330 S.E.2d 810 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1985
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than one ounce of marijuana. We affirm.
1. Appellant asserts that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his conviction. More specifically, he cites Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456 (1) (304 SE2d 468) (1983), and Anderson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 459 (3) (304 SE2d 550) (1983), in support of his
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); OCGA § 16-13-30. See also McLeod v. State, 170 Ga. App. 415 (3) (317 SE2d 253) (1984).
2. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for severance is without merit. The grant or denial of a motion to sever is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. OCGA § 17-8-4. “The burden was on the [appellant] to show prejudice for the severance to be required. [Cit.] . . . [Appellant] has made no showing of prejudice and the denial of the motion was proper.” Whitlock v. State, 148 Ga. App. 203 (2) (251 SE2d 59) (1978).
. 3. Appellant’s final enumeration of error is the admission of testimony by one of the State’s witnesses that he saw “one or two known drug dealers” going in and out of the apartment and that he also saw appellant go in and out of the same apartment. Appellant contends that his character was placed in evidence by the testimony. Inasmuch as there was no objection to the evidence when offered, appellant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Brown v. State, 163 Ga. App. 896 (2) (296 SE2d 185) (1982). Furthermore, our review of the record reveals that the statement was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial without such an objection.
Judgment affirmed.