220 U.S. 523 | SCOTUS | 1911
LIGHT
v.
UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of United States.
*527 Mr. James H. Teller, with whom Mr. John T. Barnett, Attorney General of Colorado, Mr. Henry M. Teller, Mr. C.S. Thomas, Mr. E.C. Stimson, Mr. Milton Smith, Mr. H.A. Hicks and Mr. Ralph McCrillis were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Ernest Knaebel for the United States.
*534 MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant was enjoined from pasturing his cattle on the Holy Cross Forest Reserve, because he had refused to comply with the regulations adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture, under the authority conferred by the act of June 4, 1897, (30 Stat. 35), to make rules and regulations as to the use, occupancy and preservation of forests. The validity of the rule is attacked on the ground that Congress could not delegate to the Secretary legislative power. We need not discuss that question in view of the opinion in United States v. Grimaud, just decided, ante, p. 506.
*535 The bill alleged, and there was evidence to support the finding, that the defendant, with the expectation and intention that they would do so, turned his cattle out at a time and place which made it certain that they would leave the open public lands and go at once to the Reserve, where there was good water and fine pasturage. When notified to remove the cattle, he declined to do so and threatened to resist if they should be driven off by a forest officer. He justified this position on the ground that the statute of Colorado provided that a landowner could not recover damages for trespass by animals unless the property was enclosed with a fence of designated size and material. Regardless of any conflict in the testimony, the defendant claims that unless the Government put a fence around the Reserve it had no remedy, either at law or in equity, nor could he be required to prevent his cattle straying upon the Reserve from the open public land on which he had a right to turn them loose.
At common law the owner was required to confine his live stock, or else was held liable for any damage done by them upon the land of third persons. That law was not adapted to the situation of those States where there were great plains and vast tracts of unenclosed land, suitable for pasture. And so, without passing a statute, or taking any affirmative action on the subject, the United States suffered its public domain to be used for such purposes. There thus grew up a sort of implied license that these lands, thus left open, might be used so long as the Government did not cancel its tacit consent. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 326. Its failure to object, however, did not confer any vested right on the complainant, nor did it deprive the United States of the power of recalling any implied license under which the land had been used for private purposes. Steele v. United States, 113 U.S. 130; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 513.
It is contended, however, that Congress cannot constitutionally *536 withdraw large bodies of land from settlement without the consent of the State where it is located; and it is then argued that the act of 1891 providing for the establishment of reservations was void, so that what is nominally a Reserve is, in law, to be treated as open and unenclosed land, as to which there still exists the implied license that it may be used for grazing purposes. But "the Nation is an owner, and has made Congress the principal agent to dispose of its property." . . . "Congress is the body to which is given the power to determine the conditions upon which the public lands shall be disposed of." Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 126. "The Government has with respect to its own land the rights of an ordinary proprietor to maintain its possession and prosecute trespassers. It may deal with such lands precisely as an ordinary individual may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from sale." Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 524. And if it may withhold from sale and settlement it may also as an owner object to its property being used for grazing purposes, for "the Government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power to protect the public domain from trespass and unlawful appropriation." United States v. Beebee, 127 U.S. 342.
The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land it can do so indefinitely, Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 243. It is true that the "United States do not and cannot hold property as a monarch may for private or personal purposes." Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 158. But that does not lead to the conclusion that it is without the rights incident to ownership, for the Constitution declares, § 3, Art. IV, that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or the property belonging to the United States." "The full scope of this *537 paragraph has never been definitely settled. Primarily, at least, it is a grant of power to the United States of control over its property." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 89.
"All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country." United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine. The courts cannot compel it to set aside the lands for settlement; or to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing purposes; nor interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress establishes a forest reserve for what it decides to be national and public purposes. In the same way and in the exercise of the same trust it may disestablish a reserve, and devote the property to some other national and public purpose. These are rights incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property belonging to it. Even a private owner would be entitled to protection against willful trespasses, and statutes providing that damage done by animals cannot be recovered, unless the land had been enclosed with a fence of the size and material required, do not give permission to the owner of cattle to use his neighbor's land as a pasture. They are intended to condone trespasses by straying cattle; they have no application to cases where they are driven upon unfenced land in order that they may feed there. Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81; Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Montana, 316; St. Louis Cattle Co. v. Vaught, 1 Tex. App. 388; The Union Pacific v. Rollins, 5 Kansas, 165, 176.
Fence laws do not authorize wanton and willful trespass, nor do they afford immunity to those who, in disregard of property rights, turn loose their cattle under circumstances showing that they were intended to graze upon the lands of another.
This the defendant did, under circumstances equivalent to driving his cattle upon the forest reserve. He could *538 have obtained a permit for reasonable pasturage. He not only declined to apply for such license, but there is evidence that he threatened to resist efforts to have his cattle removed from the Reserve, and in his answer he declares that he will continue to turn out his cattle, and contends that if they go upon the Reserve the Government has no remedy at law or in equity. This claim answers itself.
It appears that the defendant turned out his cattle under circumstances which showed that he expected and intended that they would go upon the Reserve to graze thereon. Under the facts the court properly granted an injunction. The judgment was right on the merits, wholly regardless of the question as to whether the Government had enclosed its property.
This makes it unnecessary to consider how far the United States is required to fence its property, or the other constitutional questions involved. For, as said in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 "where cases in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without important reasons." The decree is therefore
Affirmed.
