On plaintiff’s exceptions to the direction of a verdict for the defendant Perlstein in the Trial Court. Therein the plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant Deveno by default. The action is trover, alleging the conversion of a motor truck owned by Deveno, which he mortgaged to the plaintiff on November 17, 1947, and sold to Morris Auto Mart on January 27, 1948, the mortgage never having been recorded. At the time of the sale there was an unpaid balance on the mortgage debt, payable at the rate of $25 per week. The sale was undoubtedly a conversion of the plaintiff’s interest in the truck.
Dean
v.
Cushman,
In testing the propriety of the directed verdict all the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Heath
v.
Jaquith,
On these facts the plaintiff asserts that Perlstein must be held to have participated in the conversion of the truck. The principle is undoubted that one who aids or assists another in the conversion of property is a party to it with the one aided or assisted.
Scott
v.
Perkins,
“by instigating, aiding or assisting *, or * knowingly benefits by its proceeds in whole or in part.”
The other authorities lay special emphasis on aiding and abetting, citing Scott v. Perkins, supra, but R. C. L. declares that liability may be grounded on advice and assistance, coupled with the acceptance of benefits, and Am. Jur. includes “conniving” with “aiding or abetting.” None of the cases cited on the point, however, holds a party on facts comparable with those in the instant case so far as they are applicable to Perlstein. The statement in Am. Jur. is that the rules concerning aiding, abetting or conniving:
“are particularly applicable where the defendant received benefit from the conversion, and subsequently approved and adopted it.”
No case has been cited to us, or come to our attention, where mere advice, even when motivated by the selfish desire to benefit by having the proceeds of a conversion applied to the payment of a debt, has been held to constitute the adviser a converter.
*227
On the facts presented we cannot be unmindful of the definiteness with which it has always been declared in this court that an unrecorded mortgage of personal property gives the mortgagee no rights against one who purchases that mortgaged property after the expiration of the recording period fixed by statute, R. S., 1944, Chap. 164, Sec. 1, even though the purchaser had knowledge of the mortgage, or against such a one who attaches it, or takes a mortgage on it (and records it).
Hayden
v.
Russell et al.,
Exceptions overruled.
