| N.Y. App. Div. | Jul 11, 1911
Lead Opinion
A load of baled hay consigned to plaintiff’s employer was being unloaded by the plaintiff and other workmen under his direction. After the door of the car was opened far enough two bales fell, one after the other, striking the plaintiff and injuring him.
The car was loaded by the consignor and transported by the' defendant from the station where it was loaded to the station where it was being unloaded. The plaintiff seeks to recover for the personal injuries thus sustained by him., because, as he claims, the hay was not properly loaded. It is claimed ■ that instead of standing, the bales on end, they should have been laid down' and piled one upon the other, or that there should have been cleats across the door opening or false doors so as to prevent ’the hay from resting against the door of the car.
I think actionable negligence cannot be predicated against the defendant in the way the'hay was loaded in the car. So far as there was any danger of the hay falling "from the car, the dangerous condition, as it seems to me, was created by the men in unloading. I do not ,see how it would make it any safer to pile one bale upon another, if piled as high as a bale standing on.end; nor is it clear to me how, as to the unloaders,• cleats across the opening or a false door would have made any difference, for the cleat would have had to be removed' or the door opened in order to get the hay out. Of course, the situation and danger might be more apparent to the unloaders, but it would have been apparent to the plaintiff and his men here if they had looked. The door had been opened sufficiently wide before the hay fell, so- it could be seen that the bales were standing on end and that there was no cleat or false door to
I think the judgment and order must be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
All concurred, except Spring, J., who dissented in. an opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
Each bale of hay was about four feet and two inches long, two feet wide and twenty-two inches thick, weighing a little over 200 pounds. They were placed in the car standing on end, in two tiers one on top of the other. The car was well filled, and, as testified by one witness, “there was just'.room enoiigh to shut the door; piled just so close — so we couldn’t slide the door.” And by another witness: “The hay rubbed on the door when I opened it at the top.” The door was fastened and sealed by the station agent of the defendant, but there was no inspection as to the manner of loading by him or by any one on behalf of the defendant. Nor had there been any rule promulgated by the defendant providing for a method of loading baled hay in its cars.
The car was left by the defendant on a switch track. in the yard of the consignee, and the plaintiff with a. man. named Loveland attempted to unload it. The car door stuck fast and the plaintiff put his hands against the lower part of the door, which was about four feet from the ground and up about as high as the plaintiff’s shoulders, and attempted to push it open. He succeeded in pushing the lower part along about a foot, but was unable to crowd it further. Loveland then got up in the opening partly in the car and pushed against the door, and Hammond, an employee of the defendant, took hold of the brace or handle on the other end, and the three "together moved it along. ' Loveland, evidently observing the bales "of hay adjacent to the door and leaning against it were about to fall, jumped, telling the plaintiff to “look out.” Following Loveland came one bale of hay which struck the plaintiff on the back, knocking him to the ground, and the second bale also
It is the claim of the plaintiff that the hay was improperly loaded; that there should have been a rule of the defendant prescribing the manner of loading, or at least it should ‘have been inspected by the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that it had a right to rely on the shipper of the hay to load it properly and that there was no obligation upon it to inspect or to provide any rule as to the manner of loading. I think the jury were well justified in finding that the hay was improperly loaded. There is plenty of evidence showing that the bales of hay shoifid either be placed flat in the car, or if the bales in one tier stand up the long way on top or alongside of these bales there should be a tier lying flat down to hold them in place, and this would look reasonable. It seems clear that where two bales of hay, each over four feet in height, with an uneven base of from twenty-two to twenty-four inches, are placed on top of each other paaking a pile eight feet high a very little jar would cause them to fall. If these bales were piled close to the car door and leaned very slightly against it, as soon as the door was opened inevitably they would fall out. Common sense ought to indicate that it is improper and dangerous to place these bales standing out of plumb close against the door so that it must rub against them when opened. At least two. of the witnesses on behalf of the defendant testified on cross-examination in effect thgt it was dangerous to pile bales of hay in tiers standing on end, one on top of the other.
Again, I think it was the duty of the railroad company to inspect these loaded cars before they were shipped away. It could not delegate its duty as a common carrier to the shipper of .this hay. As soon as the hay came into its custody for transportation its liability as a common carrier began (Ames v. Fargo, 114 App. Div. 667; London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 144 N.Y. 200" court="NY" date_filed="1894-12-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/l-lf-ins-co-v--r-w-orr-co-3584037?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3584037">144 N. Y. 200), and it cannot absolve itself from liability upon a claim that the shipper was liable instead of it. If that rule were 'to obtain the deféndant could be relieved from liability to a third party, or its servants, very easily.
It is claimed, also, by the defendant that the plaintiff has failed to show freedom from contributory negligence. He was standing stooped over, pushing the lower part of the door which reached to his shoulders. He was devoting his whole attention to that business, as the door was binding' so that it was difficult to push it along. Assuming, as he testified, that he noticed that the hay was standing on end, he knew nothing.about how high it was piled, nor did he realize that it was resting against the door or that he was in any danger. Even Loveland, who got up in' the car to push the door at the top, did not apprehend the danger.
The plaintiff’s conduct must be judged by that of any man. of ordinary prudence engaged in the same kind of business. One thing was occupying his attention, and that is, pushing the door: He supposed he was in a place of safety and had a
right to assume that the hay was properly loaded. ■ He certainly had no reason to expect that as soon as the door was pushed open,- which was- the only place for taking out the hay, these heavy bales would begin to topple out. I think the question of his conduct was for the jury.
There is no question before us of the weight of the evidence, and we ought. not to hold as matter of law either that the defendant was not negligent or that contributory negligence is imputable to the plaintiff.
I think the judgment should be .affirmed.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event.