293 Mass. 90 | Mass. | 1935
These four actions of tort were heard together. They arise out of a collision of automobiles. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant in each case.
It appeared that the occupation of one of the jurors who heard the cases was set forth on the list of jurors furnished counsel for the plaintiffs by the clerk of the court, and upon the ballot required by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 234, § 25, as a "merchant,” although at the time he served on these cases he was in fact an agent of two life insurance companies, and had been listed for a long time previously as such an agent in certain public directories. Each plaintiff duly filed a motion for a new trial, together with an affidavit in support thereof, identical in each case. The grounds upon which each motion was based in substance were that the verdict was against the evidence and the weight of the evidence; that the verdict was against the law applicable to the case; that there was an irregularity in the impanelling of one of the jurors who sat in the case, in that his occupation was erroneously described; that the plaintiff’s counsel relied upon and believed the statement of his occupation to be true, and for that reason did not challenge this juror when his name was drawn to serve on the panel; that subsequent to the return of a verdict for the defendant in each case the plaintiff first learned that this juror was in the insurance business, and was listed as such agent in certain directories; that the occupation of the juror designated on the jury list was
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 234, § 32, provides as follows: “No irregularity in a writ of venire facias or in the drawing, summoning, returning or impanelling of jurors shall be sufficient to set aside a verdict, unless the objecting party has been injured thereby or unless the objection was made before the verdict.” This statute is applicable to the present case. No objection was made to the drawing, summoning, returning or impanelling of the juror in question before the verdict. There was no error in the name of said juror as it appeared on the ballot; his residence was there given as Quincy, and his occupation as merchant. So far as appears it was correct. If the plaintiffs were not satis
The plaintiffs cite the case of Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 203 Mass. 493. The facts in that case are plainly distinguishable from those appearing in the present case.
As the motions for a new trial were addressed to the discretion of the trial judge no error of law appears in their denial. Manning v. Boston Elevated Railway, 187 Mass. 496, 499.
Exceptions overruled.