Aсtion for declaratory judgment as to plaintiff’s status under a certain indemnity insurance policy issued by the defendant. Among other things, under this policy, defendant agreed to (1) indemnify plaintiff against loss imposed by lаw for damages due to an accident; (2) defend in plaintiff’s name and on his behalf any suit against plaintiff alleging such injury; (3) retained the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any claims against plaintiff. Also contained in the policy were the following provisions: (a) “When an accident occurs written notice shall be given ® '* * as soon as practicable * * (b) “No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy * #
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff, an operator of trucks and heаvy equipment, carried liability coverage, under the above mentioned policy, for accidents in connection with said equipment. On October 1, 1954, a crane, owned by plaintiff and operated by his employee, was engaged in unloading heavy pipes from a railway car for the Key City *526 Gas Company of Dubuque, Iowa. All men engaged in this work, except the crane operator, were gаs company employees. While so engaged, an employee named John Lehman caught his hand between the end of a pipe and the side of the car, sustaining the injuries complained of. Lehman was wearing gloves and, while after the injury there was some blood showing on the glove, the injury did not appear to be too serious. He was immediately taken to a medical clinic by an emрloyee of the gas company. Later that day the operator of the crane told plaintiff that one of the company men “got his hand hurt.” It is not contended by plaintiff that he at this time gave notice, either oral or written, to the defendant-company or its authorized agent. Plaintiff heard nothing further about the accident until in September 1955, when he was questioned by an attorney representing thе insurance carrier of the gas company. Plaintiff attempted to contact the local agent for defendant-company, but did not succeed until in November 1955. Early in 1956 an action for damages was commenced against plaintiff by John Lehman and the Royal Indemnity of Liverpool. In February 1956, whether before or after the damage action was commenced is not clear, the defendant notified plaintiff by letter that the delay in the giving of notice of the accident “has so prejudiced the further handling of this case and constitutes such a breach of contract that we hereby notify yоu that we have no liability under the policy and hereby return the matter to you for it no longer falls to us for attention.”
By this action, plaintiff asks the court to declare him to be entitled to the benefits of thе insurance policy which was in effect on October 1, 1954. The trial court so held and defendant appeals.
I. Appellant asserts the court erred in holding that the failure to give notice of the аccident for more than a year thereafter was excused. The policy provides, “When an accident occurs written notice shall be given * # * to the company * * *
as soon as practicable.”
(Italics ours.) This provision “аs soon as practicable” has been before this court and other courts many times. Its accepted meaning is “within a reasonable time in the light of the circumstances”, and what constitutes a rеa
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sonable time is a fact question for the jury. 45 C. J. S., Insurance, sections 982(4a), 1054; and 46 C. J. S., Insurance, section 1375; Lyon v. The Railway Passenger Assurance Co.,
The trial court based its decree upon three propositions: (1) Lack of prejudice; (2) reasonable mistake; (3) trivial occurrence. We will consider these in reverse order.
(1) Trivial occurrence. 45 C. J. S., Insurance, section 1056(a), states that, generally, delay is excusable in the case of an accident which is trivial and results in no apparent harm, or which furnishes no ground for insured, acting as a reasonable and prudent man, to believe at the time that a claim for damages will arise or that the injury is one insured against. See also 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, section 1115; Annotation, 18 A. L. R.2d 474; Glade v. General Mut. Ins. Assn.,
(2) Reasonable mistake. The general rule appears to be that insured may be excused for delay in giving the required notice “where it appears that, acting as a reasonably prudent person, he beliеved that he was not liable for the accident.”
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18 A. L. R.2d 472. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Manson, 94 N. H. 389,
(3) Lack of prejudice. Appellant contends that this being a -casе where the performance of the giving of notice was made a condition precedent, prejudice will be presumed as a matter of law. The authorities are hopelessly divided upоn the question and this court does not appear to have passed directly upon the question. However, in Glade v. General Mut. Ins. Assn.,
II. Appellant further contends thе court erred in receiving evidence as to what plaintiff and various witnesses thought about the purpose of insurance, their interpretation of the insurance, the significance of the acсident, the co-operativeness of plaintiff and the procedure of liability insurance companies in eases where a substantial third-party injury and the presence of a subrogated workmеn’s compensation insurer are known. In the argument, the above statement is divided into three divisions, each dealing with an alleged different type of testimony based upon appellant’s statement of facts, but with no attempt to point out any specific testimony that might come under any one of the three divisions. It is clearly an omnibus assignment of error as to testimony received and does not conform to rule 344, Rules of Civil Procedure. It is not considered by the court.
Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. —Affirmed.