179 P.2d 263 | N.M. | 1947
This is an appeal from a decree cancelling a ten year "unless" oil and gas lease, for non-compliance with the implied covenants to diligently develop and operate the lease following discovery of carbon dioxide gas (CO[2]) in paying quantities. We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court.
The plaintiff is the son-in-law of the lessor and acquired title shortly prior to the filing of this suit with knowledge of the rights of the defendants. The lease was made March 4, 1935, covering 26,000 acres in Harding County, and the only consideration was the promise of development or the annual payment of one dollar per acre as delay rental. The beginning of drilling operations was delayed beyond the sixty day period provided in the lease and there is controversy as to whether they started in 1935 or 1936, but as the lease was validated by a writing signed by de Baca December 2, 1936, the date is immaterial.
The trial court made the following findings of fact, all of which we find are sustained by substantial evidence.
To which we add the following:
a. The defendants have expended considerable sums of money, (probably in excess of $50,000) in the drilling of the two wells and have received no returns from them.
b. After December 7, 1941, it was impossible to provide materials with which to build a plant for the manufacture of dry ice.
c. That at and prior to the filing of each of the suits by de Baca the defendants had defaulted in the performance of their obligations under the lease, after demand for performance and a reasonable time therefor had expired.
We have considered the assignments of error based on the refusal of the trial court to adopt the defendants' requested findings of fact, and find that except as added by us above, they were covered by adverse findings, were immaterial or recitations of evidentiary facts.
We here reaffirm our holding in State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden,
But the duty of lessee does not end there. He must proceed with reasonable diligence, as viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent operator, having in mind his own interest as well as that of the lessor, to market the product. 2 Summers Oil Gas, Perm.Ed., § 415. The record shows that gas from the commercial well could only be marketed by the erection of a plant so that it might be converted into dry ice. No plant was even started following the final completion of this well in December, 1938. *100
The defendants urge they were unable to raise money to develop the lease because of threats of cancellation and the filing of the suits by de Baca attacking their title, and that such acts tolled the time for development. They cite many cases in support of such claims, but an examination of them shows they were based on wrongful claims and suits, and they are, therefore, not applicable here.
They also cite many cases holding that even though a lessee be in default for failure to develop under the implied covenants following discovery in paying quantities, cancellation will not be decreed where the lessor has failed to make demand for development and allowed a reasonable time therefor. In this case, however, many demands were made by de Baca for such development or payment of delay rentals, and although promises were made to comply with such demands they were not kept.
Owing to the expenditures made on the second well in which gas was found in paying quantities, we will give the answering defendants another opportunity to market the gas therein. Under the rules of the Oil Conservation Commission forty acres constitute a drilling unit, and we will direct the trial court to modify its decree and deny cancellation of the interests of such defendants in the lease on the forty acre tract on which the paying well was completed in December, 1938, on the condition that they proceed with reasonable diligence to market the gas from the well, and if there be no purchaser available that they proceed to the erection and operation of a plant to process it. Neither party will be allowed costs to date.
The decree of the District Court will be affirmed except for the modification here directed, and it is so ordered.
BICKLEY, C.J., and BRICE, LUJAN, and SADLER, JJ., concur.