Liggett v. KimballLiggett v. Kimball
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bohling (per curiam)
“Insofar as my client, Baird Liggett, is concerned’ he is willing to accept the provisions made for him in the Will of which you have been appointed Executor. Since the death of Mrs. Liggett he has not indicated by any word or act that he intended to legally contest the Will. As for his part he accepts the 80 acres devised to him as being his part of the estate.”
The refusal to admit in evidence said Exhibit 6 was not reversible error, in view of the issues presented by the pleadings and the conceded facts. Said letter expressed Kimball‘s opinion of the legal effect of plaintiff‘s refusal to dismiss the pending suit and forecast his intention to treat further refusal as conclusive that plaintiff intended not to accept his devise under the will. Those were matters he was not authorized to determine conclusively. Moreover if that letter had been admitted, then, clearly, Prewitt‘s reply thereto should have been admitted, in which it was clearly stated that plaintiff was not contesting the will and was willing to accept the eighty acres as his full portion.
A number of cases from other jurisdictions are cited, dealing with the question of what does or does not constitute contest of a will such as to justify enforcement of a forfeiture provision. They are based on facts not analogous to the facts of the ease before us. We deem it unnecessary to review and distinguish them. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Westhues and Bohling, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by COOLEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.
William B. Dickinson and Martin B. Dickinson for respondent.
By his original petition herein, filed March 13, 1933, plaintiff claimed that on the evening of said February 28th, by agreement with the tenant, he moved household goods into the house and acquired possession, the understanding between him and the tenant being that the latter might remain in the house till she could remove her belongings; that about midnight that night defendants unlawfully and forcibly entered the premises and by threats and intimidation forced him and his wife to leave. He prayed actual and punitive damages and that defendants be enjoined from further occupying the premises and for general relief.
Defendants filed answer, denying plaintiff‘s claim of ownership, pleading the will of Mary H. Liggett, and asserting that plaintiff had contested the will, thereby forfeiting his devise and therefore had no title to the land and, consequently, no right to possession; that the title was in Kimball, as trustee for the Salvation Army, subject to a life estate in defendant Hal H. Liggett, and that Adair was in actual possession as tenant of Kimball or of him and Hal H. Liggett.
The case came to trial in December, 1934. At that time the case of Liggett v. Liggett, supra, had been tried in the circuit court, resulting in a judgment for plaintiff adjudging him to be the owner of said eighty. An appeal had been taken from that judgment, which was then undetermined. The judgment, however, was offered and admitted in evidence.
During the trial of this case plaintiff, over defendants’ objections, was permitted to file an amended petition. It was in two counts, the first being a count in ejectment, alleging ownership and right of possession in plaintiff, with the usual prayer for possession, damages, etc. The second count was in effect an action for damages as for trespass. Said second count was dismissed before the trial progressed further and need not be noticed. After unavailing motions to strike out the amended petition, for a continuance and for a stay of proceedings until the case of Liggett v. Liggett, supra, should be decided on appeal, defendants refiled their answer to plaintiff‘s original petition as their answer to the amended petition and the trial pro-
At the close of the case the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, submitting only the amount of damages, if any, the reasonable value of rents and profits from March 1, 1933, to date of trial and the monthly value of rents and profits. The jury found accordingly, and that the reasonable value of rents and profits from March 1, 1933, to date of trial was $630 and that plaintiff was therefore damaged in that sum, and that the monthly value of the rents and profits was $30.
No complaint is made on this appeal regarding the matter of damages, rents and profits, etc. That branch of the case, therefore, needs no discussion. The substantial controverted issue was and is whether plaintiff had forfeited the devise given him in his mother‘s will. If he had not forfeited he was indisputably the owner and entitled to possession of the land in controversy. That question was fully considered by us and decided in plaintiff‘s favor in Liggett v. Liggett, supra, where the facts bearing on that issue are stated, and to which reference is here made for such facts.
Appellants complain of error by the court in permitting the filing of the amended petition and refusing to strike it out on their motion. They did not stand on their objection and motion to strike, but refiled their answer to the original petition as their answer to the amended petition and proceeded with the trial. Under numerous decisions of this court we think they waived the right to have that matter reviewed on appeal. [See Scovill v. Glassner, 79 Mo. 449; Younger v. Evers, 333 Mo. 931, 936, 64 S. W. (2d) 936, 937(3) and cases cited; Dyer v. Harper, 336 Mo. 52, 59, 77 S. W. (2d) 106, 109(10), and cases cited; Grymes v. Liebke Hardwood Mill & Lumber Co., 111 Mo. App. 358, 85 S. W. 946, cited in Younger v. Evers, supra, and Dyer v. Harper, supra.]
Moreover, we deem it useless to discuss this and several other alleged errors urged in defendants’ brief. They could affect only the ultimate question of plaintiff‘s ownership of the land in dispute. That issue is conclusively determined by our decision in Liggett v. Liggett, supra. The judgment is affirmed. Westhues and Bohling, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by COOLEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.