MEMORANDUM
On Junе 12, 2009, Plaintiffs Cynthia Libonati, Victoria Witte, and Dorothy Sack
I. Factual Background
Decedent died at the age of 85 on June 5, 2009. Plaintiffs Cynthia Libonati and Victoria Witte are Decedent’s nieces. (Pis.’ Complaint, at 3.) Plaintiff Dorothy Sackerman is the widow of Decedent’s brother. (Id.) Defendant Dora Ransom is Decedent’s former neighbor, Defendant Leslie Ransom is Dora’s husband, and Defendant Katherine Sharpe is Dora’s mother (Id. at 4, 7.) All three reside in the same home. (Id. at 6.)
Prior to his death in June, Decedent was under the complete care of Dora Ransom (“Ransom”) and was living in the Ransom family home. (Id. at 6.) On December 23, 2008, Decedent executed a Durable Power of Attorney, naming Ransom as his attorney in fact. (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiffs, Decedent was suffering from a form of dementia in his final months of life. (Id. at 4.) On February 5, 2009, Decedent was admitted to the hospital and later diagnosed with a terminal illness and given a life expectancy of only three months. (Id. at 6.) By this time his mental state had deteriorated significantly and he was apparently unable to care for himself. (Id.) It was at this time that Ransom moved Dеcedent into Defendants’ home. Plaintiff's contend that throughout the time he was residing with Defendants, Decedent was confused and disoriented. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants isolated Decedent from his family and prevented him from visiting or communicating with them. (Id. at 8.)
On February 5, 2009, the same day he was admitted to the hоspital, Decedent signed a writing purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiffs, Ransom has indicated that she is the named personal representative and sole beneficiary under the purported Last Will and Testament. 1 (Id. at 9-10.) After Decedent’s death, Ransom submitted documents to Plaintiffs indicаting that pri- or to his death, she had transferred at least $350,000 of his assets to herself and designated herself the beneficiary of his transfer on death bank accounts. (Id. at 10.)
On June 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City challenging the validity of the purported Last Will and Testament. (Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, (“Defs.’ Mem.”) Ex. A at 13.) In the complaint, Plaintiffs contend that Decedent was not legally competent to execute a Will, that the execution of the Will was the product of undue influence and fraud, and that the Will lacked the requisite formalities. (Id. at 13-14.)
II. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Plaintiffs Complaint
Defendants do not dispute that the citizenship of the parties is diverse, with the amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332, et seq. Instead, they argue that this action falls within the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction. However, for the reasons stated below, the Defendants’ arguments are without merit.
A federal court “has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate.”
Markham v. Allen,
The probate exception does not prevent a federal cоurt from determining the rights of the parties; it prohibits only the administration of assets.
See Markham,
While the probate exсeption to federal subject matter jurisdiction is narrow, the jurisdiction of the Maryland Orphans’ Court is also limited. In Maryland, the Orphans’ Court is a tribunal of special limited jurisdiction and can exercise only the authority and power expressly provided to it by law.
See, e.g., DeFelice,
(a) The court may conduct judicial probate, direct the conduct of a personal representative, and pass orders which may be required in the course of the administration of an estate of a decedent. It may summon witnesses. The court may not, under pretext of incidental power or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction not expressly conferred.
(b) The court may not establish rules of practice and procedure inconsistent with the Maryland Rules or with any statute.
(c) An interested person may petition the court to resolve any question concerning an estate or its administration.
Md. Est. & Trusts Code § 2-102. Ultimately, the Orphans’ Court must be confined to the express letter of its authority.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Bruscup,
In the instant case, the Defendants argue that a dispute regarding title to property formerly titled to a decedent falls outside the scope of federal subject mattеr jurisdiction. However, as long as diversity requirements are met, federal jurisdiction over such a matter is entirely appropriate. First, Plaintiffs’ claim is distinct and separate from the probate claim filed in Orphans’ Court. There is no danger that this Court will interfere with the proceedings of the Orphans’ Court, “save tо the extent that the state court (will be) bound by the judgment to recognize” the rights adjudicated herein.
Akrotirianakis v. Burroughs,
Defendants nevertheless argue that the proceedings in this Court will interfere with probate proceedings in Orphans’ Court, on the ground that the federal claim merely restates “the same allegations” from the Orphans’ Court (Defs.’ Mem. at 2.) In their federal claim, Plaintiffs contend that Ransom abused a confidential relationship and ultimately her fiduciary obligations as Decedent’s attorney-in-fact to execute certain self serving financial transactions prior to Decedent’s death. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Ransom transferred $350,000 of Decedent’s assets to herself, and made herself the beneficiary оf his transfer on death accounts. (Mem. Supp. Pis.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
Not only are the claims distinct, the Orphans’ Court has no jurisdiction over the claims raised by Plaintiffs in this Court because it does not have jurisdiction to decide questions of title to personal property. In
DeFelice,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Orрhans’ Court had no jurisdiction to decide conflicting claims to the proceeds of the decedent’s auto insurance policy.
DeFelice, 55
Md.App. at 479,
Resolution of Plaintiffs’ claim will not require this Court
to
assume control over property within the possession of the probate court. The disputed transfer on death accounts and $350,000 in intervivos transfers are not probate assets. Plaintiffs allege that they are the proper beneficiaries of those accounts. Regardless of the decision in this Court, administration of Decedent’s estate will proceed in the Orphans’ Court unimpeded.
See, e.g., Akrotirianakis,
Kroll v. Fisher,
III. Motion to Stay Proceedings in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
In the alternative to their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants argue that this Court should stay these proceedings, pending an adjudication of the matter in Orphans’ Court. In assessing whether to stаy a federal suit due to a concurrent state proceeding, a federal court must weigh its “obligation to exercise jurisdiction” against a “combination of factors counseling against that exercise,” such as: “the inconvenience of the federal forum,” “the desirability of avoiding piecеmeal litigation,” and “the order in which jurisdiction was obtained.”
Colorado River Water Conservation v. United States,
IV. Conclusion
The probate exception does not preclude federal subject matter jurisdiction, and no factors outweigh the Court’s obligation to exercise its jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, I deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and deny Defendant’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings of this Court. A separate order to that effect is being entered herewith.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is, this 22nd day of October,
ORDERED
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint is denied;
2. Defendant’s Motion to Stay Further Proceedings is denied.
Notes
. At the time the complаint was filed, Defendants had yet to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the purported Last Will and Testament. (Id. at 6.)
. The Supreme Court recently clarified the rationale for the probate exception in
Marshall v. Marshall,
stating that it is “essentially a reiteration of the general principle that, when one court is exеrcising in
rem
jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in
rem
jurisdiction over the same res.”
Marshall
v.
Marshall,
. The comment to the predecessor statute to § 2-102 stated: "It was felt to be unnecessary to describe in detail all of the rules which the Court of Appeals of Maryland has developed in setting forth those areas in which the [Orphans’] Court does not have jurisdiction. These rules, for example, prohibit the court from exercising jurisdiction over questions of title.”
DeFelice,