This is a petition for writ of certiorari in which petitioner seeks review of an order by the Broward Circuit Court, acting in its appellate capacity, affirming a final and amended final judgment against petitioner for $3,531.43 in a lien action under the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act. We deny the petition.
Petitioner had his car, which had been damaged in an accident, brought to respondent for repair. He gave respondent two repair estimates prepared by his insurance company. Petitioner claims that he orally agreed with respondent to a price of repair below the prices indicated in the estimates. Respondent, however, contends that the agreement was for a price based on the estimates, reduced only by petitioner’s insurance policy deductible. No written estimate was prepared by petitioner, and the work was performed. The parties were then unable to agree as to the amount due.
After posting a cash bond in court, petitioner got his car back from the respondent, who sued him to recover the bond. Petitioner counterclaimed for damages for the additional auto rental bills he incurred. After a non-jury trial, the county court entered a final judgment against petitioner.
Section 559.905, Florida Statutes (1985), requires a repair shop to prepare a written estimate prior to performing repair work which will exceed $50.00. This section defines the estimate as a form setting forth the estimated cost of repair work, and provides that the estimate may be waived in writing. Section 559.919, Florida Statutes, provides that no repair shop may refuse to return a customer’s car or enforce its lien if it has “failed to substantially comply with the provisions of ss. 559.901-559.923.”
The question then becomes whether a repair shop is entitled to recover for repairs made according to a written estimate in substantial conformance with this Act’s requirements, to which the car owner agreed, even though the estimate was prepared by a third party, namely an insurance company in this instance. Although the statutes do not speak to this situation, we see nothing which precludes it. The record supports the county court’s conclusion that there was “substantial compliance” by respondent with the requirements of this Act, and petitioner has failed to show how the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in affirming the judgment entered on this basis.
Both sides cite to Osteen v. Morris,
It is settled that in statutory construction, legislative intent is the polestar by which the courts must be guided, and that no literal interpretation should be given which leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous construction or purpose not designated by the legislature. State v. Miller,
CERTIORARI DENIED.
