This is an action for actual and punitive damages for slander and libel. There are three counts in the plaintiff’s second amended petition, two for slander and one for libel. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss all three counts of the petition for failure to stаte a cause of action. The trial court sustained the motion as to counts one and two and the plaintiff has appealed. The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal as premature for the reasons that count three of the second amended petition and count four of the first amended petition have not been disposed of, hence there is not a final appealable judgment.
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Unquestionably, it-is tbe general rule that for the purposes of an appeal a judgmеnt must be a final judgment and to be final the judgment must dispose of all parties and all issues in the case and failing in this respect an appeal is premature and subject to dismissal. V.A.M.S., Sec. 512.020; Supreme Court Rule 3.24; Deeds v. Foster, (Mo.) 235 S. W. (2) 262; Graham v. Bottorff, (Mo. App.)
In the first count the plaintiff alleges that a public meeting was held in one of the court rooms in the Greene County Courthouse. In the course of the meeting the defendant stated that “M. D. Light-foot was paid by private utility money to defeаt the bond issue” at a special election. Whereupon, it is alleged, the plaintiff presented a *881 complete list of contributors to campaign funds to be used against the bond issue and “read such list'to the meeting in detail and thereupon plaintiff asked if a notary public was in the crowd and one John McKinney, a then commissioned notary public within and for the County of Greene, State of Missouri, arose and at plaintiff’s instigation and suggestion, said John McKinney, a notary public, swore plaintiff under oath administered by said notary publiс that said statements were true and correct and further that ‘other than two one-dollar bills mailed anonymously years ago’ ” plaintiff was never paid one cent by anyone. After this episode it is alleged the defendant uttered the following slander: “M. D. Lightfoot is slick enough to cover it up — no sworn statement can change, the truth. I still say private utility money was used.” The basis of the claim that the language is slanderous per se is this allegation “meaning and intending to mean and being understood by those present to mean that private utility monеy was used by plaintiff in the aforesaid bond election and that the plaintiff had sworn falsely, said charge of false swearing being a crime under the law of the State of Missouri.”
The appellant contends that the language complained of imputes to him the crimе of making a false affidavit, a crime punishable by imprisonment, even though a misdemeanor, and is therefore slanderous per se. It may be conceded, if in the stated circumstances the language complained of imputes to the plaintiff the crime of making a false affidavit, that he has stated a cause of action for slander, even though there is no allegation or claim of special damages. Vaughn v. May, (Mo. App.)
In count two of the petition it is alleged, at the same meeting, the defendant said, “ ‘I have called a meeting for this room next week. Then I will make some serious charges against M. D. Lightfoot and invite him to be present as I am curious to know what he will say about them. ’ ’ ’ The meeting was held on August 9th, 1949, and, after the meeting, the plaintiff was talking to a group of persons and the defendant approached and in the presence of approximately one hundred persons said, “ ‘you аre not going to talk here you damned communist.’ ” It is then alleged that the words were defamatory and slanderous “Meaning and intending to mean and being understood by those present to mean that plaintiff was a member of the Communist Party and advocated, abetted, advisеd, taught or encouraged the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States by force or violence, a crime under the laws of the United States.” It is urged that the pleaded language and innuendoes impute to the plaintiff the crime of advocating the overthrow of the government of the United States by force (18 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2385), a felony (Mo. R. S. A., Sec. 559.400), and is, therefore, slanderous per se.
As a general rule the imputation of political principles or practices оbjectionable to the average person in the community has been recognized as defamatory and actionable per se. Annotations 51 A. L. R. 1071; 171 A. L. R. 709. “Whether language has that tendency (that is, whether it is defamatory and actionable without proof of special damages) depends, among other factors, upon the temper of the times, the current of contemporary public opinion, with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a differеnt place.” Mencher v. Chesley,
In this jurisdiction oral words imputing or charging the commission of a crime amounting to a felony are defamatory and actionable per se (Starnes v. St. Joseph Ry., L. H. & P. Co.,
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled, and, for the reasons noted, the judgment is affirmed as to count one and reversed and remanded as to count two.
The foregoing opinion by Barrett, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.