[¶ 1.] Plаintiff Jodee L. Liffengren (Lif-fengren) appeals the circuit court’s summary judgment to Defendant Jeffrey L. Bendt, M.D. ( Bendt) on the basis of the running of the statute of limitation pursuant to SDCL 15-2-14.1. We affirm.
*630 FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] On September 28, 1994, in Rapid City, South Dakota, Liffengren underwent a laparoscopy 1 by Bendt, a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist for thе removal of a cyst,on her left fallopian tube. Liffengren had a history of multiple ovarian cysts, which had required other surgical procedures, all performed by Bendt at his clinic. After the laparoscopy, Liffengren began experiencing persistent pain in her right lower abdomen. Bendt admitted her to Rapid City Regional Hospital on October 7, 1994 when she began experiencing “sudden, severe, and sharp pain” in her abdomen. • Bendt consulted Dr. A.R. Ya-mada, a physician specializing in 'urology, concerning the treatment of Liffengren.
[¶ 3.] Bendt performed complete blood work tests on Liffengren, as well as an IVP test, which invоlves the use of dye to determine if there is a leak in the bladder or ureter. 2 The IVP test confirmed that Liffengren had a small pinhole puncture in her right ureter, which apparently allowed a small amount of , urine to leak into her peritoneal cavity. 3 Yamada made the decision to place a stent, оr small straw, in Liffengren’s ureter to heal the small pinhole. This procedure relieved her pain and she was discharged from the hospital on October 10, 1994. Liffengren’s discharge summary was completed by Yama-da.
' [¶ 4.] On October 17, 1994, Liffengren went to Bendt’s, clinic for the purpose of receiving a Depo Provera birth control shot. Bendt did not personally administer the shot to Liffengren. She had no other contact with Bendt or his office after October 17, 1994. Liffengren returned to Ya-mada’s office on November 11, 1994, for the removal of the stent, and continued to see him until January 19, 1995. Liffen-gren obtained the services of another gynecologist, Dr. Randell Bauman, in January of 1995.
[¶ 5.] On October 28, 1996, Liffengren served Bendt with a summons and complaint concerning her condition resulting from the laparoscopy, alleging medical malpractice. On November 7, 1996, Bendt moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of limitation in SDCL 15-2-14.1 expired. ' Liffengren contested the motion, arguing the continuing treatment exception tolls the two-year statute of limitation and claiming it was not until January of 1995 that she retained the services of Bauman to replace Bendt. The circuit court ruled on January 28,1998 that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the start of the running of the statute of limitation.
[¶ 6.] On September 16, 1999, Bendt renewed his motion for summary judgment on the basis there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the expiration of the statute of limitation, based on this Court’s “continuing treatment” decisions of
Bruske v. Hille,
[¶ 7.] Liffengren now appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration:
Whether the circuit court erred in granting summáry judgment to Bendt.
*631 STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 8.] Our standard of review for a circuit court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment was recently restated in Hart v. Miller:
Summary judgment is authorized “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that thе moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” SDCL 15 — 6—56(c). We will affirm only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the legal questions have been correctly decided. Bego v. Gordon,407 N.W.2d 801 , 804 (S.D.1987). All reasonable inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Morgan v. Baldwin,450 N.W.2d 783 , 785 (S.D.1990). The burden is on the moving party to clearly show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co.,83 S.D. 207 , 212,157 N.W.2d 19 , 21 (1968).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 9.] Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Bendt.
[¶ 10.] Liffengren claims the alleged malpractice occurred on September 28, 1994, the date Bendt performed the laparoscopy and purportedly punctured her ureter. Thus, pursuant to SDCL 15-2-14.1, the statute of limitation would have run by Sеptember 28,1996:
An action against á physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, sanitarium, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, chiropractor, or other practitioner of the healing arts for malpractice, error, mistake or failing to cure, whether based upon contract or tort, can be cоmmenced only within two years after -the alleged malpractice, error; mistake or failure to cure shall have occurred[.]
This statute of limitation is an “occurrence rule,” and it begins to run when the alleged negligent act occurs, rather than when it is discovered.
Beckel,
[¶ 11.-] Liffengren argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when the doctor/patient relationship with Bendt ended, thus, this issue should be decided by а jury. She claims that she continued to rely upon Bendt and upon his recommendation of Yamada’s services, and that her relationship with Bendt and Yamada did not end until she obtained the services of another gynecologist in January 1995. Essentially, Liffengren is attempting to bootstrap her November, 1994 and January 1995 visits, with Yamada tо her prior treatment by Bendt.
[¶ 12.] Bendt responds that after Liffen-gren’s release from the hospital on October 10, 1994, he did not treat her again for any purpose related to her laparoscopy. At most, he claims the last time Liffengren had contact, with his office was for the Depo-Provera shot, which was unrelated to her laparoscopy. Thus, at the latest, *632 the doctor/patient relationship between Bendt and Liffengren ended on October 17, 1994. For this reason, Bendt argues since Liffengren served her summons and complaint on October 28, 1996, the statute of limitation for filing medical malpractice claims had already run. We agree with Bendt.
[¶ 13.] This Court has recognized the “continuing treatment” rule or exception to toll the running of the statute of limitation in medical malpractice actions.
See id.
¶ 10 (citing
Wells v. Billars,
In the area of medical malpractice ... this court has carved an exception to the statute of limitation[ ]. This exceрtion prevents the statute of limitatio&s clock from ticking when the alleged harm is the result of a continuing tort. See [Wells,391 N.W.2d 668 ]; [Alberts,299 N.W.2d 454 ], In Wells, the court tolled the statute of limitation[ ] for torts arising out of a physician’s “continuing treatment” until the doctor-patient relationship ended. [Wells,391 N.W.2d at 673 .] The rationale behind this doctrine was to prevent the refusal to seek or administer health care due to pending litigation when treatment may be desperately needed. [Id. at 672.]
[¶ 14.] For the purpose of her claim of alleged malpractice stemming from the laparoscopy, there is no question the doctor/patient relationship between Bendt and Liffengren ended on October 10, 1994. Continuous treatment for purposes of the exception must consist of treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries.
Borgia v. City of New York,
[¶ 15.] Even if Bendt had continued to medically treat Liffengren after her surgery, her cause of action would still turn on the nature of the condition for which she was being treated, not a general patient-physician relationship. Continuous treatment is not held to be synonymous with the continuing patient-physician relationship.
Atha v. Polsky,
Continuous treatment ... embodies the treatment for that condition out of which the negligence is alleged to have arisen, continuing after the negligent act rather than the continuation of the general patient-physician relationship. While the termination of the treatment can be the time of accrual where there is no affirmative act of negligence and the injury results from the course of treatment, the general rule is thаt the statutory period is not postponed when there is a specific act of negligence even though the physician continues to treat *633 the patient as long as the condition is not aggravated by it.
Id.
(emphasis in original). “A continuing relationship is ‘not sporadic but developing and involves a continuity of the professional services from which the alleged malpractice stems.’ ”
Bruske,
[¶ 16.] This action does not come within the continuing treatment exception. Bendt performed the single procedure of the laparoscopy. When Liffengren began to feel pain and discomfort after the procedure, she went back to Bendt who immediately recognized the problem and consulted Yamada, a urologist. After Yamada placed the stent in Liffengren’s ureter, her condition was corrected, and she was discharged from the hospital on October 10, 1994. She did not sеe Bendt again after her discharge, thus no doctor-patient relationship continued because she never returned to him for further treatment of this condition. Bendt indicated in his affidavit that the October 7-10 hospitalization was “the last time [he] personally provided medical care to [Liffengren].” Further, Bendt stated “[t]he date of October 17, 1994, [was] the last time that anyone connected with my medical practice provided any care and treatment to [Liffengren].”
[¶ 17.] In the alternative, Liffengren insists that “[her] relationship with Bendt in conjunction with his consultation of Dr. Andrew Yamada was an ongoing, continuous, developing and depеndent relationship which existed in relation to the damage to [her] ureter until January 19, 1995.” We do not agree. While Yamada may have continued to treat her after release from the hospital, that “continued treatment” cannot toll the statute of limitation with respect to her malpractice claim against Bendt. The purpose of the continuous treatment exception for purposes of tolling the statute of limitation is that the alleged continuous treatment be provided by the
same
physician or clinic.
See Florio v. Cook,
[¶ 18.] In Florio, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against a physician after a laminectomy for removal of a spinal cord tumor. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s referral to her own physician for further observation and treatment after the surgery invoked the continuous treatment exception, thus preventing the running of the statute of limi *634 tation. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument, concluding that:
[n]o material question of fact is raised by this contention. In open court on oral argument, [plaintiff] conceded that [defendant] could have done no more — if he did — than request the family physician to give such care and treatment as was warranted by the circumstances and that there was no master-servant or principal-agent relationship between the two physicians.
Florio,
[¶ 19.] Similarly, in this case, there is no evidence there was a master-servant relationship or principal-agent relationship between Bendt and Yamada. Liffengren stated in her affidavit that after Yamada plaсed the stent in her ureter, “[she] was then discharged from the hospital on October 10, 1994 and returned to Yamada’s office on November 11, 1994, for the removal of the st[e]nt. [She] then continued [to see] Yamada on a regular basis for checkups until [her] last appointment with him on January 19, 1995.” Thus, it is apparent the only contаct Liffengren had with a physician for follow-up care after Yamada’s procedure, was with Yamada. The record is uncontroverted that once Liffengren left the hospital, Bendt had nothing more to do with her treatment, either by consultation with Yamada or otherwise.
See Langner v. Simpson,
[¶ 20.] No genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the expiration of the statute of limitation against Bendt. The continuing treatment doctrine cannot operate to extend the statute of limitation period beyond two years from October 10, 1994. As is evident from the record, Bendt’s treatment and care of Liffengren ended when she was discharged from the hospital, and began seeing Yamada for follow-up care after his surgery. Bendt did not treat Liffengren for the injury associated with her laparoscopy after October 10, 1994. There is no evidence that Bendt monitored or relied upon Yamada’s treatment of Liffengren after Yamada’s discharge оf her. The evidence in this case is that Liffengren relied upon Yamada, not Bendt, after her release from the hospital. She was discharged pursuant to Yamada’s order. As such, the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Bendt is affirmed.
Notes
. Laparoscopic surgery' involves the use of instruments inserted through small incisions in the abdomen. This procedure does not involve opening the abdomen to remove the cystic mass.
. The ureter is the fibromuscular tube which conveys urine from the kidney to the bladder. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary 1676 (25th ed.1974).
. The peritoneum is the membrane lining, the abdominal and pelvic walls. It fоrms a covering for many organs, including the colon, upper end of the rectum, uterus, and ovaries. The peritoneum also partially covers the posterior wall of the bladder. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary 1168 (25th ed.1974).
.Dr. Bendt filed his initial motion for summary judgment on November 7, 1996. It was denied by'the circuit court on January 28, 1997. Subsequently, we handed down two continuing treatment cases, Bruske on August 20, 1997, and Beckel on May 20, 1998.