398 Pa. 415 | Pa. | 1959
Opinion by
The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission condemned and entered upon certain property of Morris Edwin Lichtenstein, the plaintiff, in Towamencin Township, in Montgomery County, for use in the construction of the Delaware Diver Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. In due course, Lichtenstein petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for the appointment of viewers for the ascertainment and determination of the damages due him for the Commission’s appropriation of his property. The viewers filed their report on June 24, 1958. Therein they awarded the plaintiff damages in the sum of $84,800. No exceptions were filed to the viewers’ report nor was an appeal taken from their award which automatically became final.
On September 19, 1958, almost three months after the final award (Lichtenstein having made numerous demands for payment in the interim), the Commission tendered him a check for $84,800 which he refused to accept because the sum did not include interest from the date of the viewers’ award. The Commission persisted in refusing to pay interest on the award and a few days later petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County to order Lichtenstein to satisfy the award of record upon the Commission’s paying to him the sum of $84,800. The court granted a rule on the Commission’s petition calling upon Lichtenstein to show cause why satisfaction of the award should not be entered, as prayed for in the Commission’s petition. After argument, the Court discharged the rule and ordered the Commission to pay interest on the award at
The Act of April 25, 1929, P. L. 777, No. 328, Section 1, as amended by the Act of March 26, 1931, P. L. 10, No. 7, Section 1, 26 PS §43, provides that “The amount of damages allowed in a report of viewers for the taking, injury or destruction of property by the exercise of the right of eminent domain shall, as finally confirmed, bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the report.”
It has been held that the foregoing statutory provision was not intended to bind the Commonwealth. In Culver v. Commonwealth, 348 Pa. 472, 474-475, 35 A. 2d 64, after noting that “The learned court below was of the opinion that the Act of April 25, 1929, P. L. 777, as amended by the Act of March 26, 1931, P. L. 10, has obligated the Commonwealth to pay interest under the facts of this case — this being an eminent domain proceeding”, this Court then said that “A reading of this statute reveals that this was error. In Tunison v. Commonwealth, supra [347 Pa. 76, 31 A. 2d 521], we said (p. 78) : ‘. . . it is axiomatic that a statute is never presumed to deprive the state of any prerogative, right or property unless the intention to do so is clearly manifest, either by express terms or necessary implication. Baker et al. v. Kirschnek et al., 317 Pa. 225; Commonwealth v. Trunk et al., 320 Pa. 270; see 59 C. J. 1103, §653.’ The Act of 1929, as amended, does not specifically mention the Commonwealth nor does it indicate any intendment on the part of the legislature to deprive the State of its nonliability for the payment of interest on its obligations.”
The appellant relies on the ruling in Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Smith, 350 Pa. 355, 363, 39 A. 2d 139, where this court affirmed the modification
Nothing could be clearer than that claims against the Turnpike Commission are not chargeable to the Commonwealth. Yet, the above quoted statement from the Smith case plainly implies that the liabilities of the Turnpike Commission do not bear interest because the Commission is, in effect, the alter ego of the Commonwealth which is not liable for interest. This conclusion was reasoned from the fact that the Act of May 21, 1937, P. L. 774, No. 211, 36 PS §652a et seq., which created the Turnpike Commission, constituted it “an instrumentality of the Commonwealth,” performing “an essential governmental function of the Commonwealth.” But, equally so is every legislatively ordained municipal corporation, school district or po
In the Culver case, supra, it was said that to make the Commonwealth liable for interest, the legislature would expressly have to so declare, the rationale being that, without such legislative declaration, the Commonwealth is free from liability for interest because of its sovereign immunity. But, it would be carrying this particular immunity beyond justifiable limits to extend it to an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, created for the performance of an essential governmental function, where liability for the principal sum involved resulted from the appropriation by the instrumentality, under its power of eminent domain, of private property for use in the furtherance of the public purpose for which the instrumentality was created. Indeed, it
Judgment affirmed.