasons will become apparent. The first, No. comes us from order granting motion for attorneys’ fees costs under U.S.C. § SBC Internet Services, LLC (d/b/a AT&T), Comcast Cable Communications, LLC (collectively “the ISPs”), Anthony Smith, defendants in underly ing litigation. The order imposed joint several liability for against Paul Duffy, John Steele, Paul Hans meier. They appealed from order. They did not, however, file either clarify nature sanc tions or stay order. Instead, simply pay. defendants then moved for show cause why should held in contempt for their failure pay, alternative immediate contempt. After hearing, failed pay there excuse behavior. It thus held them civil contempt ordered them pay 10% original award cover defendants’ additional costs contempt litigation. It assessed daily fine, payment forthcoming. second appeal before us, No. contempt proceeding.
I
A Lightspeed Media operates online pornography sites. Our story begins when brought suit St. Clair County, Illinois, one John Doe defendant, identified only *3 ‐ through IP address. (An IP, Internet Protocol, address the number assigned a particular device the Inter net.) Doe’s IP address allegedly associated with the un lawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, made possible by use of widely shared, “hacked” password. Lightspeed then identified approximately 6,600 others (through IP ad dresses only) as alleged “co conspirators” wide reaching scheme steal passwords and content. The only conspirato rial act alleged use of same password. Then, fol lowing what seems appellants’ modus operandi , see, e.g. , AF Holdings, LLC Does 1–1058 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2014), Lightspeed, acting ex parte served subpoenas ISPs (which point non parties) personal ly identifiable information each of 6,600 alleged co conspirators, none whom been joined parties. The ISPs refused turn over information and instead quash and protective order.
The state trial denied ISPs’ motion, and so ISPs sought appellate review. At same time, called an attorney representing ISPs and requested name and title each employee who decided ISP would comply with subpoenas. then submitted affidavit stating ISP attorney refused provide information. Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled trial erred by refusing quash subpoenas. Lightspeed responded amending complaint August formally naming co conspirator parties ISPs unidentified “corporate representatives” ISPs. complaint painted broad brush: alleged everything negligence, violations Computer Fraud Abuse Act, U.S.C. §§ 1030(g), de ceptive practices aiding abetting. “John Doe,” *4 amended complaint, became Anthony Smith. Then, ignoring the fact the Illinois Supreme Court just rejected request for the same information, Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information Smith’s purported 6,600 co conspirators.
On August ISPs removed case Dis trict Court for Southern District Illinois. U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Lightspeed immediately emergency motion in advance routine Rule 26(f) conference, see F ED . R. C IV . P. 26(f), asking federal ISPs produce same “co conspirators’” personally identifia ble information. At same time, Hansmeier submitted motion pro hac vice admission; he identify law firm form. Steele entered appearance in which he listed his firm Prenda Law. firm affiliations, however, turned out be provisional, put kindly. At emer gency motion hearing, Steele identified firm Steele Hansmeier PLLC, said he with Prenda Law, with something called Alpha Law Firm. Steele Prenda are listed at same street address, North Clark Street, Chicago, different suites.
Addressing discovery motion at emergency hear ing, spoke at length about dire need re quested information. Unconvinced, judge denied motion, stating passing he “skeptical about how could ever be put on, but my feet set stone it. I’ve seen some cases didn’t look too hot start got better time. This may one those cases.” Defendants then submitted both motion dismiss stay discovery pending ruling *5 ‐ mer motion. November 2012, Hansmeier submitted mo tion withdraw without indicating which firm he was with; in March withdrew.
This was only Duffy, Steele, and at time. While dismiss pending Southern District Illinois, Central Dis trict California held hearing express purpose exploring role this trio, operating often “Prenda Law,” played some underlying copyright infringement litigation. That hearing go well them; sanctions were im posed all three (among others) and matter referred variety state federal authorities. Ingenuity LLC John Doe No. cv WL (C.D. Cal. May 2013). For our purposes relevant fact there Steele, Hansmeier, owned controlled Prenda Law. went say
demonstrated [a] willingness deceive just [that] Court, but other courts where have appeared. [Their] representations about operations, rela tionships, financial interests varied from feigned ignorance misstatements outright lies. But deception calculated so Court would grant [their] early discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] identify defendants exact set tlement proceeds from them.
Id. *3. After show cause entered Cen tral District California but before any im posed, Duffy, Steele, (along others Prenda) began voluntarily dismiss similar cases across country, including one now before us. Four *6 teen days after district court granted Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, defendant Smith filed a motion for attorney’s fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and U.S.C. § 1927. Duffy filed response; Steele and Hansmeier did not. October, district court granted Smith fees and costs pursuant section 1927. The ran jointly and severally against each appellant. Taking into account both record before and rulings other districts, court litigation Smith “smacked bullying pretense.” The court said decision impose sanctions particularly informed emergency mo tion discovery. next day, Hansmeier filed motion vacate reconsider, and few days later Steele and Duffy did same. Hansmeier and Steele alleged while received notice were being sought, not.
After district granted fees and costs Smith, ISPs filed motion requesting same. Steele opposed motion, so held hearing deal both motion reconsider fees awarded Smith new ISP motion. On November denied motion reconsider (which been behalf all three appellants) awarded attorneys’ ISPs. Appeal No. fol lowed.
B Notice Opportunity Heard contend due process rights violated because never received proper tice Smith’s sanctions. record, however, *7 & does not support them. First, as district court concluded, even if we assume they have notice originally, defect was cured when granted rehear ing on sanctions issue. Indeed, in their briefs before this court, Steele seem concede much. Their complaint has shifted one focusing adequacy of their opportunity respond . It is too late change theories, however, in any event, correctly ruled whatever procedural flaw there may been ful ly corrected affording new opportunity a hearing. Finally, received adequate notice first place.
Due process requires “notice ‘reasonably calculated, un der all circumstances, apprise interested parties of pendency of action afford them an opportunity present their objections.’” United States Air Funds, Inc. v. Es pinosa U.S. (2010) (citing Mullane Central Han over Bank Trust Co. U.S. (1950)). Actual notice is required. Id. talking here about service process, which proceeds under more restrictive set rules. F ED . R. C IV . P. Instead, one step ongoing piece litigation. Given close connections among lawyers, reasonable conclude service would suffice give notice well. behavior each one displayed throughout litigation underscored ongoing relationship communication: used one other’s CM/ECF login information, motions behalf each other, submitted substantially similar documents.
It worth noting Federal Rule Civil Proce dure 5(b)(2)(B)(i) permits leaving notice person’s office clerk someone charge, or even conspicuous *8 8 13 ‐ 3801 14 ‐ 1682 place. received notice, he was in charge of Prenda Law, there was evidence both Steele Hansmeier were working Prenda well. While huff “wholly gloss[ed] over fact Hans ‐ meier noticed appearance in case Alpha Law Firm, Prenda Law,” ample reason find Prenda/Alpha distinction illusory at best, fraudu ‐ lent at worst. Two days after moved withdraw this case, he declared in another action he “of coun ‐ sel law firm, Prenda Law, Inc.” Hansmeier “also counsel firm.” Declaration of John Steele, Ingenuity LLC v. John Doe , Case No. 2:12 ‐ cv ‐ 08333 ‐ ODW JC, ECF No. ¶¶ 1, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013). And this say nothing fact at least once in dicated in this he counsel Prenda. separate proceedings Central District Califor nia, Duffy, Steele, each took Fifth instead answering questions about attorney miscon duct relationship between Prenda other poten tial shell companies. See Ingenuity LLC WL 1898633, at *2 n.3. also Joe Mullin, “Judge smash: Prenda’s porn trolling days over,” ArsTechnica (April 2, 2013), available http://arstechnica.com/tech ‐ policy/2013/04/prenda ‐ porn trolls clam up plans ‐ crumble ‐ ‐ ‐ la ‐ courtroom/ (all websites cited opinion last visited July 2014). Fifth Amendment, however, “does forbid ad verse inferences parties civil actions when refuse testify response probative evidence.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, U.S. (1976); see LaSalle Bank Lake View Seguban F.3d (7th Cir. 1995). *9 9 13 ‐ 3801 14 ‐ 1682
A quick look at publicly available documents supports finding service also accom plished service Steele Hansmeier. its application for authorization transact business in Florida, Steele Hansmeier, Minnesota corporation, listed its mailing ad dress as 161 N. Clark St. No. Chicago, IL 60601. Paul Hansmeier is listed as Manager address is listed as 1111 Lincoln Rd., Suite in Miami Beach, Florida. See http://search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/CorporationSearch/Search ResultDetail/EntityName/forl ‐ m11000004784 ‐ c904d9dd b0c6 ‐ ‐ bce2 ‐ 4476d6ff780f/Steele%20Hansmeier/Page1.
Interestingly, N. Clark St. Suite also listed as principal place business for Prenda Law, Inc., its application authorization transact business Florida. Its registered agent, Mark Lutz, uses same Mi ami Beach address Hansmeier Steele Hansmeier application. See http://search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/ CorporationSearch/SearchResultDetail/EntityName/forp f11000004516 ‐ 3c50423a ‐ 5be3 ‐ 4bf9 ‐ bf44 ‐ 36f37c29f9cc/Prenda %20Law/Page1. See also Declaration Brett L. Gibbs Sup porting Motion Indicative Ruling, Ingenuity LLC Doe Case No. 2:12 cv ‐ ‐ ODW, Doc. ‐ ¶¶ 12–13 (“I accepted Hansmeier’s offer work at Steele Hansmeier … I worked Steele Hansmeier PLLC its successor, Prenda Law, Inc., late March until late February 2013.”). Alpha’s connection Steele Hansmeier Prenda shows up search Steele Minnesota’s business filing site. There, lists registered ad dress S. 8th St. #900 Alpha Law Firm Minneapolis, MN See http://mblsportal.sos.state.mn.us/Business/Search Details?filingGuid=7e930678 96d4 e011 a886 001ec94ffe7f. DieTrollDie, “Down Rabbit Hole – Pren *10 ‐ da/Steele/Hansmeier Wonderland,” (Feb. 2012), available at http://dietrolldie.com/2012/02/28/down rabbit hole ‐ prendasteelehansmeier wonderland/.
Little more need be said. We disappointed that appellants’ own attorney, Daniel J. Voelker, either una ble or unwilling to tell us oral argument about precise relationship between Prenda Alpha Law, despite rel evance issues on appeal. No matter: we have enough to conclude with confidence notice to Duffy reason ably calculated to apprise Steele Hansmeier pen dency motion. For icing on cake, we add also Steele received actual notice via email. Smith sent notice to email address Steele shared Duffy. While Duffy argues after he with drew from he did receive those emails, dis trict did find him to be credible. have reason upset assessment. Opportunity be Heard
Steele Hansmeier argue they never given opportunity be heard Smith’s motion. Once again, record belies assertion. As we noted, adequate notice hearing. submitted memorandum opposition Smith’s motion, but Steele not. Nonetheless, gave all three another opportunity heard matter after submitted motions vacate or reconsider or der granting Smith’s request attorneys’ fees. Before rehearing, both submitted briefs opposition Comcast’s fees. They chose submit addi tional briefs (apart what presented vacate reconsider itself) any other aspect order. *11 At hearing explained detail why he thought should not be imposed him; Steele spoke well. This more than sufficed as an oppor ‐ tunity to be heard.
3. ISPs’ Motions for Fees addition to challenging attorneys’ fees Smith, argue district erred granting to ISPs. Duffy argues he not given an oppor ‐ tunity to respond to ISPs’ request, all three argue not given an opportunity to respond to fee itemization.
a. Duffy’s Opportunity to Respond While submitted timely memoran da opposition to ISPs’ motions, Duffy did not. He serts he not given an opportunity to respond be cause ruled motions before time respond expired under local rules. This argu ment frivolous. Duffy does cite any local rule point, had he taken time look rules, he quickly would realized there time respond. The ISPs electronically filed motions November 8, 2013. The local rules allow days any response elec tronically motions. SDIL LR 7.1(g); SDIL LR 5.1(c). rules provide “[f]ailure file timely response may, Court’s discretion, considered ad mission merits motion.” SDIL LR 7.1(g). Duffy had until November submit response, but he file anything. granted ISPs’ mo tion November opportunity re spond; he simply chose exercise it.
b. Fee itemization All three appellants argue they were given opportunity to respond to both Smith the ISPs’ fee item ization prejudiced by this alleged omission. Once again, they miss the mark. They had a full opportunity to respond to Smith’s itemization but chose to focus on other issues. With respect ISPs’ itemization, correct district court erred when it ruled too quickly, but we conclude this error harmless.
Smith filed his itemization on November 8, 2013; he added a notice he would raise itemization November hearing. On November 10, a notice intention file a response Smith’s itemization on before November On November court sent a Notice Striking, which required Smith re file his itemization corrected signature block; Smith complied same day. On November district court held rehearing on matter Smith’s fees initial hearing ISPs’ request fees. On November court ordered docket text be modified describe defendants’ November re submitted itemization supplement sanctions. court indicate any change deadline response. then issued ruling finding reasonable November 27—five days after date which promised response Smith’s itemization. While contend reset response deadline November when characterized Smith’s re submitted itemization supplement, give us no indication why should so. Beyond fact never actually reset deadline, there change *13 13 1682 substance Smith’s itemization. Moreover, appellants could not have relied on that November characterization, because their deadline submit their opposition was that same day. In short, appellants had ample opportunity be heard on any questions related Smith’s itemization fees.
The time the court gave for responses the ISPs’ itemi zation was shorter than days called by local rules. AT&T not file itemization until November 15; Comcast’s filing was even later, November ruled on submissions on November just five days later. noted that Duffy, Hansmei er, responses specific itemiza tion. It went on explain that it response unneces sary because, after having reviewed itemizations, it con cluded itemized fees reasonable. We can sume error accelerate time ruling without informing parties revised schedule. Nevertheless, any such error harmless. Appellants given us any reason believe ISPs’ itemization unreasonable. Indeed, focusing errors Smith ’s fees, argue Smith’s fees are unreason able when compared requested Comcast. see reversible error here.
c. Timeliness ISPs’ Motion Appellants next challenge ISPs’ ground they delayed too long before filing it. They correct motions under section must unreasonably delayed. Overnite Transp. Co. Chi. Indus. Tire Co. F.2d (7th Cir. 1983). But they push point too far when assert delay divested juris diction over motion. Overnite which *14 rely, appeal of the judgment was pending, and eight months elapsed between the filing the notice of appeal and this affirmance on appeal. During period, jurisdiction had shifted the district court the court appeals. After this court affirmed, the district court granted attorneys’ pursuant section 1927. Id. at 792. held district court was without jurisdiction rule on the motion for costs attorneys’ fees. The district court reserved jurisdiction over this issue after notice appeal was filed; statute leave jurisdiction district court for this purpose; no motions concerning case directed either court district court during eight months appeal merits was pend ing. Id. circumstances here entirely different. Between time was voluntarily dismissed time when ISPs motion for sanctions, district court re
tained jurisdiction; no appeal pending. Smith moved April originally granted motion October 2013. Appellants moved reconsideration late October early November, point ISPs moved attorneys’ fees. It up decide, discretion, whether timely. concluded was, we see abuse discretion ruling. Merits
Appellants next throw variety arguments regarding substantive ruling wall, hope one might stick. None does. *15 court ordered imposition of attorneys’ fees under
section from inception of suit. statute reads follows:
Any attorney or other person admitted conduct cases in any of United States or any Territo ry thereof who so multiplies proceedings in any unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by satisfy personally excess costs, ex penses, attorneys ʹ fees reasonably incurred cause of such conduct.
Our review of fee awards under section only abuse of discretion. Walter Fiorenzo F.2d (7th Cir. 1988). Sanctions proper if attorney “has acted in objectively unreasonable manner by engaging serious studied disregard orderly process justice … or where claim [is] without plausible legal factual basis lacking justification.” Id. (internal quotation marks citations omitted). Bearing standard mind, we consider whether abused discretion by impos ing fees entire course litigation making liability joint several.
a. Fees Inception
Lightspeed’s suit ISPs premised notion because ISPs challenged appellants’ subpoe na personally identifiable information Smith’s 6,600 “co conspirators,” somehow became part purport ed plot steal Lightspeed’s content. If there any con ceivable merit theory, then perhaps would been inappropriate. But there not.
Count I alleged the ISPs violated the Computer Fraud Abuse Act (CFAA), U.S.C. §§ 1030(g), by failing prevent hacking. The only alleged assistance hackers, however, challenge subpoena. As ex pansive CFAA is, see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges Computer Fraud Abuse Act M INN . L. R EV . 1563–65 (2010), this is a frivolous charge.
Court II alleged ISPs were unjustly enriched be cause collected subscriber fees from people who used internet gain illegal access Lightspeed’s website. To day, provided support idea every time internet user does something unlaw ful online, user’s ISP is unjustly enriched because it con tinues receiving subscriber from malefactor. law fact contrary. U.S.C. § 512(a) (a “service provider shall liable … infringement copyright by reason provider’s transmitting, routing, provid ing connections for” material distributed by others network).
Count III alleges ISPs were members a civil conspiracy hack steal Lightspeed because ISPs supposedly knew alleged hacking yet pro tected John Does challenging subpoena. Count III throws accusation ISP corporate repre sentatives co conspirators. These assertions utterly without legal merit. complaint lacks even most ru dimentary allegation agreement would satisfy federal pleading standards. addition, service provider does risk becoming co conspirator every time challenges subpoena. To argue challenging subpoena makes ISPs co conspirators fictional copyright infringement *17 ring is frivolous. Appellants’ theory is all the more outra geous given the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court quashed a functionally identical abusive subpoena.
Count IV alleges ISPs violated the Illinois Con sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILCS § 505/2, by engaging deceptive practice of allowing illegal access plaintiff’s online content. More than this, however, needed state claim under Illinois statute: it requires “(1) deceptive act or practice by defendant; (2) defendant’s intent plaintiff rely decep tion; (3) occurrence of deception during course of conduct involving trade commerce.” Robinson Toyota Motor Credit Corp., N.E.2d (Ill. 2002). The Act al so covers unfair conduct. Id. Lightspeed’s complaint fails place defendants notice how may have violat ed statute.
Counts V VI are similarly meritless. They allege ISPs aided abetted Smith thousands John Does fighting subpoenas. They assert, somewhat contradictorily, ISP corporate representatives acted outside scope employment when helped aiding abetting. These claims baseless. similarly abuse discretion awarding attorneys’ Smith inception suit. Lightspeed raised baseless claims pressed meritless “emergency” discovery hearing. litigation “smacked bully pretense.” At November hearing fees, could been more clear: stated engaged “abusive litigation … simply filing lawsuit do discovery find out if you can sue somebody. That’s just utter non *18 14 1682 sense.” We see no need belabor point. record am ‐ ply supports district court’s conclusions, our discus ‐ sion thus far demonstrates. There abuse discretion decision grant either ISPs Smith fees for entire case.
b. Joint Several Liability now turn question whether abused discretion holding jointly sever ally liable for awarded. Appellants begin by assert ing misapplied section by holding them vicariously liable for each others’ actions. They mis taken. While is true section liability is direct, see Claiborne v. Wisdom F.3d (7th Cir. 2005), holding parties jointly severally liable for costs after de termining each one individually liable is finding direct liability.
Next, contend FM Industries, Inc. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2010), stands for proposition lawyer cannot be held responsible documents bear another’s name but not his own. FMI, however, does stand such broad proposition. There, we upheld against attorney, but we could levied copyright specialist re tained plaintiff’s principal counsel. copyright special ist, we said,
seems been sanctioned making mis take agreeing help careless lawyer [] who put name frivolous malicious documents … [b]ut course [the copyright specialist] en gaged second tier reviewer … [H]e engaged *19 help [the attorney] get his bearings in copyright law. That [the copyright specialist] failed at this task does not make him responsible documents that bear [the attorney’s] name but not own.
Id. at 340. defendant had argued that copyright spe cialist should liable because he did not prevent lead attorney filing unreasonable and vexatious documents. rejected reasoning and commented “[s]ection does require every lawyer who files appearance review and vet every paper by every other lawyer.” Id. at relevant question thus relates scope respon
sibility undertaken each individual attorney. our case, court found while Steele and Hansmeier were listed every document, evidence showed they were “in cahoots” with and worked with him use judicial system legally meritless claim. Their efforts seem continued this court. While both Steele Hansmeier now contend showed up this only after federal proceedings underway, record shows both were volved shadows state proceedings. Steele called AT&T’s counsel about subpoenas, he ap peared argued ISPs’ motion quash motion stay. appeared conference before magistrate judge sole signatory page opposition ISPs’ stay discovery. While insist only mini mal activity case, abuse discretion when otherwise.
II turn now to No. appeal from or
der holding Duffy, Steele, civil contempt fining each one one third of 10% of defendants’ costs stemming from first appeal.
A As we noted outset, after court ordered appellants to pay section sanctions within days order, they failed do so. As a result, defendants submitted joint contempt, alternative, an order show cause why they should all be held contempt. At show cause hearing, each appellant ad mitted he had paid any part sanctions. None theless, appellants argued contempt unavailable because sanctions order should regarded money judgment thus something enforceable through contempt proceedings. In alternative, claimed inability pay. thought equitable enforceable by use contempt power. Based appellants’ claimed inability pay, dis trict ordered each submit financial statement from certified public accountant verified asserted lack resources. Although financial statements submit ted, opened Pandora’s Box. Attached each financial statement bombshell letter appellants’ certified public accountant stating had “elected omit substantially all disclosures required general ly accepted accounting principles.” Not surprisingly, dis trict statements insufficient establish inability pay. It took notice these same attorneys posted large bonds other cases. conjunction *21 21 & 1682 failure even to mention these other cases, court saw this as attempt to impede its ability to make an accurate assessment of current ability pay. court found appellants had willfully violated order and made effort comply. magni
tude of harm significant, added, particularly underlying baseless and misuse of courts. Additionally, appellants made mis representations presented “half truths” show ‐ cause hearing, showing clear disrespect court. Taking all of into account, sanctioned appellants amount 10% original sanction ordered sum divided equally among them. It also set up schedule additional fines if failed comply.
B
Our review, before, abuse discretion. See Au totech Techs. LP v. Integral Research Dev. Corp. , F.3d (7th Cir. 2007). To succeed contempt petition, de fendants had demonstrate clear convincing evi dence appellants violated express unequivo cal command order. Id. Broken down into ele ments, evidence show (1) set forth unambiguous command; (2) appellants violated command; (3) appellants’ violation significant; (4) failed take steps reasonably diligently comply order. id.; see FTC v. Trudeau F.3d (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Prima Tek II, LLC Klerk’s Plastic Indus., B.V. F.3d (7th Cir. 2008). take elements turn.
22 13 3801 14 1682 court’s original order was unambiguous. The made clear that it was imposing sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 explicitly commanded appellants to pay within days. Appellants try to evade it arguing that they thought order was for a money judgment. But was neither private nor public litigation attor neys. What at stake power to govern bar. As section (and matter U.S.C. § 1651) re flect, courts authority, through contempt proceed ings, to sanction attorneys to enforce orders. Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig , F.3d (7th Cir. 1997) (“Use contempt power is an appropriate way to enforce a sanction misconduct, which is an ordinary money judgment.”); Alpern Lieb F.3d (7th Cir. 1993) (“[Rule 11] directs imposition un professional conduct in litigation, while form sanction is often here order pay attorney ʹ s opponent litigation, it is still sanction, just restitution criminal is sanction even when directs payment made private person rather than government.”). money judgment de fense gets appellants nowhere.
Appellants next argue there is evidence they substantially comply order, least take reasonable diligent steps do so. This position ignores record. At show cause hearing made clear they paid anything and, when questioned about payment, never pointed any step direction. They elected instead defend ground unable pay. Inability pay indeed valid defense contempt proceedings, re Resource Tech. Corp. F.3d (7th Cir. 2010), but question whether sanc *23 23 1682 tions paid is different question why payment was made. was entitled to answer first one negative, given appellants’ admission record neither paid required amount to de ‐ fendants nor posted a supersedeas bond.
Appellants next argue even if civil contempt might been proper, was type of contempt im ‐ posed them. They urge fine imposed was criminal nature are therefore entitled a sepa rate prosecution full due process. see nothing here, however, would justify characterizing these fines criminal. Civil contempt proceedings may either coercive or remedial. See United States v. Dowell , F.3d (7th Cir. 2001). They “designed either compel contem nor into compliance with existing com pensate complainant losses sustained result of contumacy.” Id. This fine remedial. It paid defendants, see Hicks Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock , U.S. (1988), corresponded attorneys’ costs incurred defendants during course of litigating contempt motion. fact chose fine equal 10% original sanction without consulting bill ing statements does convert into fine criminal contempt. Evans City Evanston F.2d (7th Cir. 1991).
Appellants’ related argument court’s inability ‐ pay analysis abuse discretion equally unavail ing. Where “there has been effort even partial compli ance order, inability pay defense re quires showing ‘complete inability’ pay”; “had burden establishing ‘clearly, plainly unmis *24 3801 14 1682 takably ’ ‘compliance impossible .’” re Resource Tech. Corp. F.3d (citing Huber Marine Midland Bank F.3d (2d Cir. 1995)).
**********************
Appellants’ burden each these proceedings high record supports holdings meet it. Any arguments we discussed do merit separate attention. We A FFIRM der imposed against appellants No. A FFIRM No. holding appellants civil contempt imposing stated fine. Costs ap peal taxed jointly severally. F ED . R. A PP . P. 39(a).