Lidge v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical CenterLidge v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs, individually and as administrators of the estate of their son, Tamir Victor Lidge (decedent), commenced this negligence and medical malpractice action against defendants to recover damages for the premature birth and subsequent death of decedent.
During the course of the litigation, disputes arose over discovery matters, and Supreme Court issued three discovery orders. Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in failing to enforce those orders and in impermissibly reconsidering previously issued orders. We reject that contention. “[E]very court retains continuing jurisdiction to reconsider its prior interlocutory orders during the pendency of the action” (Liss v Trans Auto Sys.,
We further conclude that the court properly precluded testimony from plaintiffs’ expert that exceeded the scope of the expert disclosure inasmuch as defendants established that they were prejudiced by plaintiffs’ failure to include alleged theories of negligence in the expert disclosure (see Conroe v Barmore-Sellstrom, Inc.,
At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the hospital moved to dismiss the complaint against it and defendant John L. DeFazio, M.D. moved to dismiss the individual cause of action of Cynthia Lidge (plaintiff) against him. The court properly granted both motions. Plaintiffs’ expert did not testify that any hospital personnel deviated from an applicable standard of care. The expert also failed to establish any basis of liability by DeFazio to plaintiff individually. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the testimony of plaintiff and her husband that one hospital physician erred in using an incorrectly sized mask on decedent during resuscitation efforts was insufficient to establish the
Finally, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a mistrial inasmuch as two fleeting references to precluded evidence did not create a “ ‘substantial possibility of injustice’ ” (Everding v Bombard,