47 Ind. App. 280 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1911
— Appellee, Eliza Leyhan, as administratrix of the estate of Timothy J. Leyhan, deceased, received $3,400 from the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company, in settlement of a claim for damages for causing the death of her husband, who was an engineer in the employ of said railway company. The administratrix filed her inventory showing the receipt of said money, and in her final settlement report took credit to herself for $3,379.50 after paying the indebtedness. Appellant, the mother of Timothy J. Leyhan, deceased, filed exceptions to such final report, in which she claimed that she was entitled to one-fourth of the fund so received by said administratrix, alleging that she was dependent upon decedent for support. Appellee filed an answer in general denial to the exceptions, the cause was submitted to the court for trial upon the issues thus formed, and the finding and judgment were in favor of appellee, approving her final report and confirming her acts as administratrix.
Appellant’s motion for a new trial, upon the grounds that the decision of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence, and that the finding and decision of the court were contrary to law, was overruled, and judgment rendered upon the finding. The only error assigned is the overruling of appellant’s motion for a new trial.
In the ease of Dillier v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (1904), 34 Ind. App. 52, the court said that the action must be brought and maintained to the end by “the personal representative of the person for whose death damages are sought. He pursues the remedy, not for the benefit of his decedent’s estate, but as a convenient trustee specially designated by the statute to recover and distribute the damages for the beneficiaries recognized as such by the statute. Of these there are
This rule is also maintained by the court in the case of Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Osgood (1905), 36 Ind. App. 34, where the court said: “The purpose of this legislation was to provide for some pecuniary compensation to be made by one person for taking the life of another, which, before this enactment, he could not have been required to make. The right to maintain the action is vested in the personal representatives of the decedent. Had the provision gone no further, the fund recovered would have been simply assets of the estate to be disposed of as other assets. The legislature, having the right to determine what disposition should be made of the fund, charged it with the express trust that it must inure to the benefit of the widow and children, if any, first, and, if no widow or children, then to the next of kin. ’ ’
In support of her contention, appellant cites, among other cases, Duzan v. Myers (1903), 30 Ind. App. 227, 96 Am. St. 341, and Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Laporte (1904), 33 Ind. App. 691. The first case named is not in conflict with the rule announced in the cases of Dillier v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., supra, and Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Osgood, supra, for in said case there were two sets of children, and the court held that all the children of the deceased father were entitled to a share in the property or in the fund which was received, because they came within the meaning of the section of the statute, and were persons of the first class.
In the case of Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Laporte, supra, no widow or children survived decedent. Those who survived
These eases do not bear out appellant’s claim, but rather determine conclusively that there are two classes provided for by said statute. The administratrix in this case, as the wife of decedent, belonged to the first class, and, as there were no children, was entitled to the damages recovered for her benefit, to the exclusion of any person of the second class. The right is wholly statutory, and the rights given thereunder can only inure to the benefit of the parties named in their order.
Other cases cited by appellant have been considered, but they are not applicable to the case here presented. The tidal court was warranted in rendering judgment for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.