MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 30, 2004, the plaintiff, an employee of the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), filed this action against defendants Robert Graves and the DCPS. The plaintiff asserted the following claims against them: (1) violation of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601,
et seq.
(2000); (2) violation of the District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act (“DCFMLA”), D.C.Code § 32-501,
et seq.
(2003); (3) breach of contract; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint (“Compl.”) at 7-8. On August 5, 2005, the defendants requested judgment on the pleadings arguing that (1) the plaintiff failed to provide a timely and complete medical certification required by the FMLA, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Defs.’ Mot. for Judgment”) at 4-7, (2) the plaintiff had not alleged sufficiently that he is suffering from a serious health condition,
Id.,
(3) the plaintiffs DCFMLA claim is barred by the statute’s one-year statute of limitations,
Id.
at 7, (4) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs breach of contract claims,
id.
at 7-8, and (5) the defendants have absolute governmental immunity as to his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and in any event, the plaintiff has alleged no facts in his complaint that satisfy the “outrageousness” requirement necessary to establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
id.
at 8-12. On January 10, 2006,
I. Factual Background
The DCPS hired the plaintiff as an Assistant Principal for Spingarn Senior High School (“Spingarn”) in August 2001. Compl. at ¶ 4. On March 12, 2003, the plaintiff submitted an “Application of Leave,” which requested medical leave for 24 days commencing on March 13, 2003 and concluding on April 15, 2003, due to alleged “severe job related anxiety and *64 stress.” Id. ¶ 5. The plaintiffs application included a medical certification from his physician, Dr. Thomas Gay, recommending that the plaintiff not work for at least one month. Id. In response to the plaintiffs request, Robert Graves, the Principal at Spingarn, sent a letter to the plaintiff informing him that the proper procedure for requesting such leave was to complete an “Application for Leave of Absence Re: Extended Leave of Absence and the Family Leave Act,” id. ¶ 6, and Mr. Graves included a copy of this document with his response. Id. In addition to being requested to complete the application, the plaintiff was also told by Mr. Graves that he was required to submit all necessary supporting documentation along with the application and comply with the requirements of both the “Family Leave Act and the Board [of Education] Rules.” Id. Moreover, the letter from Mr. Graves noted that until the plaintiff completed the enclosed application and his request was approved, he would be placed on absent without leave status, which could lead to disciplinary actions. Id. After Mr. Grave’s issued his response, one of the school’s employees, a time keeper, notified the plaintiff that “she had not received his medical certification and [without it she] could not process [her] payroll.” Id. ¶ 7. To address this deficiency, the plaintiff allegedly delivered the medical certification to the school. Id. Nonetheless, on April 3, 2003, the plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Graves stating that he was “no longer privileged to enter the premises or grounds of Spingarn.... ” Id. ¶¶ 7-8. This letter also notified the plaintiff that all further communications by him should be directed to the Assistant Superintendent for the DCPS. Id. ¶ 8.
Following receipt of the April 3 letter, the plaintiff initiated a formal grievance procedure by submitting a grievance statement to Assistant Superintendent Lynette Adams. Id. ¶¶ 9-13. However, before the grievance process commenced, the plaintiff was notified that he should return to work on May 5, 2003. Id. ¶ 15. In response, on May 4, 2003, the plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Graves stating:
This letter is to notify you that pursuant to D.C.Code [§ ] 32-506 and District of Columbia Municipal Regulations Title 1600 — the Family Medical Leave Act — I will be away from my job as Assistant Principal at Spingarn High School for a period of sixteen (16) weeks or less depending upon the advise of my medical doctor. This is also to notify you that the original “Application for Leave” I submitted on March 14, 2003 is now being converted to absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Therefore, my Medical Leave remedies are retroactive to March 14, 2003. In accordance with the Act, I will be submitting to you a medical certificate issued by my health care provider as soon as practicable. I have an appointment with my doctor scheduled for Monday, May 5, 2003.
Id. ¶ 16.
In a letter dated May 7, 2003, the plaintiff was informed that his employment had been terminated. Id. ¶ 18. In a separate letter, the plaintiff was informed that he could continue to pursue his informal grievance through the Council of School Officers (“CSO”), as it is the exclusive representative of assistant principals. Id. Dissatisfied with the processing of his informal grievance, and believing that it had not been fully resolved, the plaintiff resubmitted his grievance to the Superintendent for the DCPS. Id. ¶ 19. When the plaintiff did not receive a response from the Superintendent, he filed an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Counsel (“EEOC”) for the DCPS. Id. The EEOC failed to timely investigate the plaintiffs allegations within the re *65 quired statutory time period, and, the plaintiff then filed a complaint with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights. (“DCOHR”). Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
The parties thereafter attempted to resolve the dispute without success. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Thus, the plaintiff withdrew the administrative complaint he had filed with the DCOHR and filed his judicial complaint with this Court. Id. ¶ 35. The plaintiff noted in his complaint filed with the Court that he received a “Certificate of Disability” from his physician on May 20, 2003, which stated that he could not return to work until June 15, 2003. Id. ¶ 17. However, the plaintiff acknowledged that he never submitted the certificate to his employer. Id.
As indicated, on January 10, 2006, this Court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, No. 04-1280(RBW) (“Jan. 10, 2006 Mem. Op.”). Currently before the Court is the Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment. 2 Included with the plaintiffs motion are two physician disability certificates, one dated March 14, 2003, which was referenced in the plaintiffs complaint, Compl. ¶ 5, and one dated April 15, 2003, which was not referenced in the complaint. And submitted with his Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment are two additional physician disability certificates, one dated May 5, 2003, which was not referenced in the complaint, and one dated May 20, 2003, which was referenced in the complaint. Id. ¶ 17. However, the only physician disability certificate the plaintiff stated in his complaint was submitted to the DCPS was the March 14, 2003 certificate. Id. ¶ 5. It appears that the plaintiff is now seeking to amend his complaint by making all of the physician disability eer-tificates part of the complaint, which in this amended posture the plaintiff seemingly contends would have precluded this Court from entering judgment for the defendants on the pleadings and therefore he is entitled to relief from the judgment.
II. Standard of Review
Motions for reconsideration are governed by either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b).
See Anyanwutaku v. Moore,
III. Legal Analysis
The plaintiff contends that this Court should reconsider its judgment entered on January 10, 2006, because he was treated *66 twice by his healthcare provider during the original period of incapacitation and these treatments trigger the protection provided by the FMLA. Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the additional medical certificates submitted with his motion for relief from the Court’s judgment present “previously undisclosed fact[s] so central to the litigation that [they] show the initial judgment to have been manifestly unjust [and therefore] reconsideration under [R]ule 60(b) is proper even though the failure to present that information was inexcusable.” Pl.’s Reply at 4-5. In opposition, the defendants respond that (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff, Def.’s Opp’n at 2, (2) the Court should deny the motion because the plaintiff may not now amend his complaint, Id. at 2-3, and (3) Rule 60(b) does not authorize relief from the judgment under the circumstances of this case, Id. at 3-4. Upon review of the pleadings and supporting memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the plaintiffs motion for relief from the judgment must be denied for several reasons.
A. Plaintiff’s Request for Relief Under Rule 59(e)
“Once a final judgment has been entered, a court cannot permit amendment of the complaint under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless the plaintiff ‘first satisfies Rule 59(e)’s more stringent standard for setting aside that judgment.’ ”
Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls.,
As noted above, Rule 59(e) requires that a motion to alter or amend a judgment be “filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). In computing the time for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), the day the judgment was entered is excluded while the day the motion was filed is included in the calculation. Fed. R.Civ.P. 6(a)
3
;
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton,
B. Plaintiff’s Request for Relief Under Rule 60(b)
Having filed his motion for reconsideration more than ten days after entry of the judgment, the relief the plaintiff is seeking must be considered under Rule 60(b).
4
See Butler v. Pearson,
(1) [MJistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Id. The only two subsections of Rule 60(b) that appear applicable in this situation are subsections (b)(2) and (b)(6). 5
*68 1. Rule 60(b)(2)
The plaintiff has failed to establish that under subsection (b)(2) the additional medical certificates submitted with his motion for relief from the judgment are “newly discovered evidence” that could not have been discovered through “reasonable diligence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). In order to receive relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(2), the movant must demonstrate that “(1) the newly discovered evidence [is] of facts that existed at the time of trial or other dispositive proceeding, (2) the [party seeking relief] must have been justifiably ignorant of [the evidence] despite due diligence, (3) the evidence must be admissible and of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome, and (4) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.”
U.S. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Under the first prong of this four part test, “evidence cannot be newly discovered if it was known to the party at the time of trial.”
Lans v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
Under the second prong of the Rule 60(b)(2) test, the plaintiff “must demonstrate to the Court that the failure to produce the [medical certificates] did not result from a lack of diligence on his part,
*69
and that the evidence could not by the exercise of [reasonable] diligence have been discovered in time to present it in the original proceeding.”
Lans,
The moving party must also show that the proffered evidence is “admissible and of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome.”
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Although there is a line of authority that appears to allow relief from a judgment based on newly discovered evidence in the absence of due diligence, the reasoning in these cases is inapplicable here, and in any event, is not a basis for granting the plaintiff relief under subsection 60(b)(2). In
Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit granted a new trial where the evidence offered as grounds for relief appeared conclusive and proved that the basis for the underlying judgment had been previously satisfied.
Finally, the medical certificates included with the plaintiffs motion are not cumulative or merely relevant for impeachment and therefore satisfy the final prong of the Rule 60(b)(2) test. However, the Court having found that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the three other necessary elements required by Rule 60(b)(2), the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under this subsection of the Rule.
2. Rule 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6), the “catch-all provision” of Rule 60(b), “gives [this Court] broad latitude to relieve a party from a judgment for ‘any other reason justifying relief from the operation of a judgment’ ” not specified in the five preceding subsections.
Richardson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
In
Government Financial Services One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, Inc.,
Here, the plaintiff has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances that bring this case within the scope of Rule 60(b)(6). This conclusion is called for because the plaintiff merely presents evidence that is conceivably helpful to his cause that he knew about when his complaint was filed and when this matter was before this Court on the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Since the plaintiff was aware of the existence of the medical certificates and was in possession of one of them throughout the course of this litigation, he is unable to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Legal authority has made the fault/no fault distinction the controlling factor in determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist. 12 Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.48[3][b] (3d ed. 2007) (“[C]ases seem to make [the] fault/no fault distinction the controlling factor in determining whether extraordinary circumstances will be found or not.”) This is so because the “primary requirement” of Rule 60(b)(6) is a showing of “justification for relief from the judgment.”
Harjo v. Andrus,
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief from this Court’s January 10, 2006 judgment on the pleadings under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Court is compelled to conclude that the Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment must be DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The following papers have been submitted to the Court in connection with the plaintiffs motions: (1) the Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration ("Def.'s Opp'n”); and (2) the Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Opposition Motion (“Pl.’s Reply”).
. The only claim pled in his complaint for which the plaintiff appears to be seeking relief is his FMLA claim, as this is the only claim addressed in his current motion.
. The filing date is not included in the last day for the filing of the motion if it was on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday or the clerk’s office was inaccessible on that day due to inclement weather or other conditions. Id.
. On February 7, 2006, the plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal indicating that he was appealing this Court’s January 10, 2006 judgment. Subsequently, on March 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed his Motion for Relief from Judgment with this Court. In a situation like this, "the filing of a notice of appeal 'confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’ ”
Piper
v.
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice,
. The plaintiff alludes to subsection 60(b)(1) as a basis for granting his requested relief, but fails to present anything that supports relief being granted under this provision of the Rule.
See
Pl.'s Mot. for Relief at 2. In any
*68
event, subsection (b)(1) has no applicability in this situation because the plaintiffs failure to give the medical certificates to his attorney does not qualify as "inadvertence” under Rule 60(b)(1).
See Bershad v. McDonough,